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THESIS SUMMARY 
Although conventional Irish historiography has viewed French support for the Jacobite war 
effort in Ireland in the period 1689-1691 largely in terms of military assistance, a small 
number of scholars have taken a more original view. Their works considered the 
interaction between the two groups by looking at both French and Irish sources and 
scholarship in tandem, thus creating a new paradigm through which to examine the period. 
 
This new approach is adopted here and is applied to the concept of information as it related 
to French support for Jacobite Ireland. Through themes and individuals the crucial 
importance of information, its acquisition, concealment and transmission is shown in the 
context of the changing French appraisals of the Irish campaign. The information to be 
considered ranges from propaganda and diplomacy to court gossip and cryptography. Both 
thematic areas like propaganda and intelligence through correspondence are examined.  
Specific French individuals, exemplary in the appropriation and exploitation of 
information, are looked at and their contributions assessed. 
 
The thesis shows that the French went to considerable effort to stay informed about the 
situation in Jacobite Ireland and to secure their channels of communication. The efforts of 
the new Williamite regime to intercept and disrupt that flow of information, both regarding 
correspondence and propaganda in an Irish and a Three-Kingdom context are also outlined.  
The study also considers domestic French discussions and court conflicts and how these 
may have influenced military events in Ireland. 
 
In sum, this study argues that French support for James II was subject to internal discussion 
and brokerage of influence at court. The examination as a whole confirms  information as a 
valid framework of enquiry to better understand French interaction with Jacobites in 
Ireland, but is also applicable in a wider context, that of the use of intelligence in the 
conflict between France and the new Williamite regime in the Three Kingdoms in the early 
period of the Nine Years War. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Recent decades have seen the flowering of scholarship on Jacobite Ireland and 
louisquatorzien France, the former particularly in the wake of the tercentenary of the 
Jacobite Wars in Ireland.1 The greater availability of archival material, such as the 
landmark publication of Mulloy’s edition of Franco-Irish Correspondence, has led to new 
and fruitful questions being asked of those sources and to the reappraisal of more 
traditional assumptions and approaches.2 Nevertheless, the relationship between the two 
has not received due consideration. Studies of Jacobite Ireland in this period tend to paint 
the French involvement there in broad strokes, seldom engaging with the nuances. There 
are two notable exceptions to this trend: Symcox focused on the development of Louis 
XIV’s strategy in relation to Ireland and Conroy looked at French maritime interest in 
Ireland in terms of navigation and cartography.3 Although their works differ greatly in style 
and scope, Symcox and Conroy demonstrate that a synthetic approach to French activity in 
relation to Ireland yields fresh insight about both spheres and is a useful way forward. 
This study builds on their approach in analysing French support for James II and his forces 
in Ireland in the period 1689–1691; specifically, it examines aspects of transmission, 
circulation and appropriation of information related to French conduct of the Irish 
campaign. Situating this in the larger context of the War of the Three Kings as well as the 
start of the Nine Years War, this study proceeds thematically and conceptually. It examines 
a range of sources — both primary and secondary, Irish and French. Through case studies 
of the practical mechanics and of exemplary individuals, it explores topics including 
propaganda, diplomacy, strategy, court gossip and espionage, with particular emphasis on 
the nature and flow of information. 
                                                   
1
 By “louisquatorzien” I understand scholarly works on state and society in France in the 
reign of Louis XIV, 1643-1715. 
2
 Sheila Mulloy, Franco-Irish Correspondence 1688–1692, Irish Manuscripts Commission, 
(Dublin, 1983–1984), 3 vols. 
3
 Geoffrey Symcox, Louis XIV and the War in Ireland: A Study of his Strategic Thinking 
and Decision Making ( UCLA (Ph.D. thesis), 1967), hereafter called “Symcox, Thesis”.. 
Jane Conroy, “Galway Bay, Louis XIV’s Navy and the ‘Petit Bougard’”, JGAHS, 48 
(1997), 36–48. See also Conroy, “The French are on the Sea: Mapping the Irish 
Coastline, 1690” in Jane Conroy (ed.), Franco-Irish Connections: Essays, Memoirs and 
Poems in Memory of Pierre Joannon (Dublin, 2009). 
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Chapter I is a review of the secondary scholarship relevant to this study. It mainly covers 
works on Jacobite Ireland and seventeenth-century France under Louis XIV. It suggests 
that “crossover” studies — works which look at interactions between these two spheres — 
are few but offer fresh insights into both. This thesis thus extends that synthetic approach 
to the theme of information.  
Chapter II begins that exploration. It treats of French interest in the production of Jacobite 
propaganda and goes on to examine its attempted circulation in an Irish and Three 
Kingdoms context It also looks at some of the efforts of the Williamite regime in 
countering this. 
Chapter III considers two exemplary French diplomats in Ireland, the well-known Comte 
D’Avaux and the shadowy Abbé de Gravel. It compares their roles and spheres of activity 
and shows how both figures and the sorts of information they provided shaped the French 
understanding of the evolving military and political situation in Jacobite Ireland.  
Turning from figures in Ireland to those at the centre of decision-making in France, chapter 
IV looks at the Marquis de Chamlay, a key military strategist to Louvois and Louis XIV. It 
reveals that he advised them about the Irish campaign on matters ranging from military 
tactics to the manipulation of individuals through information. 
Broadening to the wider setting of the French court, Chapter V focuses on the Comte de 
Lauzun and other influential personalities. Lauzun’s interactions with them, and 
particularly with Queen Mary of Modena, were motivated by personal gain but ultimately 
affected the nature of French support of James II. His tactics highlight the power of 
information and the importance of court politics more generally to understanding the 
French conduct of the campaign.  
The final chapter analyses the practical flow of information and its processing. It deals with 
three interrelated topics. First, it explores how the French sent, received and protected key 
information. Secondly, it looks at how the French and British treated intercepted 
correspondence. Finally, it considers how these strategies changed as the war progressed 
and the French sphere of influence in Ireland shrank. 
Through these case studies, this analysis contributes especially to the Irish scholarly debate 
on Jacobite Ireland by shedding further light on the mechanics of French involvement. 
Considering the French sources in this period in tandem with their Irish context and in 
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some cases counterparts shows the relationships and nuances of those mechanics. In so far 
as this period may be considered an “information age” like our own, this study considers 
the manner in which information brokers power and is a powerful causal factor which 
helps to explain better why events happened in the way that they did. In the process, it will 
show that the French policy towards James II’s campaign to overthrow William III was 
neither simplistic nor predetermined, as it has often been characterised.  
10 
 
CHAPTER I – LITERATURE SURVEY 
Introduction 
Soldiers fighting for three nations — Ireland, England and France — came together on 
Irish soil from 1689 to 1691.4 The main schools of historiography about this episode of the 
Nine Years War 1688–1697 reflect the priorities of these nations both then and now .5  The 
three schools tend to fall along national and linguistic lines and to reflect the considerations 
of those audiences. For example, one might characterise as “Irish historiography” works 
coming from an “Irish perspective” and for an “Irish audience”. Since the independence of 
southern Ireland in 1921, such historiography has generally been written in the English 
language and more often than not with Catholic sympathies. Although the approach of each 
of these schools has merits and contributes some important insights, it also has its 
limitations. 
The British school 
Later British historians, in their views of the events surrounding the “Glorious Revolution” 
of 1688, can be said to have moved some distance from the Whig school of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. The views expressed by Macaulay and, following in his 
steps, Trevelyan now seem to belong to a bygone age when the “story” of England, as 
opposed to a “history”, was written in colourful literary style with the seeming aim to show 
retrospectively how an island kingdom was destined to rule over a great world empire.6. To 
an extent, it might be said to be English history rather than British. The exit of “bigoted” 
Catholic James II from England and the accession of his Protestant daughter Mary II and 
her Dutch husband constituted a necessary step towards “progress” and the constitutional 
monarchy enjoyed in the Victorian Britain reading those “histories”. The pivotal event of 
                                                   
4
  Over the course of the war in Ireland, there were troops from many different 
nationalities fighting under different flags, including Irish, English, Scottish, French, 
Dutch, Danish, Germans and Swiss. 
5
  The conflict is also sometimes termed the War of the Grand Alliance. The French refer 
to this conflict as the War of the League of Augsburg (la guerre de la Ligue 
d’Augsbourg). There were soldiers fighting in Ireland from many different states and 
owing allegiance to different rulers; but wherever they were from, they fought for either 
William III, king of England, or James II and Louis XIV. In William’s army, for 
example, there were Dutch regulars, French Huguenot forces, Danish mercenaries and 
English soldiers.  
6
  Thomas B. Macaulay, A History of England from the Accession of James the Second 
London, 1848–1849), George Trevelyan, England under the Stuarts, 16th edn (London, 
1933); originally published in 1904. 
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the “Glorious Revolution” (itself a popular Whig term) contributed in assisting in the 
expansion of the British economy, the growth of overseas trade and greater investment in 
the Royal Navy — all key factors in contributing to the expansion of the Empire.  
That such a view was of its time and is no longer current is clearly shown by modern 
historians such as Harris.7 His work exemplifies the newer thinking for recasting the events 
more evenly into a composite kingdom context than the older schools of scholarship had 
done, yet has still met with criticism.8 The works are especially good for the important 
English political context, both pre-dating James II for events such as the Exclusion Crisis 
as well as offering background to the landing of William of Orange at Torbay in November 
1688 and the early years of the reign of the Joint Monarchs. Laudably, there are separate 
sections on the parallel evolution in Scotland and Ireland, with the author showing that the 
revolution was not as bloodless as traditional writers have stated. A criticism would be that 
the book is weaker post-1692, especially the start of the Georgian era, but this is beyond 
my current scope. In summary, if politics and society in Britain is the focal point of Harris, 
the necessary continental dimension to events is lacking emphasis. In contrast, both Israel 
and Mijers and Onnekink give a broader view of the reasons and motivations behind Prince 
William of Orange’s English intervention or (to use a less “Whiggish” term) invasion.9 
They put some of the seeds for the “Glorious Revolution” back into its continental 
European context, from which it had been led away by generations of understandably 
Anglo-centric history writers. Figuratively speaking, they shift the focus from London 
looking around the British Isles to where it arguably more properly belongs, to the 
Apeldoorn palace and William of Orange looking at England as a necessary ally to recruit 
against Louis XIV.10  
William was prompted by fears of a repeat of the Franco-Dutch wars of the 1670s and by 
France’s expansionist policy aimed at the Spanish Netherlands, the only buffer between its 
own territories and those of the Dutch. Israel underlines how William directly planned 
“regime change” to ensure English resources were brought to bear against France. The 
                                                   
7
  Tim Harris, Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685–1720 (London, 
2007). 
8
  See David Womersley’s review at www.socialaffairsunit.rog.uk.  
9
  Jonathan I. Israel, ‘The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution’, 105-162, in Israel, The 
Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact 
(Cambridge, 1991). Esther Mijers and David Onnekink, Redefining William III: The 
Stadholder-King (Aldershot, 2007). 
10
  Apeldoorn is many kilometres from the coast, so this is a figurative expression. It refers 
to J.I. Israel, who emphasises William of Orange’s more continental concerns. 
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authors demonstrate how the expedition was only possible when William secured funding 
from the States General. Here more republican, mercantile elements in Amsterdam had 
swung in his favour because of newly adopted French protectionist measures aimed at 
restricting the importation of Dutch goods. Success for the coup was possible given 
prevailing English opposition to James’s pro-Catholic policies from both key nobles and 
the populace. Moreover, there was fear of French domestic noble support popular opinion 
among opponents of James. These domestic opponents were afraid not only of his pro-
Catholic policies, which undermined Anglican primacy, but also that in Europe he would 
support Louis if he could or at best remain neutral in an upcoming struggle. The English 
Crown was the last piece in the jigsaw for the anti-French League of Augsburg that 
William had helped to build to be able to confront the Sun King. 
Another part of the reaction to the Whig school has included attempts to rehabilitate James 
II, with Miller being a key proponent.11 For scholarly investigation of Jacobite politics in 
the period of exile, the main English language scholar is Corp.12 His work points to a 
couple of fruitful avenues for the purposes of my own studies and includes important 
essays by Gregg. 
Regarding English and later British foreign policy, George’s article, although now quite 
dated, is nonetheless accurate in portraying James as less financially dependent on 
subventions from France than his brother Charles II had been and therefore less open to 
supporting Louis’s foreign policy. The conclusion made, perhaps fancifully, is that had 
James remained king, he would probably have preferred England to remain neutral in a 
more general European War, concentrating instead on a blue-water policy involving Royal 
Navy protection of trade and expansion of overseas territories.13  
For a view of British strategic thinking and investigation in the “long eighteenth century”, 
Black has contributed a number of works. His book from 1999 has an enlightening 
historiographical piece which looks at how Britain had the same political debate as France 
as to whether or not to expend resources on a continental policy or an overseas, trade-based 
                                                   
11
  John Miller, James II: A Study in Kingship (Hove, 1978). 
12
  Edward Corp (ed.), A Court in Exile: The Stuarts in France 1689–1718 (Cambridge, 
2009). See Edward Gregg’s essay, “France, Rome and the exiled Stuarts, 1689-1713” in 
Corp’s work. 
13
  Robert George, “Financial Relations between Louis XIV and James II”, Journal of 
Modern History (April 1931). 
13 
 
strategy.14 The author attempts to cast doubt on a British “preference” for a “blue-water” 
strategy, suggesting it was less a choice and more a consequence of poor performance for 
its continental European land army exploits, with Marlborough being the exception. It 
does, however, argue convincingly that by the end of the Nine Years War in 1697, English 
military organisation as regards training, equipment and logistics was on a par with where 
France had been since the early 1680s. Although not strictly relevant to Ireland in 1689–
1691, it is still a thought-provoking essay on strategic considerations of the age and quite 
applicable to France also. 
The Irish school 
Generally speaking, the “Irish school” understands the episode as part of a larger narrative 
of Irish conflict with Britain, a narrative that was very much alive until comparatively 
recently. As it could be validly argued that the Irish school partly functions in relation to 
British scholarship, I have treated the latter contributors first. For example, the defeat of 
the forces of James II at the Battle of the Boyne in July 1690 was a pivotal moment in the 
war of 1689–1691. This Williamite victory is celebrated to this day by many Northern Irish 
Protestants as “The Glorious Twelfth”.  
From the perspective of the Irish school, the seventeenth-century struggle between the 
Anglo-Irish Jacobites and Williamites is also a struggle between Catholics and Protestants, 
as well as between England and Ireland. Although French involvement and aid to Ireland is 
acknowledged, it tends to be mentioned rather than investigated. French policy in 1689–
1691 is understood teleologically and as such as specific to Ireland. Overall, the episode 
has traditionally been viewed divorced from its larger continental European context.  
If earlier British (or rather English) historiography of the Early Modern period can be said 
to have been penned in the shadow of Macaulay, one could argue that Irish historiography 
from c.1900 until the 1960s suffered from a “syndrome” peculiar to nascent states, where 
history is reappraised and rewritten to reflect the new national consciousness. For the 
architects of the independent southern Irish State the previous official British narrative had 
to be actively countered, and the history rewritten for the schoolbooks of the future 
citizens. More recent “Empire memories” of Irish soldiers in Redcoat uniforms putting 
down the Indian Mutiny or later dying for King and Country in the trenches of Flanders or 
on the beaches of Gallipoli were replaced with those “independent” Irish hero figures such 
                                                   
14
  Jeremy Black, Britain as a Military Power, 1688–1815, (London, 1999). 
14 
 
as Patrick Pearse and Michael Collins. Once these were installed in the mental Pantheon of 
the new State, there was then a touching-up of the nationalist narrative to retrospectively 
include earlier figures in Irish history, avoiding those deemed part of an Irish or Ulster 
Unionist tradition. For our purposes here, these included the Catholic James II and leading 
“proto-nationalists” such as Jacobites Patrick Sarsfield and Richard Talbot, Earl of 
Tyrconnell.  
In the 1960s came a desire to revise and revisit this “nationalist” agenda. A good example 
of this was the undertaking of a multi-volume history by Moody, Martin and Byrne. Those 
works took to a fresh audience the fruits of more up-to-date research and objective 
appraisal of not only military and political events but also economic and cultural trends, 
written by chosen specialists.15 This work is useful in giving background to the internal 
politics and economy of Ireland in the Age of Restoration under Charles II and then under 
James II. Simms, the author of an earlier detailed work on the period contributed the 
chapter on the armed conflict, “The War of the Two Kings, 1685–1691”.16 The chapter title 
is worthy of attention in itself and could be viewed as being “of its time”, situating the 
struggle as an extension of the “Glorious Revolution” in England, divorced from a 
continental setting. From a historiographical point of view, the conflict between James II 
and William of Orange is today more likely to be called “the War of the Three Kings”, in 
my view properly including Louis XIV as a lead player and situating the war in the broader 
European context of the Nine Years War.17 
The tercentenaries of the “Glorious Revolution” in 1988 and the Battle of Boyne in 1990 
prompted renewed popular interest in the conflict. Maguire’s work from 1990 is an 
overview by different authors of the conflict on land and sea and, almost uniquely, 
provides insights into the contemporary propaganda conflict.18 Similar collection works are 
                                                   
15
  The series was first mooted in 1962. The relevant volume here is T.W. Moody, F.X. 
Martin and F.J. Byrne (eds), vol.III, Early Modern Ireland, 1534–1691, which first 
appeared in 1976. 
16
  John Gerald Simms, Jacobite Ireland 1685–1691 (Dublin, 1969). Its use of a wide range 
of original sources and its readable style mean it has stood the test of time well and was 
reprinted in 2000. 
17
  http://www.battleoftheboyne.ie/. 
18
  W.A. Maguire, Kings in Conflict: The revolutionary war in Ireland and its Aftermath, 
1689–1750 (Belfast, 1990). 
15 
 
those by Whelan and Bartlett.19 These collections contain essays by historians such as 
Murtagh and Childs, who later went on to produce larger contributions to the military 
history debate.20 
Military history indeed has shown itself to be a route to a more general readership than 
traditional academia. Such historians generally view this episode with particular emphasis 
on military strategy and its critique. The period for my inquiry, 1688–1691, has ample 
scope for this, with numerous studies of the various battles and sieges. These works have a 
narrower focus than the general, more academically oriented political studies, and 
concentrate on equipment, logistics, commanders and battlefield manoeuvres. The French 
military contribution to the Jacobite war effort in Ireland tends to be viewed in quite a 
uniform manner and relates to who was there, what they did in the field, what weapons 
they used and how they were supplied, rather than why they were there at all and what they 
hoped to gain beyond an immediate military advantage.21 Beyond their natural focus, the 
works reveal themselves incurious about wider considerations in France.  
The Irish perspective is to some extent a reaction to the line taken by the “British school” 
of historiography. The British school understands the Irish conflict in a slightly broader 
manner, as part of the history of the archipelago — that is to say, the maintenance of 
control over the three kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland. In a general sense, these 
Irish events were indeed part of the wider struggle between James II and William for 
control of these crowns, and the resulting shifts in political power away from a more 
absolute monarchy. The consequences were neither experienced nor historiographically 
perceived in the same way. 
                                                   
19
  Bernadette Whelan (ed.), The Last of the Great Wars: Essays on the Wars of the Three 
Kings in Ireland, 1688–1691 Limerick,1995) and Thomas Bartlett (ed.), A Military 
History of Ireland (Cambridge, 1996). 
20
  John Childs, who later wrote The Williamite Wars in Ireland 1688–1691 (Hambledon, 
2007), had a similar chapter in Bartlett’s book. Harman Murtagh of the Military History 
Society of Ireland wrote The Battle of the Boyne: A Battlefield Guide (Drogheda, 2007). 
21
  Examples of these are Michael McNally and Graham Turner, Battle of the Boyne: The 
Irish Campaign for the English Crown Oxford, 2005) in the well-known Osprey Battles 
series. Similarly, the very readable Siege of Derry by non-fiction writer Carlo Gébler 
(London, 2006), although aimed at a more popular audience, is nonetheless well 
annotated, albeit in a non-scholarly fashion. Nevertheless, some of their conclusions are 
debatable. McNally, for example, opines that Lauzun’s appointment to Ireland was a 
sinecure (p.42). 
16 
 
In studies of the Irish campaigns of 1688–1691, writers of the Irish and British schools 
refer to the French of necessity. This is more often than not in their purely functional or 
military capacity, talking about their major figures in Ireland, be it the diplomat Comte 
D’Avaux in 1689 or their army commanders, such as the Comte de Lauzun in 1690 or the 
Marquis de St. Ruth in 1691. Their motivations (strategic or otherwise) and those of the 
French monarch and ministers who sent them to Ireland are largely viewed in a monolithic 
light, if at all. Because the French only sent limited resources to what was a peripheral 
theatre, the assumption is that was all the French had ever intended the Irish campaign to 
be. There is sometimes even an assumption that Ireland had always been the only 
destination in scope for the French, which is incorrect and seems patently teleological. 
Symcox in his works has shed more light on these areas than most writers, yet his 
conclusions do not seem to have been included in the current corpus of secondary literature 
to the extent that one might have expected.22 This is surprising and is an area worthy of 
further scrutiny, historiographically if nothing else.23 
Louisquatorzien France 
Although one cannot really talk of a “French school” of historiography, there are 
nonetheless works in French oriented towards national-linguistic priorities no less than the 
Irish and British. The genre approaches the period within the narrative of an era of great 
military prowess and cultural development, termed Le Grand Siècle – “The Great 
Century”. Although clearly ensconced in the historiography of the modern French Republic 
as part of the disgraced Ancien Régime, the “Sun King” paradoxically is still viewed 
positively and occupies a mental pedestal in the French national identity similar to those of 
Napoleon and Charles de Gaulle.  
This reverence extends into historiography. Despite the justified success of the “Annales 
School” in shifting the focus of historians from traditional accounts of the “great and good” 
to social and economic history and Louis’s poorer subjects, the Sun King consistently 
remains a field of research in his own right; witness the abundance of biographies produced 
                                                   
22
  Geoffrey Symcox, The Crisis of French Sea Power, 1688–1697: From the Guerre 
d'Escadre to the Guerre de Course (The Hague, 1974). Symcox’s thesis on Louis XIV’s 
strategic decision-making regarding Ireland is not in the bibliography of Lynn’s Giant 
of the Grand Siècle, yet it would appear to be relevant. It was included in Rowland’s 
Dynastic State. 
23
  The Symcox 1967 thesis is not freely available (it can still be purchased) and Symcox 
followed it up with a book: as a consequence, it might be assumed that arguments from 
the thesis are more developed in the book. This may the case elsewhere but not for 
Symcox, as the subject matter is different. 
17 
 
on a fairly regular basis.24 Many eminent French historians of the pre-Revolution period 
have contributed studies of Le Roi Soleil.25 These all provide a broad narrative of the 
monarch’s life, and cover a wide range of personal, political and military aspects of the 
reign over and above the narrow, old-fashioned focus the French term as histoire-bataille. 
These historians, like British or Irish historians, are mainly writing the biographies for and 
from their own national-linguistic audience in the context of “their” national story. 
More generally, some of these same writers also produced large-format comprehensive 
general reference works covering the major events, figures and institutions, both of the 
reign of Louis XIV and the wider field of pre-revolutionary France. Chief among these are 
Bluche and Bély.26 The developing area of studies of Louis XIV’s state and its mechanisms 
as a focus for new investigation by both French-language and English-language scholars 
will be treated below. Bély has also written an extensive work on French diplomacy, but 
this deals with a later period than I am concerned with.27 Duccini’s book on France in the 
seventeenth century gives a general introduction to French organs of government, namely 
the various conseils, office-holders and institutions.She also produced a work on state 
propaganda in France under Louis XIII which relates to aspects of this study.28 
If there is an area that transcends the national-linguistic framework and relates to this 
study, it is surely that of France under its most famous monarch. This is a school of 
expanding remit, moving from the development and growth of the French army and navy 
through to a broader consideration of the growth of bureaucracy and administration. This 
genre also includes studies of regional institutions around France and the study of key 
individuals and families looking at the importance of clientèles in developing circles of 
social influence for advancement. Greater access to and analysis of French diplomatic, 
military, naval and, more recently, family archives have greatly contributed to this 
expansion. Here it may be said that anglophone writers led the way. 
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An early contributor to the increasing interest in louisquatorzien France and questioning of 
the nature of development of French military policies is Symcox’s thought-provoking 1974 
monograph on the challenges facing the French navy in this period.29 This is a work of 
some bearing on my focus as it refers to French sea strategy. The author shows how 
support for Jacobite Ireland fitted only tangentially into their plans and was a key strategic 
error. The same author foreshadowed his naval strategy book through his doctoral thesis.30 
Here Symcox tried to situate the Irish campaign in the context of a European struggle that 
had taken Louis XIV by surprise and shows Louis’s approach to Ireland was essentially a 
reactive one. The author believes both the king and his naval minister missed the bigger 
strategic opportunity Ireland presented. A more enterprising naval policy organised around 
blockading Ireland from English assistance would have ensured a more stable base for 
James II from which to threaten William. His examination of decision-making by the 
French government in relation to Ireland is useful for this study and very original in my 
view, as it uses the example of the Irish war to examine French topics. 
The nature of the growth of the French State in the century of Louis XIV in various forms 
has been a fertile ground for scholarship and reflects wider studies examining the growth of 
bureaucracy and administration around Europe in this period. Key contributors to the 
debates have been academics such as Baxter, Sonnino, and Mettam.31 From formerly 
accepting assumptions that the late-seventeenth-century France of Louis XIV was the 
epitome of an absolutist monarchy, newer scholarship has painted a more nuanced view of 
that state and how it functioned.32 Many regionally based investigations have underlined 
how intertwined royal administration and local interests were. They reveal a less étatist 
government, concerned with establishing royal authority but also respecting regional 
traditions and institutions and collaborating with local elites in a spirit of mutual support 
and financial reward. 
One might say that the wider context of France’s often expansionist foreign policy has 
received less attention than the diplomats applying the policies. Those studies done outline 
an overweening confidence building in the years before the Nine Years War, although 
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some perceptive articles, such as Place’s study of diplomatic events, emphasise France’s 
unpreparedness coming up to the outbreak of war in 1688 in Germany.33 On the 
circumstances leading to the outbreak of a more generalised European conflict in 1688, and 
the French rationale in this, there is no better introduction than Symcox in “Louis XIV and 
the outbreak of the Nine Years War”.34 
Although not strictly linked to the development of the French armed forces, Chapman’s 
pioneering prosopographical work from 2004 is very much in the louisquatorzien school 
examining society.35 This detailed exploration of the Pontchartrain family and its gradual 
climb of the social ladder to power charts how a clan of Breton lawyers rose to become 
powerful ministers who served successive French monarchs for almost a century. It shows 
how local notables seeking patronage and advantageous marriages could become national 
figures dispensing favours and influence. Louis Phélypeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain, took 
over the administration of the French navy on the death of Seignelay in 1690, and therefore 
has a bearing on Irish affairs in the 1690–1691 campaigns. The author underlines the 
persistence of clienteles and their importance in the navy bureaucracy as well as the social 
ties binding families of the upper echelons of administrative nobility to both each other and 
the king. This concept in social history is reminiscent of the patricians of ancient Rome and 
is applicable cross-border. 
Regarding the French army more specifically, Rowlands has examined how increased state 
organisation and bureaucracy combined with clienteles and aristocratic self-interest in 
helping to forge the greatest military machine in Europe in the period.36 His examination of 
the role of the Le Tellier clan and the issues they encountered is relevant to my own 
researches regarding Ireland and the French involvement. Furthermore, the study offers a 
good introduction to the intricacies of the French state taxation and revenue collection 
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systems so necessary to the growth of the army and its associated administration.37 It also 
looks at the concerns of the monarchy for providing the noblesse d’épée with chances for 
advancement in the armed forces, when posts in the administration were increasing the 
domain of the socially inferior noblesse de robe. French historian Drévillon has also 
contributed here in his work examining the changing perception by the lower French 
aristocracy of the army as their proper place for service and the path to preferment.38  
Rowlands is clear in differentiating himself from Lynn, however, in the appraisal of how 
those at the pinnacle of government wholly or partly controlled military decision-making.39 
This debate focuses on the so-called stratégie de cabinet and on who actually formulated 
military strategy and how much latitude was left to commanders in the field. This debate is 
relevant to the involvement of the French militarily supporting James II. Cénat’s work is a 
French-language contribution to this field and the broader Rowlands-Lynn debates on 
formulation of military policy.40 His recent biography of Chamlay, an influential advisor to 
Louis XIV, is relevant to this study and the debate on French military command and 
control.41 
Similar veins of research are now being examined by younger French-language historians 
who are delving deeper into considerable and still somewhat uncharted manuscript 
resources to gain a better knowledge of the formation of policy in France under Louis XIV 
and his ministers and of how decisions were made and then carried out. Sarmant, who 
obtained his doctorate from the Ecole des Chartes et des Manuscrits in 2003, combined 
forces with fellow archivist Salat to look at previously unedited correspondence between 
the Marquis de Louvois and his royal master.42 Although first and foremost an edition of 
primary-source material, it also contains, usefully for my purposes, a solid introduction to 
the workings of the French army’s administration in a period, including that of French 
involvement in Ireland. His source for Louvois’s records is the French Army archives, 
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Service Historique de la Défense (SHD), based at the Château de Vincennes just outside 
Paris.  
A pertinent follow-on article and clearly based on the same body of primary research is 
Sarmant’s examination of Louvois’s methods of gathering information on particular 
theatres of operations through the organisation of networks of correspondents.43 A second 
publication of note (again, collaborative) is his 2010 work with Stoll investigating the 
machinery of government under the Sun King. It contains some treatment of conflicts 
within the upper echelons of government, which possibly influenced policy formation and 
may have had pertinence to events in Ireland.  
On propaganda and control of Information in relation to the scope of this work, the main 
works relevant are those by Claydon for William III and Klaits concerning French 
propaganda under Louis XIV.  
Biographies 
Biographies generally, though not always, tend to fall into one of the three national-
linguistic paradigms referred to above.44 They are predominantly written about the 
perceived “great” or “famous” (and “infamous”) figures of that particular nation, such as 
James II or William III for England (and Holland); Louis XIV, his war minister the 
Marquis de Louvois or Jean-Baptiste Colbert (Senior) for France; and, arguably, Patrick 
Sarsfield for Ireland.45 Louis XIV, however, is a figure of such supranational fascination 
that works on him can be found in many languages. Of those in English, Wolf is a 
reference that has stood the test of time.46 
It can be argued that Louis’s long shadow has hidden the careers of his less well-known 
servants in that language and as such these figures, though important, can appear 
secondary. One exception is a couple of now dated works regarding Jean-Baptiste Colbert 
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Sr (1630–1683) and his economic oeuvre.47 In French, a scholarly work on James II has 
only just appeared, with nothing on William III in French for a long period.48  
More unusual are biographies about the “less famous”, such as Tyrconnell for Ireland and 
Lauzun and Seignelay for France. Works on such figures tend to come along sporadically, 
after long gaps in the scholarship, and are almost exclusively written from their own 
national-linguistic school. When these figures are revived, generally after a lag of a 
generation or two, they are sometimes reworked according to the priorities of the social or 
historiographical currents at the time.  
Biographies of female figures of the age of Louis XIV also have relevance to this study. 
Recent works have focused on influential noble women at court, such as the Sun King’s 
influential mistress, Madame de Montespan, or his later morganatic wife, Madame de 
Maintenon.49 Although it might be disputed to say these works fall into the louisquatorzien 
studies - looking at the French state under Louis XIV -, there is a sense that the experiences 
and relationships of these women to the broader patriarchal society in which they moved 
can assist in understanding that society and are therefore relevant. These works look at 
historical and personal development but differ from those on figures famed for their 
literary talents, such as Madame de Sévigné. Those relevant to my interest are figures such 
as Mary of Modena, exiled Queen to James II, and Madame de Maintenon, as mentioned. 
These figures could and did act as brokers of communication and influence between male 
figures, as will be demonstrated in this study.50 
 
Irish biography 
Covering Irish historical figures is not such a well-trodden path, so older publications can 
still be important. Despite a relative lack of recent scholarship, the works nonetheless 
illuminate how the individuals concerned interacted with others in a cross-cultural setting. 
Examples of these for my scope are Murphy on the Jacobite general Justin McCarthy, and 
Petrie’s now dated biography of Richard Talbot, Earl of Tyrconnell (c.1630–1691), which 
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traces his fortunes from Royalist exile in the 1650s to his apogee as Lord Deputy of Ireland 
under James II.51 These works date from a time when a number of key primary sources 
were not as readily available in edited format as they are today. 
A newer work is that by Wauchope on another Jacobite army commander, Patrick Sarsfield 
(1655–1693).52 (His fame is mainly due to the daring raid he carried out behind enemy 
lines, which resulted in the destruction of King William’s artillery train on its way to 
Limerick during the first siege of that city in August 1690.) This earned him a place in Irish 
historical hagiography, from whence he has not budged. Wauchope (himself a descendant 
of one of James II’s Scottish colonels) has clearly taken a leaf out of Petrie’s book in the 
treatment of his subject. The tactic of adding “and the Williamite War” to the title allows 
the author to make up for the limited, verifiable biographical facts of its central character 
(as the author freely admits) by giving a good narrative account of the Irish conflict as a 
whole. One downside of the book, common with many Irish works, is that it presents a 
monolithic view of French influence. 
Francophone biographies 
The Marquis de Louvois (1641–1691), war minister to Louis XIV, has been the subject of 
a number of French-language monographs. The key work in the field is still that by 
Corvisier which provides a very good grounding to the various areas of that minister’s 
involvement.53 The character which emerges is one with incredible energy and an uncanny 
attention to detail in army administration who had the implicit trust of the Sun King for 
most of his career. He was heavily involved in the supplying of the Irish campaign and 
often had influence over policy there. The work itself is organised thematically, as regards 
the different posts Louvois occupied. Corvisier acknowledges his debt to a previous 
biographer, Rousset.54 This more comprehensive work is still relevant for my purposes 
because there are more references to original sources than in Corvisier, although Rousset 
is, like many a biographer, clearly a partisan of his subject. One criticism of Corvisier’s 
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book work might be that, although a fine scholarly work in its breadth, many of its 
quotations and references are not footnoted or endnoted.55  
Richardt’s monograph on Louvois is less detailed than either Corvisier or Rousset, but 
reflects more up-to-date research and is less reverential in tone and content than either of 
the others.56 All these works refer to some extent to the rivalries this minister entertained 
with the Colbert family. André’s account on the development of French army 
administration under Louvois and his father before him also contains enough biographical 
detail to merit mentioning it here.57 It is worth noting in passing that, to my knowledge, 
Louvois has never been the subject of an English-language biography. Another work 
relevant to my scope is Petitfils’s account of the career of the Comte de Lauzun, the 
mercurial French courtier and sometime commander of French forces in Ireland. This 
entertaining work sheds light on Louis XIV’s court and points to areas of internal French 
rivalries and court intrigues not revealed in English-language works. It is an updated 
investigation of the figure building on an older work.58 Similarly relevant is Dingli’s 
examination of the life of the Marquis de Seignelay (1651–1690), a short-lived though 
influential French navy minister under Louis XIV and a scion of the Colbert clan.59 He was 
quite involved in Irish affairs on behalf of the Sun King and was a competitor to Louvois 
as regards garnering the king’s support for his projects. 
In biographies, it is to some extent inevitable that “great figures” of a nation and the 
nation’s self-perception and self-representation occupy centre stage in their historical 
inquiries. Other nation’s heroes act more as stock characters with bit parts in teleological if 
not also somewhat anachronistic narratives. These narratives also bear the cultural imprint 
of language. The national-linguistic approaches to this episode in history are happily not 
the only ones. Other approaches, which to some extent overlap with the aforementioned 
ones, open up “national” stories to greater analysis and consideration in a wider, 
continental European setting and are also worthy of consideration. 
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As evidenced by the range of works cited above, there is a clear historiography of all the 
major events and historical characters in the great events in Ireland, Britain, and France in 
the 1688–1691 period. Those cited above are all highly informative and offer useful 
background to my area of focus. Not all scholars consider the historiography, much less in 
a systematic way in the introduction. It can therefore be difficult to trace and evaluate their 
analysis. This is especially so for publications aimed at a less academic readership. 
Latterly, authors place the conflict in Ireland squarely in its general supranational, 
European context.There is therefore a growing awareness of the touchpoints between the 
national frameworks in a way that heretofore had not been highlighted. It is to this shift in 
perception away from an Irish or British historiographical tradition and towards that of 
louisquatorzien government that I wish to contribute in my thesis, albeit primarily in an 
Irish historical context. 
There are trends common to the writings of the three “national stories”. The respective foci 
of these “schools” are not the only evidence that, in my opinion, scholars have essentially 
been writing history for a specific national audience; the other is language. That 
scholarship is published in the prevailing national language is no surprise. More revealing 
is the language of the sources, primary and secondary, which these scholars take into 
account in their studies. Generally speaking, for much of the nineteenth century, the Irish 
and British schools did not tend to consider much evidence from primary sources written in 
French.60 The same could be said regarding he French not considering many primary 
sources written in English. This was partly due to access it has to be said.61  
Scholarship from the 1960s onwards begins to see more crossovers at the level of 
secondary sources too, with universities in the US producing much work on France in this 
era. Scholars since have started to take into account secondary sources written in languages 
other than their own to a greater degree than before, and themselves to be considered by 
scholars from other national-linguistic schools, with thought-provoking results. From this 
point of view of cultural crosspollination, it is worth noting that recent English-language 
historians such as Rowlands and Chapman now regularly feature in the bibliographies of 
works of the younger French historians. The same cannot be said for earlier Francophone 
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authors whose works were rarely consulted by Anglophone scholars Goubert and André 
figure in English language works partly because of translations. It is not yet clear whether 
the recent French works cited above will find their way into the bibliographies of future 
English-language writing on the age of Louis XIV. Overall, therefore, the priorities and 
selection criteria of scholarship and the language of the influences (secondary sources) 
studied seem to be mutually reinforcing, and scholarship continues to be imbued at various 
levels with the language of the civilisation in which it is written and which its target 
audience uses.  
In conclusion, there is I believe a framework of inquiry that has been overlooked for 
Ireland in the years 1689–1691 that is worthy of further examination. This is to take the 
struggle more clearly out of its Irish and British context and to place it in a French setting, 
asking a different set of questions relating less to Ireland and more to France. As stated in 
the “General Introduction” this will be done using the theme of information, primarily its 
acquisition and circulation between France and Jacobite Ireland. This concentration is 
reflected in the literature survey above. Even though historically Ireland at the time was 
viewed as an integral part of the Three Kingdoms - and was viewed as such by the French - 
methodologically speaking the focus here is on Franco-Irish interreactions in a Jacobite 
context.Aspects of works of similar interest but wider or different scope were consulted as 
they contribute to the focus of this study.   
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CHAPTER II – JACOBITE PRINTED PROPAGANDA: FROM FRANCE TO A 
THREE-KINGDOM CONTEXT 
Introduction 
The aim of this section to shed light on what might be termed “ information wars” both in 
Ireland and the wider context of Jacobites in a Three Kingdom context. It will show ways 
in which Jacobite propaganda was encouraged by the French who wished to influence its 
content. The study moves on to look at Jacobite efforts to print propaganda material both 
for consumption in Ireland and distribution in Scotland and England. Some examples will 
be given for “domestic” Jacobite propaganda production in Britain and how the Williamite 
regime sought to crack down on this activity and prevent its circulation. 
During the “Glorious Revolution”, the successful pro-Williamite propaganda machine had 
been deployed to its full extent to influence public opinion, much to the detriment of James 
II’s image and cause. This has been examined already by historians such as Claydon and 
Schwoerer for England and Hayton for Ireland, and it is the intention to treat further of it 
here.62 Bibliographies of these works echo the old adage of history being written by the 
victors. Indeed, the volume of surviving Williamite publications, showing how 
“informationally aware” the Williamites were, contrasts with the relative paucity of 
Jacobite “promotional” documentation that has come down to us.  
After the “Glorious Revolution”, it was clear that regaining the crowns of Scotland and, 
more importantly, of England were James’s strategic aims. It is possible, that in the last 
period of his de facto reign in England and early time of his exile in France, James realised 
he had essentially lost the initiative to his more propaganda- aware son-in-law and that this 
had marshalled public opinion in England against him. Tellingly, the London premises of 
his own official printer, Henry Hills, were attacked on a number of occasions in November, 
allowing the populace to express their opinion of royally inspired publications.63 It is no 
surprise therefore that when in exile in France the aim of producing Jacobite propaganda 
for consumption in England came to the fore.  
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Jacobite Propaganda produced in France 
Shortly after his arrival into exile in France James II met with Louis XIV and discussed 
plans for French expeditions to Ireland.64 At the same time there was work done on the 
propaganda front to support this strategy. Evidence from the French diplomatic archives 
points to the Jacobites actively cooperating with the French to print propaganda pieces for 
distribution in the Three Kingdoms. In a letter to Colbert de Croissy, the French foreign 
minister from the police chief of Paris, Gabriel Nicholas de la Reynie (1625-1699) wrote 
that in accordance with permission from Louis XIV, Lord Melfort, James II’s chief 
minister in exile, had appointed Mssrs, Martin & Boudot of Paris as their official printers.65 
The first document to be printed in English in Paris was a declaration by James of his 
reasons for leaving Rochester and going to France. That it was printed in English clearly 
earmarked it for for a target audience in England or Ireland.66 Moreover the timing – start 
of February 1689 – is in line with French preparations for sending a Jacobite force to 
Ireland 
There is ample reason to believe that the French were wary of allowing the Jacobites to use 
their printing presses. La Reynie states he had told the printers that for anything printed in 
English there should be a French translation brought to him for review.  
 This was not however the main object of the letter to Croissy.67 La Reynie informed the 
minister that as he had instructed the printers to bring him any document submitted by the 
Jacobites the printers had shown him a second document Melfort had wanted printed. The 
content of this alarmed La Reynie who wrote to warn Croissy who having responsibility 
for foreign affairs would be able to communicate with Melfort. La Reynie informed 
Croissy that the content of the document attributed authority to the Pope to depose 
monarchs, even non-Catholics, should they be in disfavour with Rome. Whilst from a 
Jacobite point of view this clearly had William of Orange as a target, attributing such 
power to the Pope was not to French liking, not least because of Louis XIV’s own very bad 
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relations with the Papacy of the time.68  In fact La Reynie termed the subject “une question 
odieuse” which should not under any circumstances be printed in French for fear it would 
be distributed in France, With this kind of official attention it is unlikely this document saw 
any circulation in France. 
Propaganda and James II in Ireland 
By February 1689 events in England had gone beyond redemption, at least in the shorter 
term, with the coming to the throne of William and Mary. Nevertheless it seems likely the 
French wished to land James within one his former realms – Ireland - during some or all of 
the parliamentary debates in Scotland. The longer his presence in France endured — and as 
an extension his absence from Britain - the farther away a possible restoration must have 
seemed.  
It was no doubt to the consternation of the newly ensconced regime in Britain that they 
discovered that their erstwhile monarch, profiting from the French quickness to react and 
sailing so early in the navigating season, had arrived in Ireland on 18th March 1689 and 
was in Dublin by 22nd. French naval forces had succeeded in putting him where many 
would have doubted it possible, catching the new king William III off guard. 
With the arrival of King James and his supporters in Ireland in 1689 a key aim of theirs 
was to rectify the negative propaganda situation and reinforce his claims through 
informational channels. This would serve to both underline his de facto position in Ireland 
and to reinforce and project his continuing legitimacy as de jure sovereign into the rest of 
the Stuart realms. To this end, when in Dublin, and therefore possessing a foothold in one 
of his kingdoms, he ordered the production and dissemination of propaganda to further his 
claims. His supporters were able to avail themselves immediately of the existing printing 
infrastructure of Dublin, such as it was at the time, to have tracts, pamphlets and 
newsletters produced. Moreover they attempted through agents and adherents to transport 
these to Britain for distribution. 
Despite James’s move to Ireland the French still attempted to keep some influence over 
what propaganda the Jacobites were producing. This is evident in correspondence between 
Louis XIV and his envoy to James in Ireland, the Comte d’Avaux. In a letter of 23 March 
1689 Louis states that he had seen the letter James had had printed (probably in France 
given the timing) which was aimed at the Scottish convention. “J’ai veu la lettre que le dit 
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roy a escrit a la convention d’Escosse qui ne m’a pas paru assez persuasive pour ramener 
ceux qui composent cette assemblee a leur devoir." 69 
Louis suggested to d’Avaux that James needed to take a more moderate approach vis a vis 
his Scottish subjects, and to not antagonise those of the Protestant persuasion.  
Furthermore as Louis had not seen another draft declaration, this time from James to his 
English subjects stating the reasons for his departure to Ireland, the French king asked 
d’Avaux to procure him a copy and send it back. If that letter had not already been printed 
Louis suggested alternative wording which he said he had given to Melfort and had 
enclosed in the letter to d’Avaux. Once he received it the French ambassador should show 
it to James  “ afin que le si le roy ne l’as pas encore escrit vous le puissiez disposer a le 
faire dans le sens dudit projet, sans neantmoins luy en faire des instances trop pressantes, si 
vous y trouvez quleque repugnance.”  Louis further suggested that other pro-Jacobite 
documents had been printed in France and he encloses the text of these. If d’Avaux feels 
any of these would be useful, he could write back to Louis who would have them printed in 
as many copies as required and sent to d’Avaux in Ireland for distribution. 
In keeping with both French plans, as laid out in the instructions given to D’Avaux, and 
with James’s own desires, his next target was Scotland.70 As previously mentioned, the 
constitutional position of that kingdom was still ambiguous and a parliamentary-style 
Convention had been called in Edinburgh for April 1689.  
Anxious to believe his ever-optimistic advisors, the Earl of Melfort chief among them, that 
Ireland was securely his, James turned his attentions to Scotland. Despite the unresolved 
issue of resistance at Derry, James no doubt believed that he would soon be able to transfer 
troops to the ancient Stuart realm. Resident in the Royal Castle of Dublin, he lost little time 
in writing letters to those Scottish nobles he believed loyal and which he had sent via 
trustworthy agents. The Williamite authorities were alive to the risk of correspondence 
from Ireland and looked to their officers and informants to prevent this. In fact, as early as 
in April 1689, information came to the ear of the Earl of Shrewsbury regarding a Jacobite 
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agent, Mr Brady, who had come from Ireland but “who had been arrested in Scotland in 
possession of many letters including some written by the late King James”.71 
The correspondence at once advertised to those he thought loyal his presence in what he 
considered the least of his kingdoms, and requested their military support in the expected 
upcoming struggle.72 Also anxious to appeal to a wider audience, James issued a 
proclamation to his Scottish subjects at the start of May 1689 and did so using the services 
of Dublin printers. It was a formal declaration to rally to his cause and oppose the forces of 
William. 
Examples of the document are preserved in Dublin and attest to the thinking of James as 
regards the realm of Scotland, seeking to appeal to a broad audience. It is addressed to “all 
our loving subjects”.73 As to be expected, the language is forthright, but it also seeks to 
reassure Scots that despite his policy of religious toleration, the pre-eminent legal position 
of Protestantism would be secure on his restoration. In one example, by the wording of the 
royal title itself, “James the Seventh, by grace of God, King of Scotland, England and 
France”, the writer clearly sets out the audience James aimed at. It then immediately refers 
to the recent Scottish Convention, stating that its establishment was motivated by “men of 
pernicious principals and wicked designs”. 
The proclamation situates the king in stating categorically that he did not believe in the 
legitimacy of even calling such a meeting as he had not sanctioned it, and that its aims 
were evident from the outset: 
to call themselves the States of that Kingdom, and therein treasonably 
and wickedly to overthrow our Authority and to judge our proceedings 
and finally to dispose of our Imperial crown, which we hold from God 
alone. 
In keeping with this sentiment it is not surprising that convinced Jacobites such as Sir John 
Graham of Claverhouse, better known as Bonnie Dundee, withdrew from the meetings, 
stating he did not recognise the gathering. The proclamation then appealed to Scottish 
financial self-interest. It claimed that as under the new regime Scottish people were being 
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subjected to “heavy burthens, imprisonment and levies” they were justified in opposing the 
“unnatural usurper of our Royal Right, the Prince of Orange and his adherents”. 
James clearly desired his supporters in Scotland to rally and openly oppose the new 
regime. Whatever military actions and attacks they inflicted upon their Williamite 
adversaries, he absolved them in advance through the proclamation by conferring his 
“indemnity, pardon, warrant and approbation”. Lastly, on matters religious, bearing in 
mind the specific religious composition of Scotland between Episcopalians, Dissenters and 
Catholics the exiled monarch moved to reassure his erstwhile subjects. He undertook to 
“make good to all our subjects all that we ever promised to them in any of our Royal 
declarations in favour of the Protestant Religion, Liberty of conscience to all who lie 
peaceably, and Rights, Liberty and Property of all our people”. The message ends with the 
statement that it was sealed by King James in Dublin Castle on 4 May 1689. It was also 
signed by Melfort, James’s secretary of State for Scotland. Considering Melfort’s 
reputation in Scotland, this was an injudicious move.74 
It should be noted that the proclamation was not the only example of propaganda James 
had sent to his northern realm. It does, however, underline that while in Dublin James had 
his expected move to Scotland in mind and was preparing the way in having it produced 
and printed in numbers. Examples of Scottish “domestic” propaganda — the word 
“propaganda” being used here in its modern meaning — also appear in at least one 
secondary work I consulted. Worth citing here is the scholarship of Mann, who has 
chronicled the existence of at least two documents produced in Scotland itself. These are 
the admittedly later publications entitled Remonstrance and protestation against deposing 
James II and Ireland’s Glory, the latter printed by a John Reid and described by Mann as 
“a tract blatantly critical of the [Williamite] government”.75 Both these works were banned 
by order of the Scottish Privy council, in March and October 1691 respectively, although 
presumably they were circulating for some time before that.76 It is interesting from the 
point of view of political history of the period to detail here that the John Reid mentioned 
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had previously published Presbyterian and Covenanting material. As Mann implies, it 
would seem that commercial considerations regarding what might sell could just as easily 
have induced printers to publish pro-Jacobite ephemera, as distinct from any partisan 
political views they themselves might have held. 
The printers in Dublin for the Scottish proclamation were Andrew Crook and his partner 
Samuel Helsham. They were Protestant and long-standing members of the organisation of 
Dublin stationers, the Guild of St Luke the Evangelist, founded about 1670. These 
businessmen produced many of James’s other proclamations in Dublin, including the 
records of the so-called Patriot Parliament of 1689, which commenced soon after this 
proclamation was issued. Many other proclamations were issued on James’s orders on 
specifically Irish items. These related to revaluations of the coinage, exhortations to 
farmers to supply James’s army with corn and wheat, limits on the price of coal, and 
prohibitions on soldiers stealing horses from those members of the public who were 
allowed to keep them for their business. Suffice to say such items are propaganda only in 
the sense that they show an authority in existence, trying to direct affairs. 
For the Scottish proclamation, it is difficult to gauge how large any print run might have 
been. This is because of the general paucity of records detailing the production of the this 
type of document, and the few surviving copies. What is certain is that the proclamation 
was for Scottish consumption and that James certainly had agents travelling there and 
adherents to distribute the papers. Whether it was ever on sale, or merely given out to 
sympathisers to post in taverns and public places, is a matter of some conjecture. The only 
thing that one can be almost certain of is that James had it printed and that he probably paid 
for it — though perhaps with French silver. 
At some point in later 1689, another printer comes to the fore in Dublin in the shape of 
Alderman James Malone. A Roman Catholic, he had been admitted to the Guild in 1672 
and had been in the business of printing Catholic devotional works. Perhaps in a deliberate 
move by King James’s pro-Catholic advisors to favour a co-religionist, or equally 
plausibly, even because of more competitive commercial considerations, Malone and his 
associates started to appear as the main printers of Jacobite proclamations and by 1690 
most Jacobite printings were done by him.77  
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As the war progressed, these were not the only documents to see the light of day, and so 
other propaganda opportunities arose. One of these targets was enticing soldiers in the 
opponent’s armies to desert. This was the case for a document done by James Malone in 
the second half of 1689, a pamphlet entitled aimed at the forces of Marshall Schomberg 
who had arrived in Ulster in August: “A Letter to the Officers and Soldiers of his Majesties 
Subjects that are in the Count de Schomberg’s Army”.78 
The first line of the document cuts to the chase in inviting any soldier in the Williamite 
force to change allegiance. Whether Malone was instrumental in copywriting as well as in 
printing is unknown, but the tone suggests one versed in engaging prose: “Next to the 
honour of never engaging in a bad cause, there is nothing braver that to desert it.”79 
It is difficult to gauge at so far a remove from the events of the time whether these ploys 
had much success, but an admittedly biased reference in a later Malone publication 
indicates they might have. While such tracts or pamphlets were destined for an audience in 
Ireland, and were no doubt supported if not directly ordered by James’s closest adherents, 
they were nonetheless mindful of the wider need for production of pro-Jacobite writings in 
the more important audience of English public opinion especially. To this end, James’s 
secretary of State, Lord Melfort, wrote from Dublin to the French foreign minister, Colbert 
de Croissy, in June 1689, requesting financial support. In England he states that  
the king’s servants who have managed the printing and distribution of 
papers written against the Prince of Orange have spent £10,000 of their 
funds already and ask for more.80 
The Jacobite printers in London, he pleads, had already sold all their silver plate in an 
effort to finance their activities. Melfort, knowing that James would be very reliant on 
French finances if he was to be restored militarily, argues that the printers work was an 
essential one and asked that the French reimburse the funds. This could be done he 
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suggested via letters of change which the French could send, covertly one assumes, to 
members of the Jacobite Waldegrave family in London. 
Whether the French themselves advised the Jacobites continually in producing propaganda 
is not something I have looked at here. Klaits states that the French government’s own 
propaganda machine was largely abandoned from the early 1670s to virtually the end of the 
War of the League of Augsburg. Hayton in his essay does show French anti-Williamite 
prints of 1690 related to Ireland.81 However, if the Earl of Tyrconnell’s comments are 
correct, the Jacobites had little faith in the French themselves being able to produce any 
propaganda publications they could use, primarily due to “the little knowledge they have of 
the king’s affaires, as well as that of the three kingdoms”.82 
The possibilities for a domestic English centre of Jacobite propaganda working to 
undermine King William’s position were probably to the fore in the concerns of Daniel 
Finch (1647–1730), 2nd Earl of Nottingham and Secretary of State under the joint 
monarchs. In England, the new regime was mindful of these tactics and from the quotation 
above had probably seen the fruits of the Jacobites’ printing presses. The office of the 
Secretary of State had control of the state security and intelligence apparatus, as indeed it 
had for dissemination of government news through its own organ, the London Gazette.83 
As Marshall states their responsibilities included “interception of mail at the Post Office, 
the seizure of papers or individuals by warrant, the suppression of the printing and 
distribution of seditious material and the interrogation of suspects.84 
It is not surprising that the reference is to printed matter for England, given that was 
James’s target audience, those whom he had to win back, to convince he had their interests 
at heart. His Irish Catholic subjects were already in his wake and in any case knew he was 
probably their best, or perhaps, only prospect for greater recognition, liberty of conscience 
and chances for advancement. Paradoxically, the very fact that James was being supported 
by Irish Catholics was probably his biggest political liability, after his own religious 
convictions, in the eyes of his erstwhile English subjects. 
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In his edition of the Jacobite history of the war in Ireland, written by Jacobite soldier 
Colonel Charles O’Kelly, O’Callaghan relates how under James’s rule in Ireland there was 
a news sheet published under the name of Dublin Gazette which gave information, albeit of 
an officially approved nature, on Jacobite military undertakings in Ireland.85 He further 
alleges that some of these were transported to Scotland for distribution, no doubt to 
encourage James’s party there.86  
Even before his master’s arrival in Ireland towards the end of March, London sources 
alleged that James’s Lord Deputy Richard Talbot, Earl of Tyrconnell, made use of printing 
in Dublin to influence opinion. In a pamphlet originating in London from early 1689, and 
entitled in a way as to reveal its leanings, An Account of the Present Miserable State in 
Ireland, it was claimed that Tyrconnell had made some efforts to manage information in 
the kingdom’s capital, stating that mail from England had been interrupted and that in 
Dublin there “is no public news letter nor Gazette suffered to be in any coffee house, only 
the Dublin Gazette which is a legend in its own composition.”87 
The strategy, if that is what it was, appears to have been two-fold: to restrict the 
importation and distribution of London news sheets, and to allow only the existing Dublin 
publication to circulate, which was closer at hand and therefore easier to control. Whatever 
the actual political leanings of the Dublin Gazette, it was clearly not to the taste of the 
author of the London tract. Certainly, Hayton has catalogued a large number of Williamite 
publications printed in London in 1689–1690 covering all manner of anti-Jacobite and anti-
French themes, such as purported massacres and the subversion of the Protestant religion.88 
It is difficult to say how many of these found their way to Ireland, although some must 
have. Perhaps the Jacobite printing efforts in Dublin were designed to counter these. 
Munter in his 1967 work cast doubt on the existence of the Jacobite Dublin Gazette, citing 
it as conjecture. The reason was that no copies had survived to his knowledge, although he 
did think it possible some news sheets were circulating. He states that if they did exist, they 
might have been either a continuation of the Dublin News letter, which had been founded 
by Dublin bookseller Robert Thornton about 1685 and printed by Joseph Ray’s press. 
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Perhaps O’Callaghan was confusing the late 1690 Williamite publication of the Dublin 
Gazette and had assumed it had started earlier, under the patronage of James II In my own 
research, I have discovered that there are some extant copies of this Jacobite-inspired 
Dublin Gazette, which as yet I have not been able to see but appear to date from early 1690 
and were printed by Malone.89 It is not certain how many editions of these were produced, 
and whether consistently or sporadically. Whatever the circulation, Munter succinctly 
states the motivation behind such a publication was “not solely as a vehicle for 
announcements and decrees but in order to challenge the enemy, expose false rumours and 
in short furnish supporters with an official view.”90 
A different type of Jacobite propaganda piece was printed in late 1689, again under the 
auspices of James Malone, relating to King James’s campaign in the Ulster marches 
against forces commanded by Marshall Schomberg. This concentrated on the advances 
made by Jacobite forces and denigrated the less than impressive efforts of the Williamite 
force. 
A Relation of what most Remarkably happened during the Last 
Campaign in Ireland betwixt His Majesties’ Army Royal, and the Forces 
of the Prince of Orange, sent to Joyn the Rebels, under the Command of 
the Count de Schomberg, / Published by Authority / Dublin, printed for 
Alderman James Malone, Bookseller in Skinner-Row, 1689. 
According to the pamphlet, efforts to attract deserters from Schomberg’s forces prompted 
both James and D’Avaux to issue declarations calling on all to join his own forces, and 
“embrace the Justice of his Quarrel against them”. The tract alleges that Schomberg felt he 
was unable to rely on his own troops who had heard these proclamations. As other 
exhortations to desert had also been received, namely 
several Notes dispersed to the purpose there of, throughout his camp, he 
thought himself obliged more to guard himself against the growing 
dangers in his own army, than to think of advancing any further against 
the King’s.91 
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The copywriter was also anxious to boost the morale of the Jacobite side, stating that no 
doubt Schomberg had encouraged his troops with promises of spoil and profit in Dublin, 
intending to “divide among them, as Cromwel had done, the possessions and inheritances 
of the Loyal party”.92 
What actually transpired was grist to the Jacobite mill. Schomberg’s force, decimated by 
sickness and lacking forage, withdrew from Louth northwards to Belfast, having declined 
James’s offer of battle, which the author said brought shame on a previously successful 
commander: 
The mighty expectations of the Great Schomberg, and his Rebellious 
adherents, being thus defeated … to the loss of that Honour and 
Reputation which he had been so many years acquiring … with the weak 
remainder of his Army … being diminisht much above one half, by 
extream Sickness.93 
Schomberg’s military failure, exacerbated by inefficient supply lines and low-quality 
equipment was needless to say embarrassing to King William.94 However inglorious 
Schomberg’s efforts, there is clearly a Jacobite desire to highlight the positives in view of 
their own fiasco at Derry. Although primarily concerned with discrediting Schomberg, the 
publication also refers to other military successes by “Loyal forces” of King James against 
Ulster rebels at Sligo, Charlemont Fort in Co. Armagh, and Ardee. 
Whoever produced this publication included many interesting statements and claims to 
bolster the Jacobite cause and enhance the reputation of key figures in that establishment. 
One of those singled out for praise was Tyrconnell, “whose zeal and fidelity to the Crown 
in the worst of times can hardly in history find their parallel”. 
The state of the City of Dublin itself was the occasion to laud the achievements of another 
grandee, which for a commercial venture was a chance not to be missed. Perhaps to 
counter Williamite propaganda regarding some partisan treatment of Dublin Protestants 
and rumours of maladministration in the city, the author felt it warranted to state  
                                                   
92
 A relation of what most remarkablyhappened…, p.15. 
93
  A relation of what most remarkablyhappened…., p.14. 
94
  Simms, Jacobite Ireland, p.121. The army commissary at the time, Mr Shales in 
Chester, was suspected of being a Catholic and sympathiser of the Jacobite cause. A 
notable embarrassment was the delivery of many broken muskets. 
39 
 
that the City was so well managed, that it remained still in perfect Peace, 
by the great Care and Conduct of the Honourable Simon Luttrell, 
Collonel of Dragoons, and Governour of the Place, where by his 
prudence he had so well ordered every thing, that no attempts from 
abroad, or from any Faction within the City, could produce any Mischief, 
or give the Enemy any advantage.95 
The tract ends on a positive note for Jacobites, mentioning how Justin McCarthy, Lord 
Mountcashel, who had been captured by Ulster Williamites at Enniskillen, had managed to 
carry out a daring escape and had returned to Dublin .96 Having “[m]ost ingeniously 
wrought his own deliverance from his confinement at Iniskilling … he was very kindly 
received by the King with a hearty Welcome… Tuesday 17th of December”. It is worth 
considering for a moment here the dating of the document. The tract carries a printed date 
of 1689 on the cover sheet. The last event specifically dated is Mountcashel’s return on 17 
December, presumably using old-style dating. In this calendar the start of 1690 would have 
been Lady Day, 25 March. So it is possible the actual date of printing might have been 
between December and March.  
There is, however, one other element worth considering. In the document there is a 
reference to an English raid on Dublin Bay, which the author said was successfully 
repulsed: “Tis true that their Ships came to an Anchor in Dublin-road, and that they began 
to land some men.”97 Despite this attack on an unexpected front, the calling out of the 
Jacobite Dublin militia “soon obliged them to retire to their ships, which then immediately 
put to sea”. While it is possible there were a number of raids by Royal Navy ships 
attacking Dublin, the only one that has come down in the accepted histories is that carried 
out by a small force under Sir Cloudesley Shovell. Using a frigate and yacht, the English 
force managed to steal back a Scottish prize frigate, Pelican, before making good their 
escape in front of a large crowd on the shoreline. This vessel had previously been captured 
by French frigates off the coast of Scotland in 1689. The date generally given for Shovell’s 
exploit is late April 1690.98 The event was so embarrassing to the Jacobites, and widely 
known in Dublin and abroad, that it could not have been ignored in such a Dublin 
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publication, although perhaps some poetic licence was taken with the facts as regards exact 
dating. 
Jacobite Propaganda in Britain 
Overall, this document’s importance and propaganda value is certainly noteworthy at one 
level as an example of Jacobite propaganda that relates to military success in Ireland. 
Interestingly, it was evidently considered at the time to have been worth distributing to a 
wider audience, and to this end it appeared in England in 1690, relatively quickly after its 
publication. The English authorities seem to have been alive to this, however, as the 
Calendar of State Papers for 17 April (o.s.) records the issuance of a warrant  
to apprehend --- Pool, a bookseller, John Mullett, Benjamin Molson, 
William Haskar, John Quinney and John Shutter, for printing and 
publishing scandalous and seditious pamphlets entitled ‘a relation of 
what most remarkably happened during the last campaigne in Ireland’ as 
well as ‘the Abhorrence, or Protestant observations in Dublin, upon the 
principles and practices of the Protestants at London’.99 
It is tempting to think that the person named Pool and his/her associates are the Jacobite 
printers in England referred to above by Melfort in his letter to France. There are, however, 
other possible candidates to consider. Nottingham, as Secretary of State, had agents 
working at the London post office to identify any suspicious letters and to be on the 
lookout for anti-government publications. Again, the state papers record government 
activities in this area, when in late May 1689 the authorities issued a 
warrant to Arthur Clum, of the General Letter Office, to search for 
treasonable and seditious printed libels, books and papers, about the 
persons, and in the chambers, and warehouses of all carriers, waggoners, 
and pack-horse men and hagglers, now on the western roads.100 
This, coupled with the joint efforts to intercept correspondence between known or 
suspected Jacobites, led to a number of messages being stopped, investigated and decoded. 
In October 1689, one recipient was identified as a Mr William Canning, stationer in the 
Middle Temple, London. This led to a warrant for his apprehension on a charge of 
publishing seditious news about the king and government. 
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How much effect pro-Jacobite newsletters and printed papers coming into England had 
upon the local literate populace is difficult to judge. In a letter to Lord Shrewsbury written 
in June 1689, Lord Brandon, stationed at Ormskirk near Bolton, seems to doubt their 
effectiveness. “There are abundance of the late King’s declarations sent into the country, 
but they make no impression upon anybody.”101 
On 12 July 1690, Nottingham wrote to Lord Brandon, who had been patrolling the northern 
Welsh Coast up to and beyond Chester in search of boats coming from Ireland. Nottingham 
told him that “The Queen has information that one Tootell, who keeps a coffee house in 
Wigan, is furnished with letters of false news defaming the government.” Despite this, for 
reasons unstated, the mayor of the town could not be persuaded to intervene: “Her Majesty 
would therefore have your lordship suppress the news-letter and punish the offenders and 
prosecute the author.”102 
The reference to coffee houses is one that appears in a number of reports. As Hayton states, 
even in semi-literate societies, newspapers and news sheets were often read out aloud in 
such establishments and other meeting places, so that even those who could not read were 
still able to listen and thereafter spread news by word of mouth. 103 The sample references 
above to printers in England publishing anti-government papers and other indications that 
James had sent agents to England with papers could both go to explain the existence of a 
certain volume of “seditious” printings circulating in Britain. It would be hard to discern 
whether they had come from Ireland or originated in Britain. Whatever their origin, the 
English authorities felt obliged to go further and persuade the printers themselves to act in 
support of the government. On 21 July 1690 (o.s.), Nottingham wrote to the Company of 
Stationers, the guild in London responsible for licenced printers, reminding them that under 
a recent Act of Parliament they were obliged to keep their presses under due care, because 
there were “several scandalous and seditious books and pamphlets frequently published to 
the great disturbance of the peace of their Majesty’s government”.104 Moreover, he 
enjoined upon them to act in accordance with the new law and to “make often and diligent 
searches in all such places you or any of you shall know or have any probably reason to 
suspect and to seize all unlicensed, scandalous books and pamphlets.” In all these searches, 
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the printers were obliged to be accompanied by the “messenger of the press”, in effect a 
clerk employed by Nottingham’s own office. 
In February 1691, Henry Viscount Sidney felt obliged to write to the Mayor of London 
complaining of a number of individuals who were described as “[s]editious newsmongers 
and incendiaries” who were gathering in City coffee houses. The mayor was encouraged to 
advise magistrates and justices of the peace in the various municipal districts to proceed 
against these individuals who purposely gathered there 
to spread false and seditious reports, and to inveigh against the present 
Government, to the great discouragement and scandal of all their 
Majesties’ subjects, which if not timely prevented, may prove of very 
dangerous consequence. 
Whether these persons were Jacobite agents or merely sympathisers is hard to tell. Clearly, 
this was an ongoing problem for the government authorities in a time of war, despite any 
exhortations to freedom of speech.105 
In summary, therefore, it can be stated that Jacobite printers and writers were evidently 
active both in Ireland and in Britain. In Ireland for a period they had the “imprimatur” of 
royal authority (albeit deposed) for as long as James was in power and so were able to 
produce news sheets and pamphlets to further their cause. These publications had some sort 
of circulation in England. Other Jacobite groups were active in England and Scotland 
producing other material. In Ireland, however, this ended with the victory of King William 
at the Battle of the Boyne at the start of July 1690. Alderman James Malone’s last 
proclamation printed for King James is dated 15 June and related to an attempt to fix 
exchange rates between French and Spanish gold coins and Jacobite brass and copper 
coinage, the so-called gun money. Malone, whose career had prospered with James’s 
patronage, became persona non grata to the new regimeWhile it is possible that Malone or 
others might have also have produced the satirical illustrations so popular at the time, I 
have not found documentary evidence either for or against. As Hayton says, the real 
masters of the lampooning prints were the Dutch, so perhaps the skills might not have been 
available. The fleeting reference in French correspondence to an engraver, a certain 
Monsieur Hupiere, being sent over to Ireland along with his two boy assistants in early 
1690 is perhaps more likely to relate to the production of the gun money rather than 
propaganda, although it is tempting to think he could have produced pro-Jacobite images 
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too.106 In this tale of Jacobite propaganda, the French are generally quite absent — perhaps 
understandably, given the language issues — unless of course they were the silent business 
partner, funding the enterprise. 
Unsurprisingly, when King William and his forces landed in Ireland, he brought a loyal 
printer with him, Edward Jones from London, who brought his own printing press. It was 
Jones who printed Williamite proclamations in Dublin in later months of 1690 while the 
king was with the army.107 Once William had departed to England, Jones went with him. 
Andrew Crooke was again appointed as “Printer to His King’s Majesty in Dublin” and 
served for a number of years. His name appears on the editions of the Ascendancy 
Parliament’s anti-Catholic Penal Laws from around 1692 onwards. In an example of what 
were very changed times, the Dublin Gazette  newspaper re-appeared in September 1690 
under publisher Robert Thornton. In stark contrast to the works of James Malone, Munter 
describes it as “vehemently Protestant and staunchly Williamite”.108  
James Malone also managed to continue a career in Dublin. In keeping with his former 
sympathies, he had many interactions with the authorities on account of his religious and 
political views. Ejected from the Printers Guild in 1696, his opponents at the time stated he 
had been a “captain, commissioner of array, and printer to the late King James” during the 
war. He is further alleged to have seized the printing press of another Dublin craftsman, 
Joseph Ray, and to have “published seditious libels”.109 His troubles in 1696 resulted from 
his activities as a “promoter and trader in Popish books”. He was subsequently reinstated 
as a “freeman” in 1700. These infractions with the government seem not to have deterred 
him, and he remained active in publishing. In 1703 he again came to the attention of the 
Dublin authorities by putting his name to an edition of the Memoirs of James the Second, 
which he had printed and for which he was arrested and questioned.110 In his defence, he 
was able to prove he was not the originator of the text, as it had previously been printed in 
London, so he escaped with a heavy fine but was not incarcerated. 
Printed bills and news sheets fall into the category of ephemera, and so relatively few 
originals from this period in Ireland have survived to our time. Those having done so are 
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almost always Williamite in tone and content. The wording of many Dublin proclamations 
of James II have been preserved in some sources, such as the Stuart papers and Ormonde 
volumes (HMC). Some other copies survive in French records as they were included in 
D’Avaux’s correspondence back to France in the period 1689-90. Few examples of 
Jacobite propaganda publications, either pamphlets, news sheets or tracts have survived, 
not least because with the Williamite victory these were “seditious”, the possession of 
which would put the bearer at considerable risk if discovered. 
Clearly therefore printing such tracts was both an expensive and risky task. The 
consequences of being found out producing, transporting or even possessing such work 
were grave indeed. The victors in any case were clearly not interested in having anti-
establishment papers circulate. At the end of the day, however, Jacobite propaganda was 
fighting an uphill battle. The “Glorious Revolution” had proved that James II’s policies 
were not in tune with the majority of his subjects, the greater portion of whom were 
Anglican. The fact that James had such support from Catholic Ireland and France was a 
serious liability in their eyes, and so damaged his image still further.111 The British 
establishment, moreover, was able to harness the infinitely greater infrastructure of the 
London print houses for their own ends to produce government publications and volumes 
of popular anti-Catholic tracts. As Mann says, “Whig Anti-Jacobite propaganda was 
overwhelmingly printed in London, which signifies the attempt at centralised information 
control by English ministers”.112 In the end, the Jacobite volumes were probably too small, 
and in any case they did not catch the popular mood where James wanted to be popular. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of the conflict the French tried to assist in the production of Jacobite 
propaganda but they were not always happy with its content. With the establishment of the 
Jacobite regime in Dublin however the emphasis for production shifted directly under 
Jacobite control. James II’s supporters produced a newspaper in Dublin and many 
promotional pamphlets, some of which they tried to distribute in Scotland and England. 
There the Williamite regime made great efforts to suppress this printed dissent. In the end 
however the tide was against James II and his adherents. Despite French assistance more 
than because of it, Jacobites were ultimately unsuccessful in their propaganda endeavours. 
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This appears to be a case of the message not being to the liking of their target audience as 
much as to the state’s efforts in England and Scotland to shut down the sources.  
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CHAPTER III – THE GUISES OF DIPLOMACY: TWO FRENCH ENVOYS IN 
IRELAND 
Introduction: The Comte D’Avaux and the Abbé de Gravel 
At the start of the War of the League of Augsburg, the France of Louis XIV had few 
friends. One ally, by force of circumstance, was a monarch without a kingdom, the exiled 
James II. In February 1689, the decision was taken for James to lead an expedition to 
Ireland with French support. To assist James and to ensure French interests were protected, 
it was decided to send a loyal and experienced diplomat to advise him.113 Louis’s choice 
fell on capable shoulders: the experienced and respected Comte D’Avaux, Jean-Antoine de 
Mesmes (1640-1709). Although he was the most important French diplomat in Ireland 
during the campaign, he was not the only one. The other was the Abbé de Gravel, also 
experienced, but acting in an obscure capacity.  
Overall, this chapter aims to show what sorts of information were provided by the 
diplomats about the situation on the ground in Ireland. This was the information ministers 
such as Louvois, Colbert de Croissy and Seignelay had at their disposal, among other 
sources. It was this type of data, once analysed, that French government decision-making 
for Ireland was based on.114 The first section of the chapter deals with D’Avaux and the 
second with Abbé de Gravel.  
In wartime, intelligence and information are essential for decision-makers in both strategic 
and tactical decision-making. The French government at Versailles, with forces in Ireland 
in 1689–1691, was trying to direct a campaign in a theatre many hundreds of kilometres 
away. To this end, all of Louis XIV’s ministers requested that all their subordinates 
operating in Ireland, be they diplomats, army commissaries or engineers, write back 
informing their respective ministers concerning their activities and the state of the country 
as they saw and heard about it. D’Avaux and Gravel exemplify the sorts of figures 
deployed by the French government to supply it with crucial information. D’Avaux acted 
in an official, quite defined diplomatic and advisory role, while Gravel was a functionary 
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of lower social status in a more ambiguous but equally vital role. The division between the 
two, of seniority and historical notoriety, is reflected in the archival material and 
scholarship done. Not surprisingly, there is much more on D’Avaux than on the lesser-
known Gravel. This neglect of Gravel merits correction in terms of the Irish campaign. 
D’Avaux: An example of a French ambassador of the 17th century 
As king, Louis XIV needed to have every confidence that his ally James II received the 
best advice and that the person supplying that to him was dependable, experienced and 
loyal. The Comte D’Avaux was all these things. Before starting on the detail of D’Avaux 
in Ireland, it is worth setting the scene by looking at the context of diplomacy in the age of 
the Sun King and related historiography. 
Some recent scholarship on the history of diplomacy in the early modern period has 
focused on French diplomacy as a model to be studied in depth, including as it does those 
serving the great 17th-century figures of France, such as Richelieu, Mazarin and Louis 
XIV. Roosen is one example, while O’Connor and Rule are others.115 Another notable 
historian is Bély, who has done considerable work on events around the Peace of Utrecht in 
1713. 
The secretary in charge of foreign affairs during the Irish campaign was Charles Colbert, 
Marquis de Croissy (1625–1696). He was a brother to the famous Jean-Baptiste Colbert 
and uncle to Colbert de Seignelay, secretary of the Navy. Although he started his career as 
an army intendant in Alsace and Flanders, he gradually moved into the diplomatic 
sphere.116After participating as a negotiator at talks leading to the Treaty of Aix la 
Chapelle, he was posted as ambassador to the England of Charles II. In 1679, he was in 
Munich to discuss the marriage of the Dauphin to the daughter of the Elector of Bavaria. It 
was from there that he was recalled and named as secretary for foreign affairs.  
Although ostensibly his promotion was a result of intrigue between the Le Tellier and 
Colbert clans against the incumbent foreign secretary, Simon Arnauld de Pomponne, this is 
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not the full story.117 From a historiographical point of view, Croissy’s incumbency is 
associated with the expansionist “reunions” policy of 1679–1684. The origin of this policy 
of legalistic annexations of territory in Alsace and Lorraine was a strategic desire to 
rationalise France’s eastern borders and make them more defensible.118 The king had 
decided this needed to be done but did not feel that the conciliatory Pomponne would 
pursue this with the vigour expected. Croissy was recognised as having a harder, more 
aggressive character more in the mould of a Louvois. It is difficult to accept therefore that 
Croissy was appointed to foreign affairs merely due to intrigue. Whatever the king was, he 
was not merely an actor in his own government; he was the orchestrator.119  
The new, more expansionist policies are commented on by many historians of diplomacy. 
O’Connor contributed a succinct paper in Paul Sonnino’s collection of essays on the 
interplay between diplomatic overtures, money and the wars of the reign, underlining how 
much less cautious Louis was than Mazarin in dealing with allies.120 Wolf says the policy 
of the reunions and the associated occupations by French troops were viewed by the 
onlooking European countries as a mix of “violence and usurpation”, executed by Louis’s 
willing ministers acting in tandem.121 The tenure of Colbert de Croissy (1679–1696) is also 
remembered, along with his son Colbert de Torcy (1696–1715), who succeeded him, as 
having greatly elaborated the administration of the foreign affairs secretariat. As Rule 
points out, the department went from being a small administrative family to that of a 
bureaucratic machine, although the clientage was still evident from the small number of the 
same families from which commis were drawn.122  
Another aspect Croissy brought in was personally drafting instructions to travelling French 
envoys, whatever their grade, and being the only secretary empowered to receive foreign 
ambassadors. To some extent, this reflected the new ministerial reality in France, where 
Croissy was anxious to retain complete control of foreign affairs under the king. He wished 
to avoid the habits of the past, where secretaries for other areas had more influence on 
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foreign affairs. Louvois was a case in point, not least because he had acted as caretaker 
secretary in 1679 between Pomponne’s departure and Croissy’s return to Paris. 
A number of scholars concentrate on the more important envoys, sometimes in the context 
of a major treaty such as Westphalia, Ryswick and Utrecht. Bély’s opus widens the scope 
of the scholarly research by including the analysis of lower-level diplomats, such as 
chargés de mission on less important postings, or members of the secretarial staff travelling 
in the suite of more illustrious envoys. Although Bély’s book is beyond my scope, one 
could use his classification and see the Abbé de Gravel as an example of this second tier of 
envoy.123 Most scholars agree that envoys in this period, aside from their purely diplomatic 
functions engaging with the government of the posting busied themselves in gathering 
information useful to the home country, a characteristic one might say not obviously 
confined to the seventeenth century. This data could have been of a political, commercial 
or military nature. Even if ambassadors themselves, often at post in hostile territories and 
vulnerable to close supervision, did not engage in espionage directly, Bély argues that 
others under cover of a large entourage probably did.124 
On D’Avaux’s career specifically, there are a number of relevant secondary works. Most, 
however, are not concerned with Ireland in this period and so neglect D’Avaux’s actions 
there. In his survey of louisquatorzien diplomacy, Roosen gives details of D’Avaux’s early 
postings and cites him as a good example of the type of individual active in the diplomatic 
corps at the time. He underlines both his robe origins and the relative importance of family 
links in recruitment.125  
Regarding Irish historiography, many of the standard texts already cited in Chapter 1 deal 
with D’Avaux’s actions in Ireland. Simms is the most comprehensive, with Pillorget and 
Hayton, among others, giving good overviews.126 Hayton underlines James’s essentially 
“English” attitude in trying to avoid concessions to his Irish subjects.127 All have relied on 
Hogan’s excellent edition of D’Avaux’s correspondence and its useful introductory 
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chapter.128 What they do not deal with, though, is D’Avaux’s correspondence back to 
France and the way he related to powerful ministers there.  
D’Avaux was appointed Louis XIV’s ambassador to James II when he departed for Ireland 
in March 1689. Like many others in the diplomatic circle, D’Avaux was a member of a 
noblesse de robe family. His uncle Claude de Mesmes, also Comte D’Avaux, was a lawyer 
by training. He worked as a diplomat during the Thirty Years War and was a French 
negotiator at the Peace of Westphalia.129 The young Jean-Antoine got his first posting as 
resident envoy in Venice in 1672, was one of the French negotiators for the Treaty of 
Nijmegen and then became France’s envoy to the Dutch Republic for almost ten years. 
During that time, he was seen as an ally of Dutch republicans who struggled to restrict the 
powers of the House of Orange.130 He was ironically the envoy during the time of William 
of Orange’s preparations for the “Glorious Revolution” during 1688 and sent warnings to 
Louis of the build-up of forces. This term must have given him considerable insight into 
the mindset of William III, and so he was a sound choice as advisor to James.  
By the time of his posting to Ireland, D’Avaux was a highly experienced and respected 
“career diplomat”. As one contemporary described him,  
Monsieur d’Avaux is a true genius, and is very good tempered; he takes 
the large perspective, has much shrewdness and great experience in 
public affairs. He understands perfectly the interests of the princes of 
Europe and he writes and speaks well.131  
To Louis, D’Avaux must have appeared almost the perfect choice as ambassador to an 
important though difficult ally. To assist the diplomat in his mission Louis gave him 
official accreditation papers as ambassadeur extraordinaire to the English Royal Court.132 
Louis explained to D’Avaux that the formal letters would tell everyone who and what he 
was, an important representative of their powerful ally. In one sense, this bolstered James’s 
claim to be still a de facto ruler, not just de jure. Moreover, for Louis his armed 
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intervention in the Three Kingdoms on behalf of his ally against the new de facto rulers 
William and Mary could appear justified and indeed justifiable in a propaganda sense.  
D’Avaux detailed instructions were from Louis himself, dated at Marly, 11 February 1689 
though they were probably drawn up by Colbert de Croissy who signed them. While part of 
the instructions could be regarded as standard, there were elements more specific to this 
expedition. The intention is clearly expressed that once military control has been 
successfully established over all Ireland, there should be serious consideration given to an 
army crossing to Scotland and then England. Such indeed was James immediate aim, 
although the French always made their support contingent on complete control of Ireland.  
To this end, D’Avaux is encouraged to find reliable informants both in Ireland and Britain 
who are able to supply him with information, for payment, concerning events and politics 
in both Westminster and Scotland, in particular relating to the upcoming Edinburgh 
Convention. The ambassador is encouraged to try to identify members of the House of 
Commons willing to oppose William of Orange and his projects, and for such MPs to 
recruit others of like mind. The aim was at least to sow dissention if not actively promote 
opposition. D’Avaux should reserve up to 100,000 livres to sustain such an opposition 
grouping.133 Regarding Ireland, the diplomat is rather naively exhorted to promote peace 
between Catholics and Protestants and to encourage different political factions to forget 
their differences and work together in support of James II’s efforts to regain his throne.  
D’Avaux was in post from March 1689 until early May 1690 in Ireland, working closely 
with James II. His extant official correspondence is a valuable source of information on 
James, his various advisors and their actions in this period. As for most career diplomats of 
the time, his function required him to regularly send home written reports on a wide variety 
of topics and this duty D’Avaux fulfilled to the letter. In Ireland, he was involved in 
decisions regarding the government of the country, military, economic and administrative, 
as well as trying to organise information gathering in a Three Kingdoms context. His 
letters are especially informative for the bête noire of the French in Ireland, the ambitious 
John Drummond, Earl of Melfort. Despite officially agreeing with many of D’Avaux’s 
suggestions and plans in Ireland, generally sensible and pragmatic, Melfort, through his 
flattery of and influence over James, frequently sabotaged them by persuading the king to 
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act differently. Tyrconnell, James’s Lord Deputy in Ireland, also resented Melfort’s 
influence as nefarious and was himself favoured by D’Avaux. Moreover, he was obliged to 
referee between the English and Scottish advisors of James and Irish nationalistic elements 
who favoured a Catholic monarch but less his very English views.134 This was evident in 
the Dublin Parliament ordered by James, where he opposed many concessions to Catholics, 
much to D’Avaux’s dismay. In a general way, therefore, D’Avaux’s posting to Ireland was 
much more intense than previous or subsequent postings, as it contrasts with the regular 
conduct of diplomats, who were more only consulted on foreign policy issues than 
domestic questions. 
Another aspect of D’Avaux’s duties was to make sure that there was only one French point 
of view being put to James. In April and May 1689, a French naval officer, the Chevalier 
de Pointis, made various suggestions to the English king regarding the use of French navy 
ships in Ireland.135 These included sending some to bombard Derry in a similar fashion as 
had been done with newly designed bomb ketches at Genoa in 1684 and against Barbary 
pirate cities of Tripoli and Tunis.136 This suggestion was not appreciated by D’Avaux, who 
advised against it and then wrote to Seignelay in France about Pointis. Seignelay quickly 
wrote back to Pointis, stating firstly he did not accept the suggestion was a valid plan. He 
did not want to risk French vessels operating far from home bases (in France, as Seignelay 
saw it). More importantly, the navy secretary told him in no uncertain terms that all future 
suggestions would first have to go before D’Avaux, as he was the king’s minister in 
Ireland.137 Another figure whom D’Avaux may have had to restrain was Conrad von 
Rosen, the Livonian-born French commander of James’s forces in Ireland. Rosen wrote 
often to James, but it was clear they did not see eye to eye. 
A brief statistical study of the extant D’Avaux correspondence related to Ireland gives 
insights into both the realms of his involvement and his contacts with key figures in the 
French government. In his correspondence to France, one sees D’Avaux expressing his 
frustration as to why ostensibly obvious organisational decisions regarding army training 
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or revenue collection had not been adopted and enforced. Likewise, they are valuable for 
showing how D’Avaux interacted with the ministers in Louis’s government. Whom he 
wrote to depended on what the topic was. For overall policy relating to France and 
England, this orientation obviously came from the king, either directly or via Croissy, the 
secretary for foreign affairs. For military matters, such as army supplies, D’Avaux 
corresponded with Louvois. Here he underlined the penury of resources available on the 
island, knowing full well of the French policy of trying to support armies in theatre using 
local supplies. On trade-related subjects the ambassador wrote to Seignelay, navy secretary 
and Croissy’s nephew.138 For reports containing confidential information, or indeed 
compromising appraisals of people, D’Avaux had been given encoding tables. A secretary 
or scribe could encode missives after their dictation and prepare them to be sent to France 
via small packet vessels assigned to this task.139  
Taking as a basis the letters published in Hogan, D’Avaux sent 199 official letters to 
France in his capacity as ambassador and received 95, and this over a period of 13 months, 
from March 1689 to April 1690 (see table below). Given that envoys were advised to write 
often and cover any subjects of possible interest, this explains why he wrote twice as many 
as he received. 
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Table I: Breakdown of D’Avaux’s official correspondence while in Ireland, 1689-1690.140 
Letters sent by D’Avaux Recipients Number 
 Louis XIV 44 
 Colbert de Croissy, Foreign Affairs Secretary 49 
 Louvois, War Minister 63 
 
Seignelay, Navy Secretary & King’s 
Household 
43 
Total  199 
   Letters received by 
D’Avaux 
Senders Number 
 Louis XIV 26 
 Colbert de Croissy, Foreign Affairs Secretary 29 
 Louvois, War Minister 23 
 
Seignelay, Navy Secretary & King’s 
Household 
17 
Total  95 
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As a clarification, one must be careful with the D’Avaux – Croissy correspondence figures 
going in both directions. Most of the time when the king is writing to D’Avaux that is the 
main letter of instructions, with an accompanying cover letter from Croissy. The odd time 
the king set out the general lines of action to take in certain circumstances, and stated that 
D’Avaux will get details from Croissy, so Croissy’s letters are longer in that case. 
Likewise, D’Avaux almost always accompanies his letters to the king with a cover letter to 
Croissy, his hierarchical superior in the foreign affairs department. The fact that D’Avaux 
corresponded directly with the king underlines the interest Louis XIV had in James and the 
Irish campaign. Indeed, Sarmant notes that many of D’Avaux’s letters carry the mention 
that Louis himself had read them, or had them read to him.141 D’Avaux also wrote many 
letters to Louvois, as much of his time in Ireland was spent considering the military 
situation, discussing supplies needed and trying to highlight army organisational issues to 
James. Even so, the number is high, and given the view that the D’Avaux family were 
clients of the Le Tellier clan, this desire to inform Louvois could also be seen as service to 
one’s patron.142 
To finance James’s activities, D’Avaux was entrusted with the control of the initial 
500,000 livres funding provided by Louis. This seems to have been supplied in gold coin, 
but there were instructions for the officials transporting it to try to change some of this into 
silver coinage before embarking.143 The first 300,000 was to be paid out on James’s 
instructions as required. D’Avaux was, however, ordered to keep in reserve the remaining 
200,000 livres, to be used only in case of necessity and revealed only when the first amount 
was exhausted.144 His correspondence naturally includes what some of these monies had 
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been spent on, but in general D’Avaux and other French officials were dismayed with the 
speed with which James managed to go through the first 300,000 livres. D’Avaux’s advice 
to James on financial restraint, which did not earn him that monarch’s favour, are a 
recurring theme in his correspondence.145 Also treated at length are D’Avaux’s views, 
reflecting Louis’s decision, that James should not attempt to cross to Scotland or England 
until all of Ireland had been subdued and that militarily Ireland had been put in a state of 
readiness to resist William of Orange, should any Jacobite campaign on the British 
mainland go awry. James himself was interested in Ireland only as a stepping stone to 
Britain.146 
D’Avaux could be viewed as an eminence grise figure, almost a powerful minister in his 
own right rather than a pure ambassador from a foreign power. The scope of his activities 
in Ireland underline what an indefatigable worker he was on behalf of the Sun King. In 
James, however, it could be said that he had found almost a nemesis. The practical, logical 
suggestions he made to James regarding reducing the size of the army, setting up army 
stores at strategic points around the island and tightening civil administration either fell on 
deaf ears or stayed a dead letter, because the king never ensured his subordinates carried 
out the policies.147 While D’Avaux sent letters back to France expressing his frustration at 
this, and how difficult it was to work with James, others, like Melfort, wrote to James’s 
Queen in France. These letters, critical of D’Avaux, were sent to Saint-Germain. Through 
Mary of Modena, these views reached Louis.  
As will be seen later, those opposed to D’Avaux — or rather anxious to use James to their 
advantage, such as the Comte de Lauzun — were able to use his own honesty against him 
in order to advance a very different agenda. D’Avaux knew this was going on at court due 
to private correspondence he received from friends, but could only appeal to Louis that 
accusations of disrespect towards James II or neglect of his affairs were false. Gradually, 
however, any trust between D’Avaux and James was lost, and Louis realised this. 
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Moreover, due to Lauzun’s prompting and Mary’s support, James himself requested that 
Lauzun be sent to Ireland with troops to support him.148 
The decision was made to recall D’Avaux. In his letter, Louis made it clear that he was 
pleased with his conduct. D’Avaux himself left Ireland reluctantly, believing he still had 
much to offer and he was still writing memoranda in his final days before sailing. Louis 
knew from the correspondence and gossips that D’Avaux and Lauzun were hostile to each 
other, and it would cause trouble if both were in Ireland. This is reflected in Croissy’s 
follow-up letter, stating that the recall was also to avoid any incidents, “pour eviter tout 
contrariete qui pourroit faire naitre d’incidents entre vous-mesme et mondit. Seigneur de 
Lauzun.”149 
That he was not held responsible for the problems the French met in Ireland is shown by 
the fact that D’Avaux was invited by the king to visit him at Marly, a sought-after sign of 
favour at court.150 In November 1692, he was named ambassador to Sweden, a prestigious 
posting clearly demonstrating that he retained the king’s confidence in his abilities.151 He 
died in Paris in 1709. 
Don’t judge a monk by his habit? The Abbé de Gravel in Ireland, 1689–1691 
A shadowy figure operating on the sidelines of Jacobite forces in Ireland in the 1689–1691 
period was a French cleric, the Abbé de Gravel.152 From primary-source evidence, it is 
clear he was operating in Galway in late 1690 and the early months of 1691 and that he 
wrote to Louvois on a number of occasions.  
Gravel’s background was as an experienced lower-level diplomat who had been on many 
postings in Germany. Nevertheless, it is not clear who this figure was exactly and what was 
he doing in Ireland.153 This part of the chapter will attempt to find out what Gravel’s 
functions were in Ireland. First, though, I will attempt to give a broad overview of his 
overall experience and then I will analyse in detail the content of his correspondence.  
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Although the body of evidence for the complete career of Abbé Jacques de Gravel is a little 
scanty compared with D’Avaux, it is possible to establish “islands of truth” and pinpoint 
him at various specific times. If his role and actions in Ireland are shadowy, background 
research reveals his profile to be rather more interesting than just that of a random French 
cleric posted to Ireland with the army. He first appears in diplomatic records as a secretary 
to his (probably) older brother, the better documented Robert de Gravel (1616–1684), a 
French envoy frequently send on missions to different states in the Empire and the Swiss 
cantons. Robert had previously worked as a secretary in the service of France’s Prime 
Minister, Cardinal Mazarin (1602–1661).154 O’Connor mentions Robert de Gravel in the 
context of French foreign policy in Germany, and calls him “one of the most experienced 
and knowledgeable of French diplomats in the Empire at the time”.155 Through loyalty and 
hard work, this member of a robe family gained reward and recognition. By 1666, he is 
recorded as lord of Marly near Metz in Lorraine. In 1676 he was named a Knight of the 
Order of Saint Michael. Later on, his lordship of Marly was raised to a marquisate, thus 
entering the higher aristocracy. He died while on the key posting to the Swiss cantons at 
Soleure in 1684.156 Robert’s son, Jules de Gravel, succeeded him as Marquis de Marly and 
unusually also followed a diplomatic career. He was posted to Switzerland in 1684, then 
later to Trier, Cologne and Brandenburg.157 This son died in 1726.  
The best-documented period of Jacques de Gravel’s career is the early years, chiefly the 
mid-1660s to the 1670s. For part of this time, he was resident French emissary at the court 
of John-Philip von Schoenborn, Archbishop of Mainz. This prelate and temporal ruler was 
in the strategic ambit of both France and an Imperial Elector, a sometime ally of Louis 
XIV, a position attested to in a number of sources. The position was a delicate one, 
however, as Louis XIV notes in his memoirs. “I sent the Abbé de Gravel with instructions 
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to remain about the Elector of Mayntz, in order to watch more closely his conduct, which 
was not altogether sincere.”158 
The most complete account of Gravel’s actions at Mainz is in Badalo-Dulong’s work on 
louisquatorzien diplomacy in the Empire.159 This catalogues the many different actions in 
which Gravel engaged, aimed at improving the French position and influence vis-à-vis the 
Elector.160 Like D’Avaux, these ranged from political negotiations to issues regarding trade 
and commerce as well as sending information back to France, all duties of a contemporary 
diplomat. He also sponsored a baroque musical celebration for the Elector’s entertainment 
in 1668.161 From Mainz, Gravel wrote to a number of key figures, notably Colbert, the 
minister for commerce, in June 1673 and to the young secretary for war, the Marquis de 
Louvois, on a number of occasions in 1673 and 1674.162 Following this posting, he 
probably returned to France for a period. Relying heavily on Badalo-Dulong is 
Thompson’s study of the diplomatic position of the Electorate of Mainz, but over a longer 
period.163 Wiedeburg gives detail on Gravel’s other postings in his work on philosopher 
Gottfried von Leibniz (1646–1716). He states Gravel was resident in Mainz from 22 
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February 1666 to 16 December 1674, was posted to Hesse-Darmstadt in 1675 and was then 
present at a conference in Marchienne-au-Pont in the Spanish Netherlands in 1676.164 
Early that same year, French official records show that he spent a short period at Liege 
involved in discussions with the Prince-Bishop.165 These concerned the continued 
neutrality of the city in the Franco-Dutch war (1671–1678) and the possible evacuation of 
troops from there and the citadels of Huy and Dinant, again in the “buffer zone” territory of 
the Spanish Netherlands between France and the Dutch Republic.Almost two years later, 
his whereabouts can be identified in a letter to Leibniz from his friend Louis Ferrand, dated 
8 September 1678. It refers to the abbot as quietly living the life of a reclusive monk in an 
abbey in Poitou.166  
Mr l’Abbé de Gravel est toujours en son Abbaye de Poictou ou il mene 
non pas une vie d’Ambassadeur mais une vie du plus grand solitaire qui 
fut jamais dans la Thebaide. C’est un changement si extraordinaire que 
tout le monde en est dans l’admiration. Il y a prez de deux ans qu’il fait 
cette vie et je pense qu’il n’a pas envie de la quitter ni de se mesler 
jamais plus des employs publics. Je luy feray vos compliments la 
premiere fois que j’auray l’honneur de luy ecrire qui sera samedi 
prochain s’il plaist a Dieu.167 
That Jacques de Gravel personally knew Leibniz is not a surprise. In the late 1660s and 
early 1670s, Leibniz’s patron was the Archbishop-Elector of Mainz, and as Gravel was the 
French envoy, it seems most likely they met there. One might note in passing that Leibniz 
visited Paris in 1672 and met with Gravel at St Germain en Laye.  
After the 1678 letter there followed a long period of obscurity. The Abbé de Gravel seems 
absent from the diplomatic scene and there is little evidence about his activities or where 
he was living. It is possible that in the 1680s he acted in an advisory and secretarial 
capacity to his diplomatic nephew, as he had done for his brother. He surfaced again in 
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official records in a letter from his nephew to Croissy from Bonn in 1687, where he is 
mentioned as having met the adjutant bishop William Egon von Fuerstenberg.168 
His next appearance was in Ireland in 1690–1691, of which more later. For completeness, 
it is worth mentioning here subsequent actions of an ancillary nature towards the end of his 
career. Following the 1687 reference, I have found two other mentions of him. The first is 
in 1707, when a contemporary news sheet recorded his presence near Neuchatel in 
Switzerland in the suite of the Prince de Conti, (François Louis de Bourbon, 1664–1709), 
at the funeral of the Princesse Marie d’Orléans-Longueville, Duchess of Nemours on 26–
28 June. Gravel was , probably there to assist diplomatically in the Conti claim to the 
lordship of Neuchâtel.169  
In 1726, the Abbé was again mentioned, this time in the Mercure de France in an obituary 
notice for his nephew Jules de Gravel, Marquis de Marly, who had pursued a diplomatic 
career and died aged 72. Jacques de Gravel is mentioned as brother to the late Robert, and 
also having served as a diplomat. He is named as abbot of Argentan in southern Normandy. 
It is not clear whether the abbé was still alive at this stage, although if he were, he would 
have been very old.170 
In summary, therefore, it is certain from the records cited above that Jacques de Gravel 
originated from a family of either minor gentry or more probably robe with a record of 
faithful service to the crown. He followed the lead of a brother who served first Mazarin 
and then the new king when Louis took personal direction of government at the latter’s 
death in 1661. He entered religious life, a step common in younger sons of aspiring 
families of the time.171 By the mid-1670s, he was an experienced diplomat who had been 
sent on a number of long- and short-term postings and assignments of medium importance, 
but not to the level of posting open to his brother or nephew, both marquises. 
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The surviving correspondence written by Gravel himself and addressed to Louvois is the 
letter dated 25 December 1690 and sent from Galway.172 The letter is of nine pages of 
closely written manuscript, in quarto, in a regular and not overly flowery hand. In 
summary, it is a wide-ranging missive covering Irish politics as well as touching on the 
building of fortifications at Galway and outlining some recent military actions and contact 
with the enemy.  
The context of the time when Gravel wrote to Louvois is worth examining a little more 
closely. That Gravel was writing to Louvois is not surprising. The war minister had a great 
thirst for information and maintained relations with many officials, some with no direct 
hierarchical link to him. Of course, as a very powerful minister, no official wanted to earn 
his disfavour by not cooperating, unless one had a strong benefactor of one’s own. 
Moreover, by 1690 Louvois is generally deemed to have lost control of the Irish campaign 
and had less influence over war policy in general.173 His need for informants, such as 
Gravel, might therefore have taken greater significance. 
In the specific context of the Irish campaign, Gravel sent his letters at a time when Louvois 
was gathering information on Ireland. Louis had been considering whether to keep 
supporting the Jacobite party in Ireland. In October and November 1690, Louis and James 
had meetings at Fontainebleau and Versailles to discuss this, with Tyrconnell certainly 
present at some.174  
Gravel is full of praise for Patrick Sarsfield and describes him in glowing terms as a leader 
of “the party of the King of France” in Ireland, in contrast to Tyrconnell, who he believes 
favours treating with the Williamites.175 Gravel was not alone in identifying Sarsfield as a 
soldier of value. D’Avaux had singled him out, in a letter to Louvois concerning candidates 
for command of Irish soldiers to be sent to France.176 James, however, opposed this and 
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instead offered Justin McCarthy, Viscount Mountcashel, whom he did not like, probably 
because Mountcashel was prone to telling home truths.177 
The Context of Gravel’s actions in Ireland 
The political and military context of the time is also a key to understanding the nature of 
Gravel’s actions and the importance of his letters. After the Battle of the Boyne in July 
1690 and the flight of James II to France, the remaining Jacobite forces withdrew to the 
strategic south-western city of Limerick. The Lord Deputy Tyrconnell and Lauzun, 
commander of the 5,000 or so remaining French expeditionary force, believed the place too 
weak. On hearing news of the approach of a strong Williamite army intent on besieging the 
city, they decided to withdraw to Galway, clearly in the expectation that Limerick would 
fall. Lauzun himself was waiting for a French fleet to embark his troops, as he feared his 
troops would be captured.178  
The expected rout did not happen however. This was helped by Patrick Sarsfield, who led a 
daring cavalry raid on the approaching English artillery train in the lead-up to the siege, 
destroying a number of large pieces.179 The resulting delay while the Williamites awaited 
more cannon, coupled with the onset of inclement weather, put the besiegers at a 
disadvantage.180 To general surprise, the Irish, under the command of a French officer, De 
Boisseleau, put up a determined resistance and held the city despite vigorous efforts by 
superior enemy forces. With the prospect of having to settle in for a prolonged leaguer over 
the winter  and the threat of an invasion of England following the Royal Navy defeat at 
Beachy Head, William decided to return to England. He raised the siege after 22 days on 
29 August 1690.181 The Jacobites, though weakened, had survived to fight another 
campaign. This was a crucial moment, because once Louis learned of the success at 
Limerick, he believed the Irish front was not lost after all. 
It was suspected at the time that Tyrconnell was thinking of seeking terms from William 
III, and it would appear that he had the authority from James II to do so. From this point 
on, Tyrconnell’s authority gradually eroded away in favour of Sarsfield and his party, who 
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favoured continuing the war. In any case, his health was not what it had been, and many 
thought he did not have the mental and physical strength needed for his position.182 In this 
light, Tyrconnell took the opportunity to depart for France to consult James II at Saint-
Germain, to have his position as Viceroy confirmed and also to speak with Louis XIV. 
Along with Lauzun and about 5,000 French soldiers, he embarked aboard a French fleet 
under D’Anfreville which had put in at Galway, and sailed on 23 September 1690 to 
Brest.183 James II’s illegitimate son, James FitzJames, Duke of Berwick (1670–1734), was 
left in command, with advisors to deal with civil matters. Although blood guaranteed 
Berwick’s nominal position, he was thought a puppet of Tyrconnell and too inexperienced 
to command the army.184 
In the various discussions on whether to support Ireland, Louvois, through the information 
he received from Gravel and others, would have been able to advise the king and give him 
details perhaps not supplied by Tyrconnell, such as the competing factions among James’s 
followers in Ireland. The French would have been aware that supplies to Ireland had been 
wasted before and that backing a side itself divided was a risky venture. 
In fact, Tyrconnell, while in France, compiled a long memorandum regarding what 
supplies the Jacobites needed in Ireland. For Louvois, this must have seemed depressingly 
long: it touched on all points of arms, foodstuffs, uniforms, gunpowder and money. In 
short, anything needed for the campaign would have to be sent from France. While in the 
greater scheme of things the amounts were small, it should be noted that France was hard 
pressed to defend its own borders and that men, money and supplies were all needed at 
home. Furthermore, sending supplies by sea to Ireland outside the main navigating season 
was fraught with difficulties. This, coupled with the increasing reach of the Royal Navy, 
meant that not all supplies sent would arrive. 
Gravel states that his previous letter of 52 pages had been written on 24 November and 
given to a French navy captain, Mr Fontaine, commanding a frigate named La 
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Surprenante.185 Due to bad weather, this ship did not leave until 7 December. “Je n’ay peu 
continuer d’informer Votre Grandeur de la suite des affaires d’Irlande, parce qu’il n’est 
sorty aucun bastiment pour France jusqu’a present.”186 
Gravel explains that his news from Ireland was halted because no French navy ship 
carrying his letters had been able to leave for France. Given that sea communications was 
the only way to relay letters between Ireland and France, it had been decided by Louis in 
February 1690 that the navy should maintain ships at the ready. The king had ordered 
vessels to sail to Ireland every 15 days from Brest with the express purpose of carrying 
correspondence. So that this did not take up too many ships, those in Ireland should stay 15 
days, but not wait for letters, to avoid having all the ships either in France or in Ireland at 
any one time.187 It is possible that with the departure of the great majority of French troops 
from Ireland in September 1690, these conditions had been relaxed somewhat. Coupled 
with the lateness of the navigating season, vital news Louvois and others needed for 
decision-making was delayed, interrupting this commerce of information at the time Gravel 
had letters to send. 
From a military point of view, Gravel gives a detailed account of recent happenings. After 
the fall of Cork and strategically important Kinsale to combined English and Danish forces, 
both sides had for the most part mostly put their forces into winter quarters as best they 
could.188 Sarsfield, however, had been active in taking the fight to the enemy. An example 
is of a raiding action across the river Shannon, the front line at the time. This episode 
involved notably the burning of Mullingar, a town east of the Shannon and an obvious 
muster point for the Williamites. From a political point of view, Gravel reminded the war 
minister that there were two factions in the Irish camp, that of the King of France under 
Col. Sarsfield and that of Tyrconnell, whose role was taken by Berwick during the latter’s 
absence in France.  
En representant aussi a Vostre Grandeur l’estat et la necessite du pais, je 
luy depeignis les deux parties qui s’estoient formez en Irlande; l’un que 
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l’on appelloit le party du Roy de France [la teste] duquel estoit Mr. de 
Sarsfil [Sarsfield], et l’autre estoit celuy de Milord Tyrconnel, qui avoit 
pour chef Milord duc de Berouic [Berwick]. Les suites de cette faction 
estoit beaucoup a craindre dans une conjuncture ou le Prince d’Orange ne 
s’endort pas et l’auroit sans doute fomentees.189 
Gravel mentions later that members of Tyrconnell’s group were suspected of 
corresponding with the enemy. Berwick was persuaded by Sarsfield that two staff officers, 
Alexander MacDonnell, governor of Galway, and Thomas Nugent, Baron Riverston, were 
in this group and had them arrested.190 Given Sarsfield’s popularity with the army, 
Berwick, being himself quite ill at the time, was not in a position to oppose him. Moreover, 
Berwick went on to appoint him governor of Galway and the province of Connaught. 
Gravel stated that he had asked Sarsfield whether Louvois could address messages for  him 
to Sarsfield. Sarsfield accepted and said  he would hand over anything he got for Gravel. 
For Gravel, this was positive as anyone with suspicions of him was unlikely to dare open 
letters addressed to Sarsfield. There were unfavourable rumours circulating about these 
individuals, and in view of Sarsfield’s reputation of strong personal loyalty to James II, 
there was little Berwick could do to counter him. For Sarsfield, it might have been a useful 
tactic to ingratiate himself with a Frenchman he knew to be writing to the powerful 
Louvois at a time when Tyrconnell was in France. Certainly, Gravel seems to be full of 
praise for Sarsfield as being able to fire his troops with enthusiasm and spur them on to 
continue to fight. He pleads the Irish case for more supplies and states their hostility to any 
plans to submit themselves to the Prince of Orange. The picture painted by the writer is of 
the town and people of Galway in straitened circumstances, with morale kept up by 
Sarsfield, who only needed French supplies, arms and a French commander to help them 
continue resistance.  
Feeling that he could be accused of partiality towards the Jacobites, Gravel probably felt 
that he was painting too rosy a picture of Sarsfield for the war minister. He therefore stated 
that he is not partisan to any of the Jacobite groups, but that his only desire in Ireland has 
been to serve Louis  “depuis vint [20] mois que j’y suis entre…l’envie seule que j’ay de 
server mon Roy et de meriter vostre protection.” This is a key chronological point, because 
this letter from late December 1690 situates the cleric’s arrival in Ireland to be about May 
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1689. This helps to underline what a good understanding of Ireland Gravel must have 
acquired by this stage, and the usefulness of this experience to Louvois as a corroborating 
source of news. 
Gravel also wrote that the enemy forces are not in as good a state as believed, according to 
news he gleaned from a deserting Williamite cavalryman. The informant told how 
Williamite forces were in ill-condition, lacking steady pay and suffering at the hands of the 
Irish rapparees (roving Jacobite guerrilla bands): 
sont dans un etat pitoyable, qu’il ne vient aucun argent d’Angleterre, 
qu’il ya huit ou neuf moys qu’elles n’ont point este payees, qu’elles sont 
tres mecontentes, et qu’elles ne vivent que de pillages, que les raparees 
les tourmentent, et les fatiguent a un point qui ne se peut dire. 191 
This individual went on to say that if the Jacobites were willing to pay a bounty to those 
like himself, many others would desert too. Gravel reminds Louvois he had himself 
pointed this out in a previous letter. To this end, he had caused messages to be sent to and 
distributed among the enemy troops inviting desertion.” Je representay cet article a Vostre 
Grandeur dans ma lettre du 24 novembre, et des billets que j’avois fait semer parmy les 
ayenemis, comme un des plus essentiels au service du Roy. ”192 
Gravel then returned to the subject of Sarsfield, stating that he has the respect and loyalty 
of the Irish soldiers. Given that Sarsfield was a head of a faction, Gravel pointed out that 
the Irishman was well aware of the importance of the French connection and states that 
Sarsfield never missed an opportunity to tell his soldiers of the generosity of the French 
king. 
Qu’apres toute les bonnes qualites dont il est revetu, il en a une qui les 
surpasse de bien loin, qui est, une si profonde reconnaissance des 
bienfaits que l’Irlande a receus de la liberalite du Roy, qu’il ravit tous 
ceux a qui il en parle… et les dipose a tout entreprendre pour le service 
de sa Majeste. 
Knowing that he has praised Sarsfield and left himself open to a charge of not being 
objective, Gravel tried to reassure Louvois that he was not biased but was merely 
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presenting things as he saw them. Louvois may not have been convinced of Gravel’s 
objectivity: Tyrconnell, and not Sarsfield, was the French’s preferred Irish leader and 
Gravel perhaps made too many positive references to Sarsfield in his letter. Nevertheless, 
other writers confirmed that Gravel was right in saying that Sarsfield would continue to 
fight if he could. This was surely useful to know: if the French wanted the fighting in 
Ireland to continue, Sarsfield was willing to do so. Gravel would certainly have known 
Tyrconnell was in France at the time of this letter. His letter might have had significance 
for Louvois as a balance. 
Through his close contact with the Irish Jacobites, the Abbé realised that, despite their 
goodwill, they were in poor shape physically. He wrote of his relief at receiving news from 
France with the arrival in Galway of the frigate La Mechante. From this, he learned that 
Louis had decided to continue operations in the Irish theatre and so would send supplies.193  
La joye d’aprendre des nouvelles de France par la fregatte du Roy La 
Mechante … fut excessive particulierement quand on scut que le Roy 
vouloit bien continuer sa toute puissante protection aux Irlandois, et les 
assister dans leurs pressans besoins.194 
Well aware that Louvois always demanded solid information from his informants, Gravel 
wrote of the great need for both food and arms, with the remaining stores containing only 
six weeks’ supply.195 Nevertheless, some supplies still came in, not through navy convoys 
but but merchant ships. Gravel relates how some French trading vessels from La Rochelle 
and Nantes had brought supplies of wheat, iron, salt and wine. This was the type of detail 
that Louvois required as war minister in charge of organising supplies for the Irish 
campaign.  
That Gravel mentions some ships trading does not contradict Symcox’s statement that trade 
had completely dried up.196 Nevertheless all the information received needed analysis and 
corroboration by other sources to ensure its reliability and accuracy. This was merely 
common sense, but might have been more important to Louvois in the Lauzun period and 
after, given Louvois’s waning influence on the king.197 It is worth noting that much of the 
information Gravel supplied regarding the general military situation was echoed by 
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Ignatius White, Marquis d’Albeville, in letters to James II, Tyrconnell and Louvois.198 
While the Irish had perhaps 40,000 men available, they did not have anything like enough 
arms. The Abbé says only the Irish cavalry regiments are in good shape. “Ils ont en verite 
une necessite extreme de toute sorte de munitions et de bouche et de guerre. Il n’y en a pas 
pour six semaines dans les magasins.” Nevertheless, the overall feeling was of resignation, 
that opposition to the Williamites was their only option, convinced as they are of the 
enemy’s hatred of their religion. 
Il y a des homes suffisant pour composer une armée de 40 mil homes, 
auquels il ne manque  que des armes, et il n’y en a pas dix mil dans le 
pais. Ils paroissent résolus, pour ne pas dire desesperez, de la hayne 
implacable du Prince d’Orange contre les Catholiques, que de mourir ou 
vaincre leur est passé en coutume.199 
To a large extent, this was backed up by William III’s ill-advised Finglas declaration. 
Issued in the aftermath of the Boyne, this promised limited amnesty but excluded any 
gentry or higher nobles among the Jacobites. Coupled with Williamite soldiers’ looting of 
Catholic farmers in the midlands, despite promises of safety, it is generally agreed that this 
hardened Jacobite resolve to hold out for more. While William himself might have been 
willing to offer more generous terms to end the war, his English and Irish Protestant 
advisors opted for a hardline approach, not least because some hoped to gain estates 
confiscated from Jacobite nobles.200 As Symcox says, “the proclamation tended to harden 
the Irish resistance rather than pave the way for peace”.201 
Gravel reminds Louvois that in a previous letter he underlined the need for a French 
commander to come to Ireland, probably as the best way to unite the different Jacobite 
factions. The French ship brought news on this front, that a commander is going to come, 
and he is named as the Marquis de Bellefonds, Bernard Gigault (1630–1694).202 It is 
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certain that Gravel, like his masters in France, saw the need to put the organisation of 
Jacobite forces onto a footing more recognisably effective than had previously occurred. 
Furthermore, Gravel specifically relates how he spoke to some Irish leaders in various 
meetings, saying that any French commander must be able to command all of them and 
that they mostly agreed to this proposition.  
Et voulant sonder leurs coeurs d’avantage, je leur repliquay, par maniere 
d’entretien, qu’un marechal de France ne pourroit reconnoitre personne 
au dessus de luy. Ils me repartirent qu’il etoit vray, et que quand il y 
viendroit, il y seroit le maistre. 203 
Gravel writes that only two notables did not agree, namely Riverston and MacDonnell, but 
that they are allied to Tyrconnell: “deux créatures de Milord Tyrconel, dont le party est 
soupsonne de desseins”. 
Turning to the general political and military situation in the country, Gravel mentioned that 
some letters between Williamite commanders had been intercepted and gave Louvois some 
details of these: 
Douglas et quelques autres generaux du Prince D’Orange mandent a 
Sydnay et a ses confreres de marcher incessament vers le Chanon, ou ils 
les joindront au premier jour [i.e. 1 January]. 
One of these officers can be identified as James Douglas, a Scottish Lieutenant-General in 
William’s army, writing to Henry Viscount Sydney (1641-1704), whom William had 
recently appointed a Lord Justice in Ireland.204 While intercepting the messages was 
certainly a fillip to the Jacobite commanders, it was also some good news Gravel was able 
to tell Louvois from an otherwise gloomy Irish front. From an informational point of view, 
though, the information gleaned would be of a more tactical than strategic value. In any 
case, however, much as Louvois might have wanted to intervene in campaigns, local 
military decisions could be taken only by commanders on the ground, even more so in 
Ireland, a theatre too far removed from Versailles for more direct intervention.  
In the same letter Gravel informs Louvois of the loss to enemy forces under Marlborough 
of the key southern ports of Kinsale and Cork which he states were sold out -
“honteusement vendus a prix d’argent” - and possibly done with the connivance of Jacobite 
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leaders who advocated seeking terms from King William. Probably reflecting attitudes 
common among the Jacobites at the time, Gravel called one of the officers, Col. Roger 
MacElligott, “traitre”. Marlborough’s “joint-operations” action, successfully using the 
Royal Navy to land troops behind enemy lines, seriously hit French sea communications, a 
fact probably not lost on Gravel, thus explaining his evident frustration at the deteriorating 
Jacobite position.205 
Gravel continues by stating that the Jacobite forces were trying to entrench themselves by 
building defensive works, with those at Limerick carried out under the direction of a 
French officer, the Chevalier de Tangis. Those in Galway were built on the orders of 
Sarsfield himself. This news was clearly of interest to Louvois, as the building of 
fortifications had been identified as a priority in French strategic discussions about how 
best to oppose William III’s forces in Ireland.206 
The last points in the letter show the level of detail the Abbé concerned himself with and 
also the type of detail Louvois wanted to know. Gravel gave details of letters written to 
Tyrconnell by Riverston and Macdonnell, who had asked Gravel what the best way was to 
send them. Gravel says he told them to give them to the captain of the frigate that had just 
arrived to carry them. He added that he told the captain to inform the army intendant at 
Brest of these letters, who could then advise Louvois. From his previous diplomatic 
experience, Gravel would have been aware that the letters could be intercepted by agents of 
Louvois in his capacity as Surintendant des Postes. Telling Louvois this was a way to 
ingratiate  himself and show his loyalty.207 It also seems clear that, despite the suspicions 
which these two Jacobites were under, they trusted Gravel, a trust he no doubt cultivated. 
This underlines how skilfully Gravel had embedded himself with the Irish so that both 
factions felt they could trust him.208 
The last point the Abbé made concerned the security of his own correspondence, stating 
that if he learnt any other news he would send another note with the captain of a different 
ship soon to depart. This note would mention the current letter, so it would be possible for 
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Louvois to know if a letter had been lost, a standard precaution. He ends by properly 
assuring the war minister of his devotion to duty and that he awaits his orders, using 
deferential vocabulary consistent with that of a client: “avec une fidelite et une soumission 
autant exacte et profonde”.209 
Whether he was actually a client of Louvois is an open question. Badalo-Dulong mentions 
that Robert de Gravel had been favoured by Lionne and that this was extended to his 
brother Jacques, although he states this was due to ability, as opposed to clientage as one 
might infer.210 From my own research, it is not clear whether the Gravels were clients of 
any minister. Moreover, there is no clear evidence in the letter to indicate whether Gravel’s 
aim in writing to Louvois was an attempt to seek patronage, although he does specifically 
ask that Louvois give him orders and asks for “vostre protection”. This use of deferential 
language is indicative only of a lower-level functionary writing to a powerful minister. 
There are two other interesting letters from French individuals in Ireland writing to 
Louvois, which mention Gravel and corroborate his activities, or at least shed a slightly 
different light on them. The first is from army officer Santons-Boullain, visiting Galway on 
6 December 1690. 
Un nomme l’Abbé de Gravel, asses connu de Monsieur le comte 
D’Avaux pour ce qu’il est dans le temps qu’il etoit ambassadeur en ce 
pays, est reste dans cette ville depuis le depart de la flotte, ou il a fait des 
chansons injurieuses a la nation et fort a l’avantage des Irlandois, dont il 
leur fait sa cour, aupres desquels il s’insinue, en leur disant du bien d’eux 
et du mal des François. Il vint par le flotte de Bantry et se dit ingenieur. 
Sa conduitte au reste n’est pas des plus reglee. 211 
This is worthy of note at a number of levels. First, it mirrors what Gravel wrote himself 
later in his 25 December letter to Louvois, that he had been in Ireland for 20 months, since 
April or May 1689. This is a timeframe consistent with him coming with the fleet of 
Chateau-Renault which landed arms and men at Bantry Bay.212 This is obviously later than 
D’Avaux, who arrived with James II in late March. The wording of the letter is ambiguous 
as to whether the army officer was saying that Gravel was in D’Avaux’s entourage or 
whether Gravel had told him that he knew important people like D’Avaux in order to be 
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left alone. Both seem possible. That he told the officer he was an engineer was clearly a 
ploy, perhaps to justify why he might wander around viewing fortifications under 
construction at the time. 
The idea that Gravel was insinuating himself with the Irish may well have been part of his 
remit to make himself appear as a friend. His true “vocation” as a cleric would undoubtedly 
have helped in allaying suspicions among Irish Catholic supporters of James II. At the 
same time, although he was French, he was not one of the French soldiers of whom 
Sarsfield’s supporters were critical after Lauzun’s departure. The very fact that Gravel had 
not returned with the fleet to France might have secured credit for him in Irish Jacobite 
eyes as one who could be trusted.  
The reference to composing songs hostile to the French is a curious one on a number of 
levels. The Irish were very disillusioned with the French, as they felt they had been 
abandoned to face the might of the Protestant Williamite forces on their own, so the idea 
that songs insulting the French would be popular is entirely plausible. From a linguistic 
point of view, the songs were probably in English, given that Gravel almost certainly did 
not speak Gaelic, and songs in Latin or French probably would not have been understood 
well enough by Irish soldiers. Given references in his letter to conversations with Irish and 
English soldiers, Gravel surely must have had some reasonable command of English to be 
able to function in Ireland for so long.213  
The second is from Army Commissary Methelet on 19 April 1691, a reliable source as far 
as Louvois was concerned. 
Il y a en cette ville un François qui se nomme l’abbé de Gravel, prestre. Il 
dit qu’il vous a mandé, Monseigneur, tout ce qui s’est passé en ce pays 
depuis deux ans qu’il y est venu. Il me paroit bien-intentionné, et ne vit 
pas cependant avec la commodité qu’ont ceux que vous employez. Je le 
crois en nécessité.214 
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Methelet related to Louvois what Gravel told him but expressed surprise that for someone 
who appeared to be in the minster’s employ, Gravel’s situation seemed precarious as 
regards his personal comfort. One could understand this in different ways: that he was in 
need, in common with the hardship endured at the time by Jacobites, or that he was in 
Louvois’s employ but in some undercover capacity so a modest station was more 
becoming. 
Interestingly, the Abbé de Gravel is mentioned in English source correspondence, and in 
their eyes his role is that of undercover agent. The most notable of these relates to the 1691 
period between the departure of the French fleet from Ireland in autumn 1690 and the 
Battle of Aughrim in May 1691.These are the Finch manuscripts containing Nottingham’s 
correspondence..215 
A letter from Gravel to Louvois describing fortifications in Galway was intercepted by 
Williamite forces and forwarded to Nottingham. In a letter to Henry Viscount Sydney 
dated 9 June 1691, Nottingham mentions this interception. 
Your lordship may remember I gave you a long French letter of many 
sheets written by Abbé Gravel (if I mistake not the name) from Ireland. I 
have ask’d Mr Bridgeman for it and he can’t find it. I should be glad to 
have it because it may possibly be of use and particularly at this time, for 
there is a plain discovery of the French designes to perswade the Irish to 
subject themselves to France, and is now beginning to be executed, by 
obliging the rebells to take commissions of the French king.216 
This reference could be to different ideas. One is the rumour in Ireland that the Jacobites 
were disenchanted with James II and would prefer to see Ireland independent of England 
and so move under French suzerainty. It could also refer to the fact that the French were 
taking Irish soldiers to France and some, like Justin MacCarthy, Viscount Mountcashel, 
specifically received French commissions as he was going to command a regiment of Irish 
troops in France. A letter from Gravel describing the fortifications would certainly have 
interested the French war minister. The works were being supervised by French engineers 
all sent by Louvois, so it would have reassured him on the strengthening of defences at 
Galway, Athlone and Limerick that the building was actually in progress.217 
                                                   
215
 Finch, vol.iii , p.106. 
216
 Finch, vol.iii  p.106. 
217
 Childs, The Williamite Wars in Ireland, p.367. 
75 
 
The next mention is in a letter from Nottingham to Dutch General Ginkel from 28 August 
1691. This places it after the Williamite victory at the Battle of Aughrim and the death of 
French commander the Marquis de St Ruth, and the surrender of Galway on terms on 21 
July. It clearly refers to Gravel having been apprehended by the Williamites. The words of 
Notthingham clearly show his suspicions of the captured cleric.218 
As to the Abbé Gravel, ‘tis certain that he is a very dangerous man and, 
whatever he may pretend, he was certainly employed by Monsr. Louvois; 
and if he be not included in the articles granted to Galway ‘tis fitt that he 
should be kept a very close prisoner, but you can judge how farr you can 
proceed against him, for he deserves no favour nor in the least to be 
trusted. Monsr. Ginckell … has found the Abbé Gravel at Galway, whose 
long letter to Monsr. Louvois your lordship saw. He desires the King’s 
protection and offers to turn Protestant, but I think he is not to be trusted 
nor will deserve any favour, and I have writ so to Monsr. Ginckell. 
One would surely have to note that Gravel’s offer to become Protestant and serve William 
III was a ruse, as indeed it was considered by his English interrogators. 
Other sources that shed light on the Abbé’s activities in Ireland include two separate 
French secondary sources commenting archival material in the Archives des Affaires 
Etrangères. The first mentions Gravel, as a source of information for Louvois on Ireland.219 
The second states that the Abbé was a chargé de mission in Ireland.220 It is not clear, 
though, whether this was a task Gravel had specifically been given by either Croissy or 
Louvois, or just extrapolated by later archivists. Gravel implies that he has been telling 
Louvois news of Ireland for the two years he has been in the country.221 It should be noted 
that unlike D’Avaux and Lauzun, who had their letters encrypted, Gravel’s surviving 
correspondence is not in cipher. While it is possible that this was a deliberate move, as 
                                                   
218
 Baron Godert van Reede van Ginkel (1644–1703), later 1st Earl of Athlone. 
219
 J.J. Jusserrand (ed.), Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de 
France depuis le Traite de Westphalie jusqu'à la Revolution Francaise, XXV, 
Angleterre, Tome II, 1660–1690 (1887), p.433. 
220
 ”Chargé de mission” is a term used in the Inventaire sommaire des archives du 
Département des affaires étrangères, p. 383, vol.1, (Paris 1903).  
221
 If Gravel was still a diplomat, his superior would have been Colbert de Croissy as 
secretary of foreign affairs. However, Louvois did for a short time act as caretaker 
secretary for that department in 1679, between the departure of Pomponne and the 
arrival of Croissy. Closer contacts between Gravel and Louvois may date from then. As 
previously mentioned, Gravel wrote to Louvois from Mainz in 1672. 
76 
 
ciphering letters was time-consuming, it is more likely that he did not have a cipher.222 
This perhaps could be applied to Gravel. Other means of hiding messages existed, such as 
writing in lemon juice, or simply using a series of multiple forwarding addresses, as used 
by the French agent in London writing his confidential letters to “Mr Pierret” in France.223 
Spy or ambassador? 
Gravel’s letter was published in Mulloy’s edition of the Service Historique de la Défense 
records relating to Ireland. Symcox had consulted this same correspondence for his 1967 
thesis and mentions Gravel’s presence. He does not supply any meaningful background 
information, apart from surmising due to the content of Gravel’s letter that he was working 
for Louvois.  
What is interesting is that in the autumn of 1689 there was a significant re-appraisal of 
“Irish” policy taking place in Paris. It was felt that D’Avaux, although still a respected 
diplomat, had reached an impasse in his relations with the notoriously difficult James II, 
and therefore it was decided to recall him. A document exists in the Archives des Affaires 
Etrangères dated October 1689, which lists ten or so possible successors to D’Avaux.224 
The Abbé de Gravel is among the names. Presumably these names were picked for their 
experience and ability, and Gravel’s name was not just included because he was known to 
be in Ireland already.  
Symcox states that this list remained a dead letter, as no ambassador was appointed to 
replace D’Avaux. This is true. No “foreign affairs” affiliated ambassador was appointed. 
Instead, the choice fell, for political reasons, to a French courtier well known to James, 
namely the Comte de Lauzun. It does not mean, however, that Gravel stopped whatever he 
was doing — far from it. It is equally plausible that Gravel stayed working as a lower-level 
functionary, supplying information. If the French were to keep supporting Jacobites in 
Ireland, then this was much needed in France, as it concerned the different factions, both 
Sarsfield’s and Tyrconnell’s, which threatened the unity of the Irish forces, France’s allies 
and guardians of their foothold in Britain on behalf of James II. Gravel could still have 
been attached to foreign affairs, as attested by the copy of the letter in those archives, but 
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addressed his letter to Louvois on grounds that the information was of a military nature. 
One could say he was following the same division of responsibilities as seen in the division 
of D’Avaux’s correspondence.225 According to Soll, it was Colbert in the Navy Secretariat 
who had greatly expanded French spying activities. From my own researches and Burger’s 
work, it appears that this remained under their auspices, although this does not preclude the 
possibility that Louvois or Colbert de Croissy sent their own agents on specific missions.226 
A key question regarding Gravel must be who sent him to Ireland. It seems probable that 
Gravel’s role changed over the time he was in Ireland. It is my view that he started as part 
of D’Avaux’s entourage. This certainly would have stopped once the ambassador was 
recalled, leaving in March 1690, as Lauzun arrived with French troops. It would seem odd 
that Gravel would not have been able to travel back to France, which implies there was an 
order to stay in Ireland.227 Practically, acting in an information-gathering capacity, would 
seem plausible, using his clerical role as cover. Certainly given Louvois’s hostility to 
Lauzun (and D’Avaux’s, it has to be said), it would have been useful for Louvois to have 
such a figure remaining behind. This could have been ostensibly in James’s or more 
probably Lauzun’s entourage.  
When Lauzun himself then left with most of the French troops in September 1690 in 
d’Amfreville’s fleet from Galway, Gravel’s role might conceivably have changed again, 
this time to try to find out about the factions in the Irish army. He does specifically request 
orders from Louvois in his letter, perhaps underlining this role as a self-made one. 
Why do more letters from Gravel not survive? 
Although Gravel stated that he has been in Ireland for two years, only two or three letters 
from him are known to have existed and only one has survived: the one discussed above, 
dated 25 December 1690; an earlier letter of some 52 pages, which Gravel stated he sent to 
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Louvois at the start of November 1690; and a possible third letter alluded to in Finch’s 
correspondence of June 1691 as intercepted. 228  
Given the length of time Gravel spent in Ireland, it seems likely that other letters were 
written and sent to Louvois. If so, what happened to them? It is possible that some were 
intercepted and never reached Louvois. Others, if they did reach Louvois, are not 
catalogued in the Service Historique de la Défense archives relating to Ireland as being 
from Gravel. It is possible that these were catalogued along with other papers and bound 
into volumes unrelated to Ireland. It is also possible, though speculative, to consider the 
idea that the content of this putative correspondence was somehow compromising to 
Louvois, perhaps because of comments relating to D’Avaux, Lauzun or James II himself, 
and that they were therefore destroyed.  
It is possible that the correspondence exists in the Archives des Affaires Etrangères or the 
Service Historique de la Défense in documents not specifically relating to Ireland, as yet 
uninvestigated for Irish links.229 It should be noted regarding the timelines involved in 
Finch that by the time Gravel was captured at Galway, his master Louvois had died 
suddenly at Versailles. After that stage the trail of Gravel in Ireland is lost. He was released 
at some stage and made his way back to France. This would have happened after the 
October 1691 Treaty of Limerick, by which the Jacobite war in Ireland ended, and with it 
French involvement. Gravel probably returned on one of the many ships left Ireland 
carrying Irish Jacobite soldiers who had chosen to serve James II abroad.  
An outline of some of his later activities is given above. Given that France was at war until 
1697 with precious few allies, the options for diplomatic postings abroad were obviously 
limited. As already noted, at some stage Gravel was named as abbot of Argentan in 
Normandy, and it is possible that he spent many of his remaining years there. 
Conclusion 
From the investigations and letter analysis above, my own view is that Gravel travelled to 
Ireland in the entourage of D’Avaux. At some stage, he started to get involved in trying to 
understand Irish Jacobite politics and informed D’Avaux of these matters by word of 
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mouth. When D’Avaux was recalled, Gravel’s role might have changed, or changed 
emphasis, perhaps to spy on Lauzun for Louvois and then, when Lauzun left, to continue to 
tell Louvois of the conflicting currents in Irish Jacobite politics. It is likely that Gravel’s 
purpose in Ireland was to stay among the Irish and, under the albeit legitimate cover of 
being a cleric, to gather as much information as possible about what was happening in 
Ireland and to send this in letter form back to Louvois. This is what can be gleaned directly 
from the surviving correspondence from late 1690. Gravel himself says he has been in 
Ireland since May 1689 and that he has been sending information to Louvois. It is not 
elucidated, however, whether this role had been a constant one during that whole period. 
What is clear is that his character is perceived as a strange one by other French officials 
and not clearly understood by them. They also notice that his activities and methods are 
unconventional and that he associates with the Irish Jacobites. 
That his role was an important one was certainly believed by the Williamite authorities, as 
evidenced by their correspondence and their attitude to him once he was in their hands. It 
can certainly be said that his methods were perceived as unorthodox and that he seems to 
be most interested in gaining the confidence of the Irish to ascertain their desire to continue 
fighting.  
This role seems to fit into a pattern for other conflicts where Louvois, always avid for 
information, tried to get as many people as possible to send him information about the 
situation on the ground in whatever campaign. Some were paid informers, spies or casual 
informants, as referred to in both Sarmant’s and Brousse’s articles.230 Others were like the 
intendant Jean-François de Fumeron, a valued employee of the Secrétariat de la Guerre. He 
was under no illusions that part of his remit was to write back often to head office to ask 
for advice and tell details of current events and any other information he was able to glean. 
From the evidence, however, Gravel seems to be acting in a slightly different manner, less 
as the official ambassador he had been earlier in his career and more like an undercover 
informant. Roosen described lower-level envoys as “second class diplomats, low in 
prestige and high in importance”.231 It seems likely Gravel falls into this category: a 
reliable information gatherer and skilful at often passing unnoticed.  
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In summary, I have been looking at two very different types of envoys, both of whom were 
sent to Ireland by the French authorities in the course of the Irish campaign between 1689 
and 1691. Both individuals were there to serve Louis XIV as best they could, albeit in very 
different roles. Although they went about their tasks in different ways, the essential goals 
of their missions were the same: to implement French policy as best they knew it and to 
gather and send back as much information as possible to their masters, the ministers of the 
Sun King. will be looking at the roles of two diplomats who were active in Ireland over the 
course and who exemplify the range of functions the ambassadors could be asked to carry 
out. 
This chapter shows the range of functions served by French diplomats in the conduct of the 
Irish campaign. D’Avaux is at the top of the range almost as a prime- ministerial figure; 
Gravel at the other end of the spectrum is almost functioning as a spy. Both are directly 
involved in officially supplying information to decision-makers in France, at a time when 
information from a remote though potentially important theatre was of key importance. As 
will be demonstrated in later chapters, this was not the only information circulating in 
France from Ireland. Other actors were also supplying information and strategic views on 
what could and should be done in Ireland. Others were involved in a propaganda struggle. 
Whose influence was paramount in these information wars, as well as military events on 
the ground, would ultimately decide the winners on events in Ireland. 
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CHAPTER IV – CHAMLAY AND SUPPORT FOR JAMES II: FROM SOUND 
ADVICE TO MANIPULATION  
This chapter will concentrate on the figure of the Sieur de Chamlay through four of his 
documents, which come from the French army archives in Vincennes. The aim is to show 
that this key military strategist to Louvois and Louis XIV offered his advice concerning 
Ireland and James II on a number of occasions in the period 1689–1691. The involvement 
of Chamlay in Irish affairs has to my knowledge never previously been demonstrated in a 
published scholarly study related to the Irish context. Moreover, his views give new insight 
into the thinking on Ireland taking place in France in the first period of the Nine Years 
War. As will be shown, the choices proposed by Chamlay varied from sound military 
advice to manipulation of information and deception of individuals. Chamlay is a good 
example for this study as a whole, in the sense that his views exemplify the use and abuse 
of information in the context of French involvement in the war in Ireland in 1689–1691.  
Historiographical introduction 
Chamlay has been the object of some considerable focus in the past 40 or 50 years for 
anglophone scholars. Although Wolf recognised Chamlay’s importance, it was Ronald 
Martin’s thesis in 1972 that broke ground from a biographical point of view.232 Since then, 
Chamlay has figured in the works of most major historians, especially those such as Lynn 
and Rowlands, interested by the formation of strategy in the later part of the reign of Louis 
XIV.  
For francophone writers, his importance was recognised by Rousset in the nineteenth 
century and later by Corvisier. The most recent and comprehensive treatment of the subject 
and his broader place in the debates around military planning has been by Cénat.233  
Much of the broader-stroke writing concentrates on Chamlay as strategist to Louvois and 
Louis XIV in the later wars of the reign, but his thinking about the Irish campaigns not 
been highlighted. Although elsewhere in this work I have consciously built on the research 
of Symcox, this is not the case in the present chapter. Symcox did not deal with Chamlay 
in relation to Ireland.  
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The question arises as to why Chamlay’s advice and ideas relative to James II and the Irish 
theatre have hitherto stayed unexamined. Part of the reason is that, from the point of view 
of Irish studies, attention has been concentrated on papers dealing almost exclusively with 
Ireland. These are the registers and minutes at the Service Historique de la Défense dealing 
with the Irish campaign, which formed the material edited by Tate and Mulloy.234 Those 
writing about Ireland do so at a high level regarding the French and break little new ground 
on that front, as they are not their primary focus. Likewise, French writers do not focus on 
Ireland either, but do write about Chamlay. Indeed, the foremost modern writer on 
Chamlay, Cénat, does not consider Chamlay and Ireland in his biography or his wider work 
on strategy. 
The papers I looked at are either in Chamlay’s own private papers, from 1689 and 1691, or 
his campaign correspondence with Louvois, in later 1689 and 1690. Neither of these 
sources could be considered “Irish sources” in the sense of those mentioned above. They 
are contained either in private records or those relating to French campaigns in the theatre 
of the Rhine. However, before delving into the content of the writings, it is first useful to 
outline some details of the Chamlay’s career. 
Summary of Chamlay’s life 
Jules-Louis Bolé, lord of Chamlay, was born in 1650, the son of Alexandre-Simon Bolé, an 
army administrator and a client of the Le Tellier family who was ennobled for service to 
the crown during the Fronde.235 Chamlay’s position of maréchal général des camps et logis 
des armées du roi had been purchased for him by his father in 1670. This post consisted of 
organising the army marches from one camp to another, ordering the clearing of routes to 
follow, as well as choosing a secure and suitable camp site. 
His first campaigns were during the Dutch war of 1672–1678. Through his organisational 
skills and geographical knowledge, he was noticed by the great French commanders of his 
age, Turenne and Condé, both of whom praised Chamlay. In this way, he came to the 
attention of Louvois and then later Louis XIV. His other talents no doubt included certain 
social skills in navigating his way into the graces of great men. While not on campaign, he 
prepared summary books of the previous season’s army campaigns, describing the 
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principal actions and giving basic maps, and submitted them to Louvois.236 These works 
were so well received that more formal versions were produced using high-quality 
materials, destined for the king’s library. Chamlay is known to have worked on at least 
three or four of these which were much enjoyed by the king, and he participated with 
Racine in writing a propaganda account of the siege of Namur in 1692. Apart from this 
history writing, Cénat states that Chamlay started corresponding with his patron Louvois 
while on campaign from December 1672, with the communication ceasing only at the 
minister’s death in July 1691.237  
Chamlay’s career stretched from the 1670s into the next century and ended with the death 
of Louis XIV in 1715. He was an exemplary individual, highly skilled in his own military 
domains, and was promoted by his patron Louvois. In this he bears comparison with 
Vauban. Through the war minister, he began to interact directly with Louis, becoming the 
king’s principal military advisor after Louvois’s death in 1691. Court historian Saint-
Simon thought Chamlay was offered the secretaryship of the war department but declined 
it in favour of his patron’s son, the Marquis de Barbezieux; although this reading is debated 
by modern scholarship.238 Whatever the case, from the time of Louvois’s death Chamlay 
no longer went on campaign but remained at Versailles as principal military adviser to the 
king, becoming a type of modern-day army chief of staff.239 Later in the reign, he became 
interested in army reform and taxation and wrote a number of papers on those topics, 
although he continued his input to official “histories”.240 Although he remained influential, 
he was to some extent sidelined from power until the king’s death, dying unmarried in 
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1719. Although a selfless servant to Louis XIV, he was never awarded any high office, 
which contributed to his relative obscurity until recent times.241  
Chamlay and the stratégie de cabinet 
Chamlay is closely associated with the violence and destruction involved in the 
controversial sacking of the German Palatinate region in 1689–1690 and is seen as having 
been one of the primary instigators of this action.242 He is also seen as a key figure in the 
so-called stratégie de cabinet policy. Although there are a number of theories as to what 
exactly the policy consisted of, suffice to say here that it relates to the question of how 
much direct control of military operations Louis and his advisors at Versailles attempted to 
foist on commanders in the field. If in the early part of the reign general strategy was 
elaborated by the king and his advisors before a campaigning season started while actual 
tactical decision-making was left to the military commanders in the different theatres, some 
historians like Lynn believe 1675 marked a change. Following the departure of Turenne 
and Condé, Louis XIV decided to involve himself more directly in the management of 
campaigns from Versailles. Historiographically this has also been a source of much 
scholarly debate: Lynn argued for greater direction from Versailles; Rowlands, on the other 
hand, understood the policy as being more of coordination with and not domination of 
commanders in the field. More recently, the debate has been added to by Sarmant and 
Cénat, with the latter unusually looking at navy command also.243 
It seems clear from these scholars that the management of military operations and 
fortification construction from Versailles was the fruit of close cooperation between the 
king, and his war minister chosen advisors. Louis was adept at the practice of war through 
experience and study rather than through great ability. He thus clearly recognised that 
soliciting advice from senior figures, talented collaborators and army commanders 
mitigated the risk of bad decisions.  
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Some of the advisors were individuals from the gentry or robe nobility, like Vauban and 
Chamlay respectively, whose exemplary merits had brought them out from under the direct 
tutelage of their patron, the Le Tellier family, and into direct contact with the king. 
Sarmant identified Chamlay’s close relationship with Louvois as one of a client-patron, 
which developed into a friendship.244 Wolf too emphasised the aspect of friendship in his 
succinct summary of Chamlay’s role and abilities. “Chamlay, one of Louvois’ best friends 
and important military advisers, was a man of many parts: a diplomat, a military strategist, 
a superb officer in managing the movements of an army.”245 
Therefore, although the Louvois-Chamlay relation may never have been on a completely 
even footing, it seems clear to Rowlands and Cénat that Chamlay had direct access to the 
king before Louvois’s demise and that this was not simply via Louvois.246 Nevertheless, 
concerning Ireland, it will be shown that Louvois’s views and those of Chamlay did not 
greatly differ. 
Chamlay, James II and Ireland – the documents. 
The following documents were all written by Chamlay and deal with French support for 
James II and what form this should take. The aim here is to give an idea of what Chamlay’s 
views on James and the situation in Ireland were while the Irish campaign was either in 
preparation or in train. The documents are from different points over the period between 
1689 and 1691. Two are memoranda from Chamlay’s private papers and two are letters 
Chamlay sent to Louvois while on campaign.  
Document 1 – Memorandum by Chamlay, January 1689 
The first dates from 25 January 1689 (n.s.) and is in the form of a handwritten 
memorandum addressed to Louis XIV.247 In it, Chamlay advocates trying to showcase 
James as preparing an invasion of England, in order to deceive William of Orange and buy 
the French time for their own plans. One should note that as the document is from 
Chamlay’s own papers, it is not certain that it was ever formally submitted to the king, 
although it may have been verbally presented.  
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The context here is that the French desire for a limited war in Germany had backfired and 
they were facing a coalition of enemies, not least William of Orange. There was a fear that 
with William having established himself in England with greater ease than expected, the 
same fleet and Dutch soldiers might be used to assist French Huguenots and make a 
landing in northern France.248 To this end, Seignelay and Vauban had toured the coasts of 
Normandy and Brittany in January 1690.249 Urgent works were undertaken in several 
locations, including around the naval base at Brest, and steps were taken to strengthen local 
militia. Whether this was enough to deter a landing was unclear. Chamlay’s memorandum, 
dated January 1689, starts with the writer’s general view of James II. 
Comme l’esprit vient rarement quand on a passé trente ans, et que j’ay eu 
l’honneur de connoistre le roy d’Angleterre a cet age, j’advoue 
ingenument, sans luy manquer de respect, que je n’ay jamais este la dupe 
des beaux commencements de son regne.250 
This is revealing in a number of ways. First, its frankness in assessing the abilities of James 
II is indicative of Chamlay’s honesty in appraising a situation or person. Secondly, it attests 
to the latitude given to Chamlay by the king in return for good advice. Thirdly, its critical 
viewpoint is very much in line with Louvois’s thinking on James, and although this could 
stem from the patron-client relationship, it is possible the two had similar views in any 
case.251 
The dating of the note is also important, as it situates the document during a period of 
serious consultation within Louis’s governing circle as to what to do with James and how 
best to employ him.252 Symcox states that some sort of French involvement in Ireland was 
being discussed in light of Tyrconnell’s messages to James that he was holding Ireland in 
his name. To this end, the Chevalier de Pointis, a naval artillery officer, had been sent to 
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Ireland on a fact-finding mission and reported back favourably on Tyrconnell and his 
aims.253 
Chamlay suggests that William’s primary concern must be to consolidate his grip on the 
Three Kingdoms, as this was the only way for the Dutch to use English resources in the 
continental war with France. “Monsr. le prince d’orange doit avoir pour objet principal, sur 
lequel roulle toute la fortune, une paix proffonde dans les trois royaumes d’Irlande, 
d’Ecosse et d’Angleterre … pour avoir des homes et de l’argent de quoy faire la guerre …” 
To prevent William from realising this peaceful control, and gain extra time for military 
preparations, Chamlay suggests that the French should act quickly given that “il est 
essentiel de le troubler autant qu’il se pourra”. Given that at the start of the Nine Years War 
it is clear that France had only expected a short, contained German campaign and was not 
prepared for a longer conflict, it was essential to stop or at least delay as long as possible 
active English involvement on the continent.  
Chamlay’s point of view is novel in the sense that it tries to use James’s presence as a tool 
to sow disinformation as to what French plans were, in the hope that such information 
would find its way to England and cast doubt on attempting any landing on the coasts of 
Louis’s kingdom. He proposes to use James’s presence in France as a cat’s paw, so that 
even if the French decided not to actually involve themselves in Ireland, it might be 
possible to make William believe something was afoot and so forestall English invasion 
plans of France. The suggestion is made to have James overtly visit the port of Le Havre, 
perhaps in the company of a general, to inspect ships there. As Le Havre was close enough 
to Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight, it might be possible to create the impression that some 
sort of invasion preparation was in progress.254 To complete the deception, and create 
confusion, the strategist further suggested that some English Jacobite officers be sent to the 
port of Saint Malo in Brittany, to sow a story that they would be making for Ireland or 
England. This ploy could make use of the possible presence of English merchants in either 
port — England not officially being at war with France — that such tales would be relayed 
to England.255 
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The chief aim he states is to trouble the Dutch ruler in establishing himself firmly and 
prevent him from getting England involved on the continent. This, he argues, would cost 
the French almost nothing and also buy time for military preparations. This fits with 
Symcox’s view that “Louis XIV had to find some means of occupying William’s forces 
before they could be turned against the soft underbelly of France.”256  
Since disinformation was the main vehicle of this proposal, it is possible that Chamlay 
foresaw that some deception would be practiced on James himself, although it might have 
been impolitic to state this specifically. If a pretext was needed to send James to the coast 
to build rumours, it could have been found and James would have been none the wiser. 
Certainly contemporary commentators such as Dangeau and Madame de Sévigné state that 
there was significant contact between Louis and James in the context of possible 
expeditions to Ireland or England, so the background was there. 
Regarding Ireland specifically, Louvois opposed any meaningful operations in Ireland for a 
number of reasons. The first was that from his perspective the continent was the only 
theatre that counted for France, as defeat there could threaten the kingdom, any other front 
being secondary. The second was that even if he had been in favour of Irish operations, like 
his brother he probably did not think much of James’s abilities, so James was not the 
person to lead it.257 Thirdly, Louvois’s relations with Seignelay were not cordial, so the 
war minister was not interested in any policy that could put the navy into the limelight, and 
operations in Ireland necessarily implied naval involvement.258 
Although Chamlay’s scheme was not followed by the French king, it is clear from events 
described in Symcox’s thesis that there were many discussions around what advantage the 
presence of an exiled English monarch could give. The suggestion of actions that cost 
nothing would have been welcome, given that France was unprepared for a conflict wider 
than the defensive actions begun around Phillipsburg. Instead, Louis was convinced by 
Pointis and Tyrconnell that Ireland was a front worth opening. The French did send James 
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II to Ireland with money, arms, and some French officers, in the hope of distracting 
England from significant continental action, so for a time therefore French involvement 
was limited.259 In any case, in early 1689 Louis did not know the strength of all the 
enemies he would be facing, so resources had to be managed closely. 
Naturally, the French expected William would himself send a force to subdue the island. 
This probability was catered for in the instructions given to the senior French officer being 
sent to Ireland in March 1689, Lieutenant-General Maumont. In the case of invasion, he 
could give combat to prevent the force from advancing inland and joining up with forces of 
disgruntled Protestants. Interestingly, the wording of the orders clearly implies that the 
decision as to when to give battle was up to Maumont. If combat was likely, the 
instructions suggest “auquel cas, autant que l'on peut juger de loin de pareille chose, il 
semble que le meilleur party soit de le donner promptement…”260 
Thus while overall strategy for Ireland was discussed and agreed at Versailles, in 
cooperation with James II, tactics had to be modified when in Ireland.261 The decision-
makers in France knew they were too far away to know the situation on the ground. In 
contrast to the continental struggles, the notion of Versailles corresponding closely with 
and consulting commanding officers on campaign in Ireland was not feasible. The 
distances were too great and the relay of information was subject to delay through wind 
and tide, or indeed outright loss. 
When Maumont was killed at the Siege of Derry, effective military command in Ireland 
fell to Conrad von Rosen. Some of Rosen’s tactics and declarations, though acceptable 
perhaps in French service on the continent, were countermanded by James himself. Rosen 
must have felt himself hamstrung, but as Ireland was not “enemy territory” but the land of 
an ally, James’s writ at least went that far. There could be no levying of “contributions” as 
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elsewhere or subjecting the civilian population to harsh treatment in the case of non-
cooperation. 
One example of this was during the Siege of Derry in 1689. Rosen suggested rounding up 
Protestant families and forcing them up to the walls of the city, to oblige the defenders to 
either admit them into the city and so quickly exhaust remaining food or leave them to 
starve in the no-man’s land between James’s besieging army and the city. James was 
outraged and said that had it been one of his own subjects who made such a suggestion, 
James would have had him hanged. It was clear that French military habits and tactics had 
to be tempered when acting on behalf of James II in Ireland. 
Document 2 – Letter from Chamlay to Louvois, August 1689 
It has been suggested that Chamlay was the real strategist behind a Louvois who 
admittedly was a master administrator, but whose grasp of strategic concepts was weak— 
an aspect, if true, that the minister was sure not to advertise to his sovereign.262 Certainly 
Louvois and Chamlay wrote to each other often when both were not at Versailles, 
especially during wartime. In August 1689, Chamlay, on campaign in the Rhineland, wrote 
to Louvois giving his views on a variety of military matters, including what James II 
needed as regards assistance to defend Ireland. This is a document which to my knowledge 
has never been published, or referred to, in any printed primary works or secondary 
scholarship relating to Ireland.263 
Chamlay’s autograph letter was dated 24 August 1689 and was written from the French 
Rhine army camp at Lichtenau. The main body of the letter relates to the French efforts to 
hold Mainz against imperial forces and also the actions of the army commander, Duras, 
which Chamlay reports back to Louvois.  
Chamlay does not mention the siege of Derry, so it is possible he thought it was still going 
on.264 In the letter, Chamlay suggests bolstering the untrained Irish levies by sending 
French troops to support them, as well as trying to fortify a number of large towns to oblige 
William III to besiege them, thus slowing any progress. Chamlay describes the forces 
under James as being just a “milice”, echoing Pointis’s original appraisal of forces amassed 
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by Tyrconnell.265 This follows thinking expressed by Pointis in his memorandum of the 
Irish situation given to Louis and his ministers in February 1689, while they were 
considering how to support Tyrconnell in his attempts to defy William. Chamlay refers to 
James’s success in Scotland (victory of Killiecrankie, 27 July 1689) but suggests that from 
what Louvois has told him of the strong militia element of James’s forces in Ireland, 
military success would not continue without regular troops: “sans que le Roy n’y aura pas 
un corps de troupes regle, qui serve de fondement et de base pour la conduitte de cette 
guerre”.266 The reason for this was that the Irish militia was untrained and untested, so 
unless bolstered by shape and example given by French troops, the Irish forces would 
always be : “toujours mises en fuites par les trouppes estrangeres reglees que le Prince 
d’Orange voudra y envoier.” 
It is interesting that he suggested sending French troops, as this is something that was not 
to Louvois’s liking, for reasons outlined above. Nevertheless, if it was decided by the king 
after consultation that sending troops was the course of action was to be followed, Louis 
would brook no opposition, and the war minister knew this. It should be noted that 
D’Avaux too had requested that French troops be sent to serve as a core around which the 
Irish forces could be moulded.267 As a respected strategist, Chamlay would have been 
aware of the overall shortage of troops the French suffered from in the early period of the 
War and notes how this weighed on Louis: “Le Roy a besoin de tant de trouppes pour la 
defense de son pays et de ses places qu’il malaise”.268 The fortification and garrisoning of 
strong points in Ireland is another area Chamlay suggests would be advantageous to James, 
as these could constitute a significant obstacle to William’s forces once they arrived, which 
Chamlay predicts would be  
lorsque l’arriere saison olbigera les armees de Flandres de se separer et 
de se retirer dans les places et alors il aura a sa disposition telle quantite 
de troupes hollandoises qu’il luy plaira pour descendre en Irlande. 
Chamlay acknowledges that the risk to French troops involved in lengthy sea crossings is 
not to be discounted — “confier les bonnes troupes a la mer pour les transmettre dans un 
                                                   
265
 Symcox, Thesis,  pp.67–68. Pointis’s memorandum is in AN, Marine, B4, 68 
266
 SHD, A1, 883, f.209–210. Chamlay to Louvois, 24 August 1689. 
267
 D’Avaux to Louvois, 6 May 1689, in Hogan, Négociations p.120. He also said he was 
impressed with the quality and physique of the Irish soldiers, but did not think much of 
their officers. 
268
 SHD, A1, 883, f.209–210. Symcox says in his thesis that full French mobilisation was 
not achieved until 1690;   
92 
 
royaume estranger au hazard de les perdre entierement” — but that victory there over 
William would constitute a singular reversal, “au plus cruel et au plus dangereux enemy 
qu’ait le Roy”. Recognising, however, that he is too far way to judge what is actually 
feasible, he adds that his idea is only a suggestion: “accepter ou pour le rejetter ainsi que 
l’on juge a propos”. Although the meaning can be taken at face value, the language used 
expresses deference and respect to Louvois, when the advice is a course of action the 
patron probably did not favour. In the end, it was decided by the king to send French troops 
to Ireland, although this was tempered by the proviso that James should send to France an 
equal number of Irish troops to serve in France.269 
It is a possible critique of Chamlay as a source to say that the advice given is relatively 
orthodox and that it could have come from almost any general staff officer. If one’s own 
forces were at a disadvantage, and one was not to lose control of a territory completely 
with enemy forces in the field, then one could consider holding out in existing 
fortifications and living to fight for another season. Certainly, it took far more men to 
besiege strongholds than to garrison them.270 It was contemporary military thinking, 
strongly supported in France by Vauban.271 His idea of linked fortresses forming a 
defensible border — the pré carré principle — was implemented by Louvois and was 
applied to France’s continental land borders at considerable expense. In an Irish context, 
what validates the advice was the fact that Protestant militia applied such tactics by holding 
Enniskillen and Derry for William and thus remaining a threat until the army of Schomberg 
arrived. For this study, however, the focus is not to judge Chamlay’s abilities as a 
strategist, so the topic is best left for scholars of military planning to evaluate. 
In responding to news from Louvois that the French fleet had left Brest for the Channel, 
Chamlay naturally wished it all success and argued that a French victory would be a lesson 
to the haughty English and Dutch: “…qui jusques’ici n’ont pas concue une haute idée de la 
puissance maritime de Sa Majeste.” Curiously, the outcome Chamlay hopes might stem 
from naval victory over the maritime powers was not an invasion of England on behalf of 
                                                   
269
 Dangeau, Journal (Paris, 1854), vol.3, p.31; entry for 28 November 1689. 
270
 In 1684, a French army of 30,000 men was sent to besiege the city of Luxembourg, held 
by a force of 3,400 Spanish soldiers. (Source: Luxembourg city guidebook to historical 
fort of Drai Echelen (Luxembourg, 2011). 
271
 In Alsace in 1688, Vauban’s chain of forts in Alsace was not finished. These included 
the sites of Fort-Louis and Landau, designed to defend Strasbourg from attacks 
launched from the Imperial fort at Phillipsburg. In 1688, Louis XIV decided to besiege 
Phillipsburg, thus shutting the last so-called gate into Alsace. See Symcox, “The 
Outbreak of the Nine Years War” (1976),    pp.186–187 and 197. 
93 
 
James II, but an idea probably closer to the thinking of his patron Louvois: “…la ruine 
totale de leur commerce pendant la presente guerre”.272 There is no exhortation or 
suggestion from him that the fleet should be more actively employed near Ireland, but it is 
conceivable that as an army man he did not feel he had the knowledge to suggest a course 
of naval action. As mentioned, his patron Louvois did not wish for the navy to have a 
greater role, and he probably supported this. Symcox states that the navy was never 
seriously considered for an important role in Irish waters, due to either “excessive caution 
or strategic blindness” on Louis’s part.273 
Document 3 – Letter from Chamlay to Louvois, August 1690 
The third document under examination here is again a letter from Chamlay to Louvois, this 
time from 1 August 1690, while he was on campaign in Germany in the French army 
commanded by the Dauphin.  
The general background for 1690 in a Nine Years War context was one of relative success 
for the French. They had secured a much-needed victory over the Allies at Fleurus in the 
Spanish Netherlands on 1 July, and this was followed up with naval success over an Allied 
fleet at Beachy Head on 10 July, thus opening a possibility of French invasion of 
England.274 The immediate Irish context for the letter, however, was defeat at the Boyne on 
11 July, which in keeping with Chamlay’s previous writings was not altogether a surprise. 
“La mauvaise nouvelle que vostre lacquais nous avoit apporte nous avons jette dans une 
grande consternation, quoyqu’elle ne peut pas beaucoup nous surprendre…”.275 
Some of the letter is spent discussing the rumour, true as it turned out, that William had 
been wounded at the Boyne.276 Chamlay says that intelligence he had from among enemy 
troops, even in his theatre across the river Rhine, was that William was dead and suggested 
this as the reason why William’s army did not pursue James as speedily as they might 
have. He does not hide his dismay that James had taken ship, although from the letter it is 
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not clear whether Chamlay knew James was bound for France or merely further along the 
south-west coast of Ireland to escape advancing Williamites.277  
While the Boyne defeat was very serious for James’s cause, Chamlay did not think the 
situation irreparable and concentrated on trying to assess options for James. He proposed 
that James retreat to a strong coastal fort and regroup. If well supplied, James could rally 
his supporters there and try to hold out until the end of the season.278 Again, this idea is 
reminiscent of his previous letter. Chamlay believed that William must pursue James in 
order not to “laisser la victoire imparfaite” but he urged James to rally his supporters, 
stating that if he were in James’s place he would endeavour to “disputer le terrain aussie 
longtemps que je pourrois”. This might force William to retire at the end of the season with 
a damaged reputation but also give hope to James’s party in England and contribute to 
upholding James’s martial reputation. Chamlay suggested that if the Jacobites were well 
enough supplied and able to defend their position for a month or two, this might oblige 
William to retire at the end of the season.279 Without such a defensive posture, evacuation 
might have to be considered: “S’il n’estoit pas praticable, j’embarquerais promptement non 
seulement les Francois mais encore tout les irlandais pour les amener en France.” 
Despite the “militia” nature of Irish Jacobite troops, Chamlay clearly did not think 
discipline and training was going to be a problem, suggesting that all they needed was to be 
                                                   
277
 James boarded a French warship at Duncannon fort in the south-east of Ireland, and 
made firstly for Cork. There the ship joined others and made for Brest. From the content 
of Louvois’s preceding letter to Chamlay, the minister had told of the outcome of the 
Boyne but not specifically of James’s flight to France. Many contemporary 
commentators and subsequent historians have considered that James II’s flight to France 
fatally damaged his reputation and that his embarkation after the Boyne was precipitate. 
Symcox in this thesis suggested it was Lauzun who had orders from Louis to prevent 
James from being captured by William and so pushed him to flee. James also thought 
Louis XIV was about to launch an invasion of England, as paradoxically it was a good 
time when Jacobite sentiment was at a height and the Williamites knew this. See 
Symcox, Thesis, pp.383–387. See Simms, “The War of the Two Kings, 1685–1691” in 
Moody, Martin and Byrne (eds), Early Modern Ireland, 1534–1691 (1976),  vol.III, 
p.496. 
278
 Chamlay, with his “encyclopaedic knowledge of European geography” was perhaps 
aware of the Irish coastal forts like Kinsale and Waterford, built in the reign of Charles 
II and had these in mind. Rowlands, Dynastic State,  p.63. 
279
 It was advice which, with hindsight, showed itself to be correct. William’s forces could 
not take Limerick in the time expected. The siege was lifted at the end of August and 
William left for England soon afterwards. The need to avoid a repeat in 1691 forced the 
Williamites to offer much better terms to the Jacobites than they had wished to, to be 
able to send troops to the continental struggle. See Mijers and Onnekink, Redefining 
William III, p.57. 
95 
 
mixed in regiments with companies of French soldiers. The Irish would follow the example 
set by the French and would do their duty. 
A copy of Louvois’s answer is in the same registre of letters, dated 7 August 1690. In it, he 
stated: “La proposition que vous faites d’embarquer beaucoup d’Irlandois est bien venue 
dans l’esprit du Roy”. Due to transport difficulties, the war minister doubted they would 
arrive in time to make a difference in the current campaign, which is what the king wanted. 
Louvois also countered Chamlay’s intelligence and affirms that his information is that 
William is not dead at all.280 As with all the Chamlay–Louvois correspondence mentioning 
Ireland, the discussion then turns to the Rhine front. Ireland, although of importance, is 
only one theatre and is not discussed in isolation. 
Document 4 – Memorandum from August 1691 
The last document to be considered here is a draft memorandum by Chamlay from 5 
August 1691. Again, it should be stated that it is not clear whether it was ever given to 
Louis, either in written or verbal form. The date is significant, however, as it was written in 
the aftermath of Louvois’s death on 16 July. The note begins with Chamlay describing his 
advisory remit from the king: “Comme vostre majeste me permet de luy exposer ce qui me 
passé par l’esprit, et que l’affaire de l’Irlande est publicque”.281 As Rowlands says, 
Chamlay was a “mine of strategic and administrative ideas”, so his suggestions might well 
have been even more welcome in the aftermath of the minister’s death and attendant 
reorganisation of the administration between the king and Barbezieux.282 The use of 
“publicque” might be a reference to the fact that at this time Louis had told James he would 
continue to support the Irish front.283 
Conscious of the enormous effort the French forces had to sustain in the face of superior 
enemy forces, he advocates only sending the strict minimum of supplies. “Je suis persuade 
qu’il ne faut n’y faire passer des troupes en Irlande, ni y consommer nostre argent par des 
convoys inutils.” 
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Following on from this statement, he returns to a concept of deception evident in the 
memorandum of early 1689 by suggesting that the commander of Irish troops already in 
France, Justin McCarthy, Viscount Mountcashel (1638–1694), be sent to Ireland as an 
influential messenger.284 Mountcashel had served in French forces in Holland in the 1670s 
and had been praised by D’Avaux for his noble manners and courage. More recently, he 
had commanded the Irish regiment which served with distinction in Savoy in 1690 under 
the Marquis de St Ruth, Mountcashel himself being wounded in action. Chamlay argues 
that Mountcashel was the right candidate to send to Ireland because of his qualities of 
“courage”, “esprit” and “naissance”. These made him an ideal candidate to persuade his 
compatriots, in unconquered Limerick especially, to continue resistance to William III.285  
Mountcashel, Chamlay argued, had to be genuinely convinced of French willingness to 
continue support. To back this up, he should sail to Limerick with a ship fully laden with 
arms and powder and carry a small amount of money, namely 30,000 ecus — a small sum 
in the context of what had been sent before — and promises of further support to come. 
The reason, Chamlay underlines, that Mountcashel should believe the French desire to 
support the Jacobite cause actively is for him to be believed in Ireland. Significantly, the 
term he uses is “tromper” — to deceive. What is to be sent, though, is the actual limit of 
what the French should send, the bare minimum to keep morale up and the front going.  
If the policy of disinformation was to be believed Chamlay clearly thought it clearly had to 
be tightly managed. To ensure the “promise” of assistance was echoed in Ireland by news 
from James’s court at St Germain, he advocated that the same deception should be 
operated in relation to James. The verb “tromper” is again used in relation to how to tell 
James and his queen of the French desire to see the Irish theatre sustained. This approach 
would ensure that while minimum assistance would be sent, it would be received with 
good grace. 
It is worth underlining the recurring theme of saving money between the January 1689 
memorandum and this from August 1691. Chamlay would have been aware of France 
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being under considerable financial pressure in the period of the war.286 Indeed, Symcox 
interestingly refers to Jacobite frustration at how little money Louis had sent in 1689 and 
1690, although he argues that the lack of resources was due to their being sorely needed on 
the continent and not a Machiavellian desire to feed the Jacobites the bare minimum.287 
When the two memos are taken together, however, the darker view seems to fit better. The 
strong impression given is that Chamlay, like Louvois, was not really interested in helping 
out James II, or Jacobite Ireland, and believed the money would be better spent at home. 
Again, it should be emphasised that in the end Louis did not follow Chamlay’s advice and 
another convoy to succour Limerick was organised. Unfortunately for the Limerick 
Jacobites, this did not arrive in time.288 For the French, even this was not a disaster, as they 
gained about 12,000 Irish Jacobite troops, fulfilling a war aim for Louis XIV once James II 
was no longer present in Ireland.289 
Ireland had not been the only “diversionary” front the French operated. Sarmant implies  
that the Rhineland offensive of late 1688 was partly launched to forestall imperial pressure 
in the wake of the Ottoman loss of Belgrade in September 1688. Other forms of pressure in 
favour of the Turks had been applied in previous years, such as French money sent to 
support the Hungarian rebel leader Count Thokoly.290  
Conclusion 
It is clear from the tone of both Chamlay’s letters and memoranda that he was a hard-
headed strategist who very much saw the Irish theatre as a diversion. In this, he largely 
shared the views of his patron Louvois. He clearly believed that James was the author of 
his own downfall, and that in the context of France finding herself in a difficult war against 
many enemies, no great expense or effort should be expended to assist his cause in Ireland, 
or elsewhere. Nevertheless, he saw James’s presence as being potentially of use in the 
context of disinformation. He was frank in his advice and had no qualms in suggesting how 
one could manipulate army officers such as Mountcashel and indeed James himself in 
order to gain advantage for his king, Louis XIV. What should not be forgotten, however, is 
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that even if the advice offered was sound, or even original, it was up to the king to decide 
finally. In the case of Ireland, he did not follow Chamlay’s proposals. This was perhaps 
because Louis felt a personal obligation to James II and also that campaigning in Ireland 
probably cost England much more than it did France. 
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CHAPTER V – HAVING THE QUEEN’S EAR: COURT POLITICS AND DECISION-
MAKING ON JACOBITE IRELAND, 1689–1690 
M.de Lauzun crut donc qu'il feroit un grand coup pour lui [Seignelay] et 
qu'il plairoit fort a Madame de Maintenon, de tirer l'affaire d'irlande des 
mains de M.de Louvois, pour la mettre dans les mains de M.de Seignelai. 
Il persuada si bien la Reine d'Angleterre, que cela fut fait.291(October 
1689) 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to outline what can be told of the information relationships 
between and surrounding Mary of Modena (1658–1718) and the Comte de Lauzun (1633–
1723) in the period between the arrival of the English royal family in France in December 
1688 and January 1689 and Lauzun’s own departure for Ireland in March 1690.292 This 
period and this relationship are crucial, I believe, to understanding the changing situation in 
Ireland and on the continent and how it affected royal policy towards Ireland. 
Contextually, the dating of the events reported in the quotation place it in September and 
October 1689, as by the end of that month decisions had been made at Versailles regarding 
the management of the war in Ireland. James II and his forces were in the field in Ireland 
since March of that year. According to D’Avaux, writing to Louvois and others, James had 
not organised his army properly and had been wasteful of precious French resources sent 
over. Hostile Derry, inadequately besieged, had held out until relief came in July 1689. 
James, for some reason, had been shocked by the landing of a Williamite force under 
General Schomberg, which stayed on James’s northern flank in Ulster effectively blocked 
his passage to Scotland.293 Seignelay, although navy secretary, was not invited by Louis to 
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join the Conseil d’En Haut until late 1689.294 Lauzun, an opponent of Louvois, tried to use 
his influence to engineer some change in favour of Seignelay. 
Historiography 
This section will use the different elements in the opening quotation to explore what 
contextual background and other relevant evidence can be marshalled to understand what is 
behind this statement and how these events happened. If this seems ambitious from such a 
short statement, it is worth looking at the relevant historiography for inspiration. It is worth 
noting here that as the focus of this work is French support for Jacobite Ireland, most of the 
works below were consulted for those sections relevant to this area. 
Both recent and older scholarship in relation to Ireland and France are problematic for our 
purposes.295 As historians write their studies with a strong focus, it naturally follows that 
some aspects of a topic, being more peripheral to their interest, are not treated with a depth 
sought by a reader with a different focus. This is true of the writing on the Irish theatre, 
even though there is a need for a cross-focus between France and Ireland. Symcox’s thesis 
is an original exception to this. Historians write their books on their own chosen subjects 
and logically focus on that. The reader who is interested both in the chosen and peripheral 
subjects and on how they are interlinked is often left unsatisfied. As mentioned in the 
introduction at the start of this paper, there are only two scholars so far who I find bring 
that crossover gap regarding Ireland: Symcox, as already mentioned, and Conroy, who 
examined the French navy’s charting and hydrography work in Irish waters during the time 
of the 1689–1691 campaign.296 
As regards the quotation above, this is exactly the case. The four anglophone historians I 
have found who refer to it are Gregg, Rowlands, Childs and Symcox.297 They are all 
writing on different topics, but the quotation is useful for all as an example of what could 
be termed as “major themes” of organisation, command and ministerial influence in the 
French armies under Louis XIV. Rowlands is the clear exception I have found here, as he 
refers to the importance of the dévôt party and sheds useful light on inter-ministerial 
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rivalries.298 The French biographer Petitfils also uses it in his work on Lauzun, as does the 
Duc de La Force in his earlier work (neither use footnotes or endnotes).299 There, as before, 
this quotation is used as a means of confirming what was happening in a peripheral but 
influential milieu, somewhere removed from the author’s own immediate subject matter. It 
is, however, more central to my interest and so worthy of further examination and 
dissection. 
Prior to examining the detail of the quotation itself, it is clearly important to consider for a 
moment the general veracity of the author. From the point of view of a critical appraisal of 
the quotation, there does not seem to be any particular reason to doubt the veracity of the 
actual statement by Madame de La Fayette. Moreover it has been  used by many scholars 
in their own works and so it is usedImplicitly one could say this tongue in cheek… this is 
the case given the number of historians, and students (like myself) who quote from her 
Memoires and use this particular one. Suffice to say at this point that I do not have any 
reasons to doubt the accuracy of the author’s words. Moreover, I can count myself as 
standing on the shoulders of well-known scholars such as Rowlands and Childs, who have 
been happy to use it and take it as valid.300 
Lauzun’s background 
As Lauzun plays a central role in the context of the above quotation, it is worth delving 
into his background prior to the Irish campaign to examine it and understand his 
motivations. 
Born in Gascony in south-west France, Antonin-Nompar de Caumont (1632–1723) was the 
scion of a cadet branch of the ancient Caumont family. Having chosen a military career, he 
first joined the household of his soldier uncle, the well-known Marechal de Gramont, who 
then paid for him to train at a military academy in Paris. He saw action in 1657 where his 
immediate commander on was the future James II, then Duke of York, exiled in France 
because of Cromwell. In 1659, Lauzun (or the Comte de Puyguilhem, as his title then was) 
was presented at court via the Comtesse de Soissons, superintendent of the household of 
Queen Anne d’Autriche. It was through this link that he met the young Louis XIV, with 
whom he quickly developed a friendship. From this point his favour with the king rrew 
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steadily, who, according to diplomat Ezechiel Spannheim: “l’honora meme de sa 
confidence, de ses bienfaits et lui donne des marques d’eclat et de distinction”.301  
The Gascon seems to have been endowed with both charisma and bravery and also had a 
deserved reputation as a Don Juan among the ladies at court. One of Lauzun’s affairs was 
with Madeleine-Fare, the daughter of war secretary Michel Le Tellier, newly wed to the 
Duke of Villiquier.302  
In 1669, he requested the vacant role of Grand Maître de l’Artillerie. This role had great 
responsibility, including a force of 800 soldiers and servants, and required close 
cooperation with the war department and its new head, the Marquis de Louvois.303 As he 
was not on good terms with Louvois, Louis promised him the post on condition it was kept 
secret until the king judged the time right. Lauzun was unable to keep the secret, which 
somehow found its way to the ears of Louvois, who rushed to see the king, This was 
alarming news, not only because of the importance of the post but also because of the 
general attitude of Lauzun, a loose cannon in Louvois’s eyes if ever there was one. 
Moreover, Louvois is likely to have reminded the king he had been working closely to 
professionalise the army and to ensure army officers and nobles did cooperate with his 
ministry; Lauzun did not fit this new schema. Louvois knew that Lauzun, along with 
Turenne and Bellefonds, did not take kindly to the instructions emanating from the clerks 
of the war department. Finally convinced, Louis opted instead for the Comte de Lude, a 
soldier of merit and a trusted gentleman of the bedchamber.   
Lauzun was furious and accused the king of reneging on his word. It was thought, 
according to Saint Simon, that Louis was going to strike him with the cane he was 
carrying, but he restrained himself and threw the cane away, preferring to have Lauzun sent 
to the Bastille to cool his heels for a short while. 
Despite this effrontery, Lauzun still somehow managed to retain the king’s affection and 
favour. To compensate him, Louis made him Captain of the King’s bodyguards in June 
1669, a position of great trust. It was in this capacity that on 31 March 1670, Lauzun 
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assisted his master in secretly ferrying away the newborn child of Louis and Madame de 
Montespan in the middle of the night to the home in Paris of the chosen governess, 
Madame Scarron, Françoise d’Aubigné. The child was Louis-Auguste de Bourbon, and 
went on to play a larger part in Lauzun’s fate than he might have suspected. 
Whatever his real qualities, Lauzun was always able to excite people’s passions, either for 
or against him. At some point in this period, he came to impress the unmarried and 
immensely wealthy cousin of the king, Anne Marie d’Orleans, Duchesse de Montpensier 
(1627–1693), known as La Grande Mademoiselle. An unlikely friendship developed 
between the two, and before long she had fallen for the charms of the intrepid little Gascon, 
six years her junior. In December 1670, he agreed to marry her, no doubt with an eye to her 
titles. When she asked Louis’s permission to wed, to general surprise he agreed.304 Almost 
at once, however, the king came under great pressure from many in his own family. It 
seems  Queen Marie-Therese, his brother Philippe, Condé and Madame de Montespan all 
agreed that such an interloper could not possibly be allowed to marry into the royal dynasty 
and, perhaps more importantly, to acquire immense wealth which should stay in the royal 
dynasty. 
Persuaded again to his public role, Louis rescinded the permission, to the great chagrin of 
Mademoiselle. Lauzun appeared unhappy but resigned to the royal will. To sweeten the 
decision, the king compensated him with a gratification of 500,000 livres and awarded him 
the prestigious right of grandes entrees.305 This symbolically important post permitted 
Lauzun access to the king’s person without the requirement of being formally announced, 
such as at the petit lever or petit coucher.306 At Easter the same year, he was awarded the 
governorship of the Berry region and went on campaign with the king to Flanders. He was 
clearly still in the king’s favour. 
From the time of the foiled wedding, Lauzun had felt that Madame de Montespan was 
undermining him in the eyes of Louis, so when another court appointment came up, he 
asked for her help. She agreed, but secretly spoke to the king against him. Lauzun found 
out, apparently by hiding in the king’s room while they were there together. Later on, he 
insulted her for her duplicity and called her dreadful names. When the king heard of this, 
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he was furious and ordered Louvois to apologise to his beloved mistress within five days. 
The only response the king got was a letter from him setting out reasons for his conduct. 
On 27 November 1671, Lauzun was arrested and sent on a long journey to prison, to the 
sadness of the Grande Mademoiselle but no doubt to the relief of others. His place of 
incarceration for 10 years was Pinerolo, a remote Italian mountain fortress with a French 
garrison.307 Like Fouquet, the incarcerated Lauzun was exactly where the king — and 
Louvois also, no doubt — wanted him, namely out of sight, out of mind, and finally under 
complete control. They both had wanted him removed, but for different reasons: Louis 
perhaps because he realised he could not get Lauzun to control himself and Louvois 
because this was the last “royal favourite” and the only one who still thought the army 
reforms did not apply to him. 
The key to his salvation was to be found in the riches of the Grande Mademoiselle. After 
years of her requests to Louis and Madame de Montespan, the price of Lauzun’s release 
was set. Only through making the little Louis-Auguste de Bourbon heir to some of her 
most valuable territories, such as the sovereign principality of the Dombes near Lyon, was 
freedom obtained for Lauzun. Even then, it was not complete, for he was bound to keep 
away from the royal court for the next few years, although he was permitted to live in 
Paris. Moreover, the Grande Mademoiselle, after being essentially robbed of her lands, was 
obliged to publicly name her heir, to much surprise at court. It was an act remembered for 
years afterwards by no less a person than the Princesse Palatine, Liselotte of Orleans, who 
remarked in 1688 in a letter to her relative: “[la Duchesse de Montpensier] a fait la sottise 
de donner son bien au batard pour tirer de prison son petit crapeau de Lauzun”.308  
Lauzun and Seignelay 
When Lauzun emerged from Pignerol, he naturally renewed his friendship with his great 
benefactress. Some historians in fact believe they married morganatically in 1681 or 
1682.309 While he later took impressive lodgings near Place Royale in Paris, she had the 
very fine Palais du Luxembourg in Paris, and he was a frequent visitor there when she was 
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not at Versailles. Despite the years of incarceration, Lauzun was just too restless to live a 
quiet life. On the lookout for new possibilities of regaining favour from the king, he was 
prepared to play a long game. It was there he had met on a number of occasions Jean 
Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Seignelay, the new secretary of the navy. Lauzun persuaded 
the Grande Mademoiselle to put in a good word for him with Seignelay who then agreed to 
meet him separately. Seignelay later underlined to Mademoiselle how he had reluctantly 
met him, only on her insistence and that he was still wary of him. “Sans vous il y aurait 
longtemps que je lui aurois fermer ma porte; c’est un homme de mauvais commerce et ou il 
n’y a nulle surete.”310 
This was by no means a rare example of well-connected court nobles looking down on 
Lauzun and keeping their distance. Despite being out of prison, Lauzun was still very much 
out of favour. Even as late as 1685 no less a figure than Madame de Maintenon wrote to 
her wayward brother, Charles d’Aubigné, exhorting him not to associate with anyone not 
in favour at court. “Soyez sur vos gardes a Paris comme a la Cour, ne voyez guere M de 
Montespan ni M de Lauzun; on dira que vous cherchez les mecontents”.311 
Nevertheless, Lauzun continued to seek out the protection and influence of Seignelay, and 
from the character of Lauzun it seems difficult to imagine other than that this was by 
design, knowing full well that the Colbert family were opponents of his old adversary 
Louvois. 
Seignelay was also appreciated by Madame de Maintenon, though at the beginning she had 
less to do with him than with his two sisters, who were members of the dévôt set and were 
married to high-ranking court nobles. Later in the 1680s, he himself gained her favour, not 
least because after a rather debauched youth he had become much more religious, which 
doubtless pleased Louis’s morganatic wife. This bienvaillance could certainly not have 
harmed his career, despite the hostility of the war minister. As Rowlands says, “Anybody 
enjoying the support of Mme de Maintenon could expect considerable favour from the king 
– something that made the Le Tellier very uneasy”.312  
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From the time of Madame de Maintenon’s secret marriage to Louis, which was probably in 
October 1683, the tone of the court changed to being quite religious.313 This prompted 
Madame de La Fayette to remark at this time: “A l'heure qu'il est, hors de la pieté point de 
salut à la Cour, aussi bien que dans l'autre Monde.” 
That Colbert’s sisters were already part of the religious set augured well for Seignelay. One 
sister, Henriette-Louise, wed the Duc de Beauvillier, while the other, Jeanne-Marie, had 
married the Duc de Chevreuse.314 These dukes, together with the charismatic priest 
François de Salignac-de la Mothe (Fenelon), later Archbishop of Cambrai, and spiritual 
director were seen as opponents to the Le Tellier family, and in later years of the reign 
were seen as promoters of some governmental reform. Fenelon was by this stage also a 
confidant of Madame de Maintenon herself. A mark of the esteem Louis XIV had for the 
virtuous Beauvillier, for example, was shown in 1688, when he was named as gouverneur 
or chief tutor to the children of the Dauphin, including the next but one in line to the 
throne, Louis, Duc de Bourgogne. Fenelon was later appointed as precepteur to the young 
duc. 
It is interesting to note that, whether it was genuine or not, Lauzun himself became more 
religiously observant than he had been previously. In Paris, he was seen going on retreats 
to a nearby monastery in the company of his mother.315 There is some evidence to suggest 
that his turning to religion had occurred in prison (which of itself is not surprising). 
Whatever the reasons, it certainly could only have helped his eventual return to royal grace 
and favour at a time when at court such behaviour was fashionable. 
When exactly Lauzun came up with the idea of serving James II in England is not known, 
but he was certainly restless in Paris and was known to want to go back to soldiering. 
When he heard news of the accession to the English throne of James II, Lauzun must have 
recalled how they had both served under Turenne in Spanish Flanders in the late 1650s. 
Lauzun therefore requested permission from Louis to travel to the English court and offer 
his services as an independent volunteer to the new English monarch. Permission was 
granted, and Lauzun travelled there in 1685, hoping to fight against Monmouth. Although 
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he saw no action, he had been well received at court there, was admired for his charm and 
panache, and made a good impression on the English monarch and his wife.316  
The second time he travelled was in the autumn of 1688, when he must have known that 
James’s position was not as strong as it had been on his previous journey. It seems likely 
that Lauzun travelled with Louis’s approval this time and brought with him a sum of 
money for James.317 He certainly sent back letters reporting on English affairs to 
Seignelay, who in turn read them to the king, who was following events across the Channel 
closely. In fact, Louis told Seignelay to tell Lauzun he appreciated his efforts, and that he 
was “tres aise d’estre informee par vous, de tout ce que vous apprendrez concernant les 
affaires d’Angleterre, elle est tres persuadee que vous y servirez tres utilement.”318 
Whatever the exact details of Lauzun’s letters, he surely stated that James’s position was 
not at all as strong as it had been, but that the English king was happy to see him and 
consulted him on different questions. As events unfolded, James feared for both his own 
life and those of his queen and heir, and so decided, perhaps on Melfort’s advice and in 
consultation with Lauzun, to send them to France for safety.319 
An action like this, requiring a mix of stealth and daring, was just the task for someone like 
Lauzun. With the help of Francesco Riva, a servant to the queen, and another Frenchman, 
the naval officer Sieur de Pointis who was in England on Seignelay’s instructions Lauzun 
led the escape party to a yacht ostensibly reserved for himself to go back to France, which 
did not attract adverse English attention.320 By 21 December they arrived in Calais, the task 
having been accomplished with aplomb.321 In the words of one historian, it was “the only 
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efficient service in his life”.322 James himself was in all probability allowed to escape from 
Rochester by a Prince William none too keen to have his father-in-law stay, and arrived on 
the French coast on 3 January. 
This deed was greatly appreciated by Louis XIV, who received Lauzun at Versailles to 
personally thank him on 4 January 1689, a meeting Lauzun must have been dreaming of 
for years. Having first spoken to Seignelay, the hero of the hour was brought to see the 
king, who greeted him warmly for the first time in almost 18 years, saying “Entrez, 
Monsieur de Lauzun, il n’y a ici que vos amis.”323 
This turn of events — notably the arrival of the English royals in France, but also the 
recovery of a man so utterly fallen from grace — stunned nearly all court commentators. 
With the installation of an exiled English court at the old chateau at Saint Germain, Lauzun 
was once again welcome there, though by a different monarch. To add to his social rebirth, 
and to the surprise of many at court, on 2 February 1689 Louis gave him back his right to 
the grandes entrees and allowed him a coveted apartment at Versailles itself, much to the 
chagrin of the abandoned Grande Mademoiselle.324 
It is evident that at the start of 1689 Lauzun occupied a position of influence with the 
exiled English royals, which in all probability was out of proportion to his talents. 
Doubtless he was determined to make the most of this unexpected opportunity to regain 
favour with Louis XIV. The commentators of the time, such as Madame de Sévigné, attest 
to the changed position of Lauzun in the wake of his service in England, and they 
recognised that Lauzun again had favour with the king in a way that most of them had 
never expected to see again, so rare a case he was. The favourable impression of Lauzun 
likewise extended to Queen Mary of Modena, who considered herself greatly in Lauzun’s 
debt for having saved her and her infant prince from the clutches of William III. 
James was so appreciative of the little Gascon that he was invited to dinner often. The 
exiled king was recorded as saying that Lauzun was his gouverneur, a surprising comment 
from a monarch implying a relationship of tutor to pupil.325 Whether James had fully 
recovered from the crisis of confidence he had suffered at the hands of his nephew is 
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difficult to know. It should be noted in passing that James was also rather subservient to his 
other advisor and fellow exile, Lord Melfort.326   
As Lauzun’s luck would have it, the international situation for France in these opening 
months of the War of the League of Augsburg was such that this was a possibility, and 
Louis XIV himself also planned to make use of James on a grander stage. As Symcox 
states James’s arrival was “providential”, as it gave him a tool with which to stir up trouble 
for this unexpectedly strong foe at a time when he had few allies.327 In fact, in early 
January 1689 James received messages from Richard Talbot, Earl of Tyrconnell, his Lord 
Deputy in Ireland, stating that he was holding Ireland for James, but needed money and 
supplies to help him hold out. This prompted the French to consider what moves they could 
make. To this end, Seignelay sent the Chevalier de Pointis to Ireland to meet with 
Tyrconnell and assess the situation on behalf of the French themselves.  
The French quickly put plans in place to launch an expeditionary force of Jacobites to 
Ireland, assured as they were at least initially of an easy landing. By mid-February it seems 
it had been decided that James would himself lead it and that, if successful, the scope was 
to be expanded, possibly to enable James to pass over to Scotland. Timing and secrecy 
were of the essence. The Parliamentary Convention in England had been meeting and was 
likely to offer the crown to William of Orange, so it was doubtless seen as an opportune 
time to land James within his dominions. At different stages of French planning, different 
individuals were involved, including James, Louis, Louvois, probably Seignelay, perhaps 
Colbert de Croissy and others. At some point in the planning, the undertaking seems to 
have shifted from being under the auspices of Seignelay to that of Louvois, but it is unclear 
how exactly this happened. Through James’s influence, it was then decided that Lauzun 
should command the armed forces on his behalf in Ireland. By 22 February, the court 
commentator and diarist Dangeau said that rumours were circulating that the expedition to 
Ireland was imminent. 
Sa Majeste demeura a Marly jusqu'a cinq heures et puis alla voir le roi 
d'Angleterre. Les deux rois et Monseigneur furent longtemps enfermés 
ensembles, et les courtisans croient que c'est pour regler le voyage du roy 
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d'Angleterre en Irlande, ou l'on ne doute plus qu'il n'aille 
incessamment.328 
When informed of this, possibly by James himself, Lauzun must have got what one could 
only describe colloquially as a rush of blood to the head. His first thought was to ask, via 
Seignelay, to be made a duke by Louis. Although Seignelay counselled against this “pre-
condition” as it were, Lauzun insisted, but was quickly disabused of the notion by the king 
himself who answered him “tres rudemment”. At that moment, it was decided that Lauzun 
would stay put and other commanders, Von Rosen, Pusignan and Maumont, would go to 
Ireland instead as James’s de facto military commanders. In compensation to Lauzun, and 
in recognition of previous services to his family, James, before his departure for Ireland, 
invested Lauzun with the Order of the Garter at a ceremony in Notre Dame in Paris. One 
can be sure that this was a moment of great satisfaction for Lauzun but might have rankled 
with Louis. 
While James departed for Ireland, Lauzun was therefore obliged to remain in France. I 
believe Lauzun, still smarting over the foolhardy request for a dukedom, considered ways 
in which he could again work himself into such a position of favour that Louis would 
create him a duke at some point in the future. The route to that was surely clear to him, via 
James and his queen, as had been demonstrated amply and publicly in his receiving the 
prestigious Garter.  
[Lauzun] n’oubliait pas pour autant les interets de la reine d’Angleterre. 
Il savait que son appui représentait un atout essentiel dans son retour en 
grace. Il allait la voir assez fréquemment a Saint Germain.329 
Lauzun’s cultivation of the English queen’s court was a shrewd policy to pursue. Although 
the 55-year-old James II himself was not a character who attracted much sympathy,330 the 
same could not be said for his charming and beautiful 30-year-old queen, From her arrival 
in France, many court observers were taken were her natural beauty and dignity. The 
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admirers included the Sun King himself, who stated that she had every quality a queen 
should have.331 
She was also very much appreciated by Madame de Maintenon, who approved of her 
genuine Catholic piety, fluent French and witty conversation. Madame de Caylus remarks 
how this appealed to her aunt. “Cette princesse avoit pourtant de l’esprit et de bonnes 
qualites qui lui attirerent de la part de madame de Maintenon une estime et un attachment 
qui n’ont fini qu’avec leurs vies.”332 
It seems generally accepted that, in contrast to her husband James, the exile of Mary of 
Modena in France appears to have given her a new lease of life to her. This is especially 
the case while James was away in Ireland. Although the exiled queen leads a life of 
exemplary piety (witness her retreats to the convent at Chaillot), she also is able to 
cultivate and build upon an existing friendship, or perhaps even admiration, expressed by 
Louis XIV.  
Gregg freely admits that in his view Mary had “virtually no experience” in politics prior to 
her arrival in France in December 1688 and yet once there had, by the time Melfort 
returned from Ireland in September 1689, assumed “a central political role”. No 
explanation is proffered as to how such a change had taken place in such a relatively short 
space of time.333   
It seems possible however to understand this change and ascribe to the influence of 
Lauzun, who was able to advise her. He had the motivation to help her, the knowledge of 
the court, and access to Seignelay, who was on good terms with the dévôt circle, as 
previously noted, of Madame de Maintenon, Seignelay’s sisters, Fenelon and the Ducs de 
Beauvillier and Chevreuse.  
I believe that Lauzun actively guided her, giving insights into matters relating to the 
different people at the French court, the functioning of ministerial government and, 
crucially, whom to influence or gain the confidence of in order to further the cause of her 
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deposed husband. James would no doubt have been in charge of this prior to his departure 
to Ireland, but it is conceivable that Lauzun was able to inform them both. Moreover, once 
James had left, her role was more important and not less so. She clearly received 
correspondence from Ireland from James and more especially Tyrconnell, who wrote to her 
regularly enough with much news of the Irish situation and many a shopping list of what 
ammunition, monies, arms and clothes were needed there most urgently.  
From the observers and commentators in the French court and references in Tyrconnell’s 
writings, it seems possible to put forward the scenario of the probable information flow 
which requests from Ireland followed. Both James and Tyrconnell were writing to Mary of 
Modena at Saint Germain. Mary also had private audiences with Louis XIV, who came to 
see her at Saint Germain, and she transmitted the requests she had received to the French 
king. He then in turn passed on the information, but perhaps not the letters themselves, 
certainly to Louvois and others, perhaps to Seignelay too. Louvois’s clerks could then 
process the requests and organise the sending of supplies. This flow would explain the 
comments which appear in Tyrconnell’s letters to Mary of Modena, stating that the goods 
they received in Ireland “we owe certainly to your great prudence, and that great influence 
you of right have over that great King”.334 
The Queen would write to James and Tyrconnell in Ireland stating what had been agreed, 
or sometimes, what she thought had been agreed with Louis. For his part, James wrote to 
his queen and both Lauzun and Seignelay, these were sent directly from Ireland but not 
always via Saint Germain.335 Certainly Tyrconnell clearly thought that his correspondence 
with the queen was confidential and that what he said privately in correspondence was not 
shared. In early November 1689 he had echos from d’Avaux that his – Tyrconnells’views - 
were known in France - and was taken aback at this. “I confesse I do not well comprehend, 
especially it being sent to your Majesti alone and noe necessity to exposing it; for how 
should the Ministers there know what I had writt to your Majestie.”336 
This is a curious sentence and may well imply either that Mary of Modena was divulging 
things private to the Jacobite cause to the French, or that the cabinet noir of Louvois — 
famous for intercepting correspondence as it transited through the hands of the postal 
service, a service also directed by the war minister — was perhaps at work, intercepting 
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and reading messages sent to and from the Queen before relaying them onto their proper 
destination. It would have been logical for the French to do this type of verification as they 
strongly suspected the exiled court at Saint Germain had been infiltrated by English spies. 
In fact it was a point of tension between Saint Germain and Croissy among others that the 
French were reluctant to give passports to either supposed Jacobites coming from England 
or to real Jacobites returning to England on behalf of James II. The references to the 
meetings between Louis and Mary sometimes come from Louvois’s Irish correspondence, 
especially when the French learned of plans about which James had written to the Queen 
but which did not coincide with French strategic concerns.337 
Sa Majeste [Louis] a apris avec surprise par une lettre de Milord 
Tirconnel pour la Reyne d’Angleterre, que laditte Reyne luy a fait voir, 
qu’il croye que le Roy d’Angleterre doit passer incessamment en 
Angleterre et qu’il n’y a d’autre moyen pour restablir ses affaires. Sa 
Majeste n’est pas persuade qu’une pareille desmarche convienne.338 
This comment, along with others, would seem to cast doubt on Corp’s assertion that Louis 
XIV’s visits to Saint Germain to Mary of Modena while James II was on campaign in 
Ireland were just “courtesy visits”.339 While some probably were, many others were clearly 
of a practical, “business” nature, on the basis of consultation between allies. Furthermore, 
D’Avaux himself believed such conversations were taking place. In May 1689, he wrote to 
Louis complaining that the lack of organisation in the Jacobite forces in Ireland was such 
that all was lost unless the king spoke to Mary of Modena: 
Si Sa Majeste n’y met la main, et n’a la bonté de faire parler à la Reyne 
d’Angleterre d’une telle manière qu’elle oblige le Roy de la Grande 
Bretagne à mettre ordre à quelque chose, ou à souffrir qu’on le mette.340 
Another role Lauzun decided to give himself, possibly in agreement with Seignelay, was to 
avenge himself on Louvois and D’Avaux, both of whom had opposed his initial 
appointment to Ireland. By mid-1689, D’Avaux and Louvois seemed strongly in control of 
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the Irish campaign. Lauzun therefore, according to the quotation at the head of this chapter, 
set his sights on wresting this control from them and putting it into the hands of his ally 
and French patron, Seignelay. With the prospect of having to supply Ireland and fight the 
combined maritime strength of England and Holland, Seignelay must have felt that here 
was the stage upon which the Navy could achieve great and lasting glory, and achieve 
stability of financial resources into the future, regardless of what subjective opponents of 
the navy such as Louvois might whisper in the king’s ear. He knew he needed greater 
resources; the Irish theatre necessarily required seaborne assistance and supply. This in 
turn obviously put the navy into a greater position of importance than a purely land-based 
conflict on France’s borders would have. Whether Seignelay was privy to Lauzun’s 
intrigues I have not been able to discover. Suffice to say that it was likely that any fallout 
from a blow to Louvois’s prestige could only benefit the Navy and himself.  
The tactics Lauzun used to obtain his aims are those of a man who perhaps feels he has 
little time to use. His strategy was twofold: first, to have D’Avaux recalled to Ireland 
somehow by damaging his reputation as much as possible; and secondly, to persuade 
Louis, no doubt via proxy conversations through the ears and lips of Mary of Modena, to 
have Louvois rescind control over the Irish campaign by giving more influence to 
Seignelay.  
The main evidence for our knowledge of events here is admittedly from an interested party, 
or rather the injured party himself. From about June or July 1689, D’Avaux stated that in 
letters he received from friends in France he heard about ugly rumours circulating at court 
in Versailles about how he was mishandling the situation in Ireland. The friends told him 
who was spreading the slanders: Lauzun.  
Lauzun seems to have gone about his aim in a typically hardnosed fashion. As almost a 
professional courtier, he must have decided that the most effective way of advancing 
himself was perhaps to be sent to Ireland. He seems therefore to have decided to attack the 
conduct of the ambassador to Ireland and his handling of the situation there. This he seems 
to have done through spreading malicious gossip at court. As there are few historical 
records pertaining to this conduct, it is difficult to be certain, but the extant evidence points 
to this as a plausible scenario. That this type of scheming was an element of his character 
seems to have been quite widely known. James II’s natural son, the Duke of Berwick 
(1670–1734), who spent time on campaign with Lauzun in Ireland, said that he had a 
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malicious streak which made him a redoubtable foe: “He turned everything to ridicule, and 
wormed out the secrets of others and played upon their foibles.”341 
Lauzun, back at court in Versailles, made his Machiavellian allegations against D’Avaux 
and the rumour machine probably did the rest for him, by making ugly rumours uglier. 
From July 1689 onwards, D’Avaux’s friends wrote to him recounting what they were 
hearing, that Lauzun had in fact been bad-mouthing him at court by saying that it was his 
fault things in Ireland were not going well.342 Lauzun certainly had heard enough elements 
of the real story from Mary of Modena to make his allegations sound plausible. By early 
autumn, a clearly worried D’Avaux felt obliged to write to Louis stating that he was doing 
everything the king wanted and was advising James sensibly, but that Lauzun was “un 
homme qui me veut diffamer de gayete de coeur.”343 
Against this backdrop, other information was coming to the notice of Louis. At the end of 
July, ships of the Royal Navy broke the Foyle boom built by the men of the Chevalier de 
Pointis and had relieved the city. The Jacobite forces, badly depleted, withdrew in disarray, 
with Rosen doing his best to keep them in some sort of shape. James — probably tired of 
hearing too many home truths as regards his not organising the defence of Ireland against 
Schomberg’s forces, through either training troops or establishing adequate magazines — 
railed against both Rosen and D’Avaux in letters back to Mary of Modena, who in turn 
informed Louis. James II wrote to Lauzun in June 1689 asking for the recall of Rosen.344 
Tyrconnell bemoaned the battles of persuasion James’s queen was obliged to wage in order 
to get what was needed for her husband’s cause in Ireland and this in the face of what they 
perceived as opposition from Louvois. “As to the supplies which wee are to have … it is 
grievous to mee to see you exposed to fight battles against that powerfull man there 
[Louvois].”345 
By autumn 1689, the situation on the continent started to deteriorate for the French. From 
the Palatinate arrived news of the unexpected capture of Mainz by Imperial forces on 11 
                                                   
341
 J.H. Jesse, Memoirs of the Court of England During the Reign of the Stuarts (London, 
1857), p.320. 
342
 Symcox, Thesis, p.189. Symcox says Lauzun’s conduct regarding D’Avaux is that of a 
“shifty backstairs politician”. 
343
 Cited in Symcox, Thesis, p.196. D’Avaux to Croissy. 
344
 Another letter in James’s own hand, in French, preserved in NLI, Ms 41770, and dated 
16 May 1689 may be to Lauzun, but this has not been verified. James expresses the 
hope “that you could be at our side, so I will write something to the Queen”. 
345
 Tyrconnell to the Queen, 20 October 1689 (o.s.), Tate, Letter-book, p.101 
116 
 
September, with some 5,000 French troops taken prisoner. The city had been lost because 
the French defenders did not have enough gunpowder, and it was Louvois’s responsibility 
to oversee that fortifications had enough supplies. Louvois admitted in a letter to a 
subordinate that strategically it was a serious loss.346 Added to that came similar news of 
the fall of Bonn on 10 October.  
With these events, Louis perhaps thought that his colossus of a war minister suddenly had 
feet of clay. Moreover, in relation to Ireland, and prompted by James II and Mary of 
Modena, Louis XIV had letters sent to Rosen and D’Avaux saying that they were to be 
recalled to France. On 4 October, it was announced that Seignelay, secretary of the navy, 
was called to the Conseil d’En Haut and so was to be a minister. 
On 29 October it was announced that the king had decided to send 7,000 French troops to 
Ireland to assist James under the command of Lauzun. Louvois had not been told about it 
until the decision had been made by the king. It seems generally agreed among scholars 
that Louvois did not think that either James or Ireland were worth the bones of a French 
grenadier and, moreover, that France should be concerned only with defending its land 
borders, and concomitantly not “wasting” money on Seignelay’s navy. Tyrconnell, 
obviously apprehensive at the coming of Lauzun, summed up the situation in a letter to 
Mary of Modena: 
That he [Lauzun] is an enemy to monsieur de Louvois, and he not friend 
of his; for madam what can the king [James] expect from him of 
businesse (as the French say to me here) att a time when his enemy is 
desired soe earnestly to be employed here without a word being said to 
himselfe about it, and that the king of France could not refuse our king to 
send Monsieur de Lauzun when he desired it.347 
If Louvois thought he had been outmanoeuvred, he was not the only one. The reaction 
from D’Avaux was anger, but as he was the consummate servant of Louis XIV, there was 
no choice but to do as he was told. All he could do was to write a letter to Colbert de 
Croissy, the minister for foreign affairs, stating his fears. 
Le Roy me dit bien que M de Lausun [sic] alloit venire, j’apprehende que 
cela ne m’attire icy bien des affaires. Tous les François icy ont vescu 
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jusqu’icy dans une grande union. Je demande toujours l’honneur de 
vostre protection car je voie bien que j’en auray besoin.348 
Despite this news it took a long time for the decision to be implemented, for D’Avaux to 
leave and Lauzun to arrive. In fact this did not happen until April 1690. This was possibly 
due to the time needed for Lauzun to prepare himself and his troops, the lateness of the 
navigating season and the work needed to ready a fleet. One of the items which no doubt 
required careful consideration in France was what orders Lauzun should have for Ireland. 
Louis XIV’s instructions to Lauzun regarding the possible death of James II in 
Ireland 
Gregg, in an otherwise very informative essay suggests that there was no discussion in 
light of the first stroke James II suffered in 1701 about what to do regarding policy when 
he died: “Surprisingly there seems to be no evidence that the French government seriously 
considered what action, if any, it would take should James II die”.349 There is an indication 
though of Louis’s frame of mind in Franco-Irish correspondence from 1690. 
Admittedly, Gregg here is talking in relation to a possible French reaction to the June 1701 
Act of Settlement. During the Irish War of 1689–1691, James II, with French assistance, 
came in arms into Ireland, so it was possible James himself could become engaged in the 
fighting and be killed. It was therefore logical to plan for such an eventuality. That this 
planning did take place is evident when one considers written instructions given to Lauzun 
in February 1690 before his embarkation for Ireland. It is possible to conjecture that this 
situation had been overlooked by the French in March 1689 when James originally went to 
Ireland and was rectified only when news came from Ireland in autumn 1689 that James 
was with his army in the field and facing the Williamite force under Schomberg, with an 
engagement probable. It is equally possible to think similar instructions were given to 
d’Avaux and have not survived or were given verbally. 
When the French changed their senior commander in Ireland and were preparing for 
Lauzun’s departure in early 1690, this again came to the fore. The fact that it was contained 
in a separate letter from the rest of the instructions could be interpreted in a number of 
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different ways. The first is that the instruction was literally an afterthought when the 
previous orders had already been composed and formally written out by clerks. The more 
likely possibility is that they were deliberately put on separate sheets. This might be 
convenient in case others were required to see instructions regarding what Lauzun was set 
to do in Ireland, while what to do in case of James’s death was to be kept secret and shown 
only if it actually happened. 350 The letter, preserved in minute-copy form in the French 
army Archives at Vincennes, was printed as part of Mulloy’s Franco-Irish 
Correspondence.351 
Le Roy ayant observe que l’instruction qui a este dressee par son ordre  
pour le sieur comte de Lauzun ne fait point mention de ce que ledit sieur 
comte de Lauzun auroit a faire au cas que le Roy d’Angleterre vint a 
mourir, quoyque Sa Majeste espere que cela n’arrivera pas, elle a 
neantmoin juge a propos de luy faire scavoir qu’il devroit en ce cas faire 
tout ce qui pourroit despendre de luy pour faire proclamer Roy en Irlande 
M. le prince de Galles. 
This is prima facie a clear statement of policy as regards what to do if James II died while 
on campaign in Ireland. The idea of having such a policy was important in the sense that in 
war such eventualities were of course possible. It is equally plausible to consider that if 
James II died in Ireland, Louis almost certainly would not have stopped the Irish campaign 
due to its strategic use as a threat to William’s flank. It is clear from this it would have 
continued, officially in the name of ‘James III’ and de facto as a necessary distraction to 
William III. In the same way that James was not able to go to Scotland with forces while 
Derry was holding out against his forces, so William III could not conceivably move so 
many English troops to Flanders if a Jacobite army were still in Ireland. From a policy 
point of view, this instruction states that it came from the king himself and this is entirely 
consistent both with self-interest but also the influence of Queen Mary of Modena. It is 
widely held that she was much more active in France trying to maintain support for her 
husband James in Ireland than her contemporaries had expected, not least because she was 
also championing the cause of her own son.  
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What follows is also a statement of policy as regards Ireland and relates to both previous 
French political dalliances and the internal Jacobite politics of which Louis had become 
aware. The next piece of the instruction is a reference to what discussions and strategic 
possibilities had taken place in the past: 
et comme il se pourroit faire que les Irlandois tesmoigneroient de 
l’inclination a se soumettre plustost au Roy qu’audit Pince de Galles, par 
plusieurs raisons qu’il est inutile de reporter icy, l’intention de Sa 
Majeste est qu’en ce cas-la ledit sieur comte de Lauzun s’explique que le 
Roy, n’ayant eu d’autre but dans la depense considerable qu’il a faite 
pour soustenir l’Irlande, que de proteger un Roy son allie, contre 
l’usurpation injuste de son gendre, ne peut consentira depouiller son 
fils.352 
Even before the “Glorious Revolution”, there had been some political and diplomatic 
contacts between, on the one hand, Tyrconnell and James II as regards the future treatment 
of Irish Catholics and, on the other hand, between Tyrconnell and the French foreign 
minister Croissy, via Bonrepaus. These discussions were around what might be termed the 
“constitutional” status of Ireland and changes to this as regards being an integral part of the 
realm of the Three Kingdoms. The contact between James and Tyrconnell were, of course, 
normal and ongoing, and centred around the extent to which James was aware of and 
supported Tyrconnell’s pro-Catholic and pro-Old English policies and implementations.  
As at this point, in 1686–1687, James had no surviving legitimate son, it was expected that 
his Protestant daughter Mary and her Calvinist Dutch husband Prince William of Orange 
would come to the throne when James died. The subject of their discussions, according to 
John Miller in his well-known article353 was what protections could be implemented for 
Catholics in Ireland or what policies were available to safeguard Catholicism in the face of 
expected Protestant opposition and possible retrenchment under the heirs presumptive. One 
of the proposals Tyrconnell had put to James had been to grant some greater form of 
independence to Ireland when James died. Another possibility discussed was to choose an 
‘Irish’ successor at the moment of James’s death, for example the Catholic Duke of 
Berwick, and request French protection.354  
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To summarise, this instruction is a noteworthy indication of the state of mind of Louis XIV 
as regards James II in 1690. Going beyond strategic considerations, it underlines the 
emotional bond which existed between the French king, James II and Queen Mary of 
Modena, and her confidence that Louis would support her son, the Prince of Wales, in the 
event of James II’s death. 
Conclusion 
It is my contention that although Lauzun was a maverick character and had taken some 
foolhardy actions in the past, he knew how the French governmental and court system 
worked, or rather could be worked. His actions imply that there were alternative channels 
of influence and persuasion outside the ministers and royal councils. Seignelay’s family 
attachment to the religious wing at court and favour specifically from Madame de 
Maintenon and his opposition to Louvois, were key to Lauzun here. With the right 
alliances and allies, this influence was deployed to push for a desired result. It does not 
seem to me, however, that the influence would work were the king to be opposed to the 
change. If, as above, Louis had decided to change his representatives anyway, events had 
merely conspired to ease the way. It is clear, however, that if Lauzun was reckless and 
foolhardy in some instances, - and as the Irish campaign revealed not a very good 
commander - in others he could be Machiavellian and very effective.  
The last word can be left to the ghost-writing author of the Life of James the Second, who 
almost seems to have been inspired by the words of Madame de La Fayette. 
Her Majesty, not knowing but he [Lauzun] might be as great a General as 
he affected to apear, made choice of him for this expedition and perhaps 
with a view to doing an agreeable thing to Madame de Maintenon in 
whose good esteem he was at that time, tho' in a contrary intrest to the 
great Minister Monsr de Louvois who probably aprehending, that should 
he prove successful in this entreprize, it might rais his credit again with 
the King his Master (whose favorit he had formerly been).355 
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CHAPTER VI – CORRESPONDENCE AND INTELLIGENCE 
This last section examines the mechanics of the flow of information and its processing. It 
deals with three interrelated topics. First, it explores how the French sent, received and 
protected key information. Secondly, it looks at how the French and British treated 
intercepted correspondence. Finally, it considers how these strategies changed as the war 
progressed and the French sphere of influence in Ireland shrank. 
From an historiographical point of view aspects of the following works are relevant to the 
focus of this synthetic study. Soll gives a useful background to the development of the 
French secret service system which was developed under Jean Baptiste Colbert. From 
Burger’s work on Renaudot it seems that overall responsibility for gathering intelligence, 
certainly in relation to assisting the Jacobites, stayed under the Secretary for the Navy, 
namely Colbert de Seignelay who died in 1690 and then Pontchartrain, beyond my scope. 
Nonetheless there was certainly intelligence gathering carried out under the auspices of 
other ministries, witness the intelligence reports which are in the French diplomatic 
archives. For a British back ground to this area I have used Marshall and to a lesser extent 
Hopkins.356 
 
Interception of Williamite/English correspondence 
Interception of Williamite correspondence by Jacobites in the course of the war in Ireland, 
or vice versa, mainly depended on either sheer luck or local intelligence — or a bit of both. 
These elements are possibly the reasons why treatment of this subject by scholars writing 
on Ireland is patchy. Both Simms and Childs mention incidences of letters being 
intercepted by each side. Apart from this, it is difficult to gain any real idea of how 
organised any interception might have been. Gravel, in his letter to Louvois, mentions 
strategic correspondence being intercepted by Jacobites.357 Sarsfield, as a popular figure 
for Catholic Ireland, seems to have been able to gather local information from locals. One 
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specific example is the intelligence he obtained leading to his successful Ballyneety raid on 
William III’s artillery train at the time of the first siege of Limerick.358 Although Jacobite 
militia raiders known as “rapparees” sometimes captured enemy messengers, as the 
Williamites gradually strengthened their hold over the island, this means of intelligence 
acquisition must have become more difficult. Indeed, it would have become more likely 
that Jacobite letters would fall into hostile hands. The Williamites were probably better 
organised from an infrastructural point of view and so able to avail of the postal service, 
such as it might have been in time of war. The use of couriers seems more likely. 
As the Royal Navy expanded its sphere of activities, the situation at sea gradually turned 
against the French and Jacobites. It was more likely in later 1690 and much of 1691 that 
French ships carrying Jacobite correspondence would be intercepted. As the war 
deteriorated from their point of view the French clearly wanted to use ports more out of 
reach from the Royal Navy. It is perhaps in this light that their surveying and mapping of 
the coastline near Limerick and Galway could be reviewed. That said, the French were 
clearly conscious of the importance of intercepting ships and capturing mail themselves. 
Although beyond the scope of this paper, a French royal ordinance of 16 December 1692 
awarded prize money to naval captains who handed over mail trunks or letters found 
aboard captured vessels.359 
The interception of French correspondence 
From a purely practical point of view, the desire to know an enemy’s views, plans and 
strengths pushes the combatant powers to engage in intelligence-gathering activities. In 
time of war, officially accredited ambassadors and their attendant “information-gatherers” 
were often sent home from hostile powers, obliging countries to find other sources. 
Regularly these sources took the form of spies, sometimes disguised as merchants, sending 
written correspondence. Their enemies knew this and responded by trying to tap into an 
enemy’s information channels. This could be done by capturing either messengers or ships 
carrying messages, perhaps furnishing decisive information for the progress of a campaign.  
From the start of the Irish War, the Jacobites were in regular communication with the 
French and their own contacts in England, Scotland and beyond. James knew he needed 
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communication channels to be open between Ireland and Britain so as to send and received 
intelligence so he resisted as much as possible French requests for him to grant privateer 
commissions against English ships. He only relented on this point in 1690 when it was 
irrelevant due to the state of war which had existed between France and England since 
1689. The French also tried to counterbalance this loss of Jacobite intelligence by 
promising to send to James, via d’Avaux, and later Lauzun, any sensitive information 
acquired by their own agents abroad. An example of this related to English naval activity. 
A French agent in England, “Mr. Parent”, confirmed in a coded letter sent from England 
that William III had issued orders to stop ships travelling between Ireland and Scotland and 
had ordered Royal Navy ships to the Irish Sea to enforce it.360 
At the same time, the French were themselves keeping up a constant stream of 
correspondence, ranging from purely military matters between army administrators to 
diplomatic efforts being waged by the Comte D’Avaux. These were put aboard the 
warships and supply vessels that crisscrossed the seas between France and Ireland on a 
fairly regular basis between March 1689 and October 1691. In early 1690 it was normally 
every 15 days that French ships travelled with letters.361 
It was crucial to both sides in the war, between Jacobites and French on the one hand, and 
the new Williamite regime on the other, to gain intelligence of the other side’s designs and 
projects. It is evident from perusal of Nottingham’s correspondence that he played a key 
role in supervising both the acquisition and analysis of intelligence and captured enemy 
correspondence. This covered both trying to trace and intercept enemy messages, either 
domestic or foreign, and also to some extent (although not within the purview of this 
paper) assisting in secret service actions carried out by the new regime in Britain and 
elsewhere. It also involved seizure of messages en route by capture at sea. This method of 
seizing letters was highly dependent on the English (or sometimes Dutch) being lucky 
enough to, first, have vessels encounter French ships and, secondly, for those to be strong 
enough to take the enemy ship, and not be taken themselves by a larger French man-of-
war.  
Securing French communications to and from Ireland 
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The French, for their part, tried to ensure some security for their correspondence in a 
number of ways. The first was for the sender of a letter to send a number of copies of it, 
generally in triplicate, as clearly the more copies sent, the bigger the likelihood that the 
addressee would get at least one of them. The Marquis de Louvois, as French war minister 
under Louis XIV, instructed his correspondents in Ireland to mark the packets, A, B and C 
and to send them via different ships and sometimes different messengers. In this way, he 
would know how long the letters were taking to reach him and whether some never arrived 
or consistently arrived late. This could prompt investigations as to why some channels 
were reliable and others perhaps were subject to interference. 
Another precaution was to ensure regularity of deliveries. In February 1690 Louvois told 
Lauzun that Louis had ordered packet ships to go to Ireland every 15 days from Brest. So 
that this would not take up too many ships, those in Ireland should stay for 15 days and 
then return, not waiting for letters, so as to avoid having all the ships either in France or in 
Ireland. Lauzun was advised to tell this to James II, to ensure there were always letters 
going between Ireland and France and always ships available to carry it.362  
Lastly came the security of having letters encoded. The main three French government 
secretariats involved to some extent in the war in Ireland, namely war, the navy and foreign 
affairs, all had standing instructions to encode sensitive data using the numeric codes that 
were available at the time. Interestingly all three areas used different codes. These were 
given to those officials travelling to Ireland so as to be able to write back to their respective 
masters in confidence.  
Correspondence and concealment 
Turning away briefly from correspondence directly received, it is worth considering those 
letters received from informants and agents abroad. For the French these were both 
Jacobites in Britain gathering information on behalf of the exiled court at St Germain, or 
indeed their own agents sent to spy. 
For such an agent in hostile territory the most common way to put off unwanted interest in 
the letters was to make them inconspicuous in their destination. Both sides, French and 
Jacobites on one, and British on the other, used the concept of multiple addresses. This 
consisted of posting a letter under separate covers via successive merchants, either directly 
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in the employ of a power, or sometime bona fide businessmen acting as casual informants. 
Thus a letter might transit via a number of addresses before it reached its final destination. 
Addresses used were often in trade hubs such as the Netherlands. 
An example of the practical side of this activity is given in the French diplomatic archives. 
In a letter to the French foreign minister, Colbert de Croissy, the secretary of Louis XIV’s 
cabinet office, Jean Talon requested that Croissy send him a list of the fake names and 
addresses under which agents in England and elsewhere sent their news to France. Once he 
was informed of this he stated he would send one of his employees to the post office when 
deliveries arrived to collect any letters so addressed.363 
While Soll underlines Jean Baptiste Colbert’s control of the overall intelligence gathering 
apparatus, it seems that after his death no other minister gained such pre-eminence. For 
Burger, Colbert de Croissy seems to have been the successor as regards gathering 
intelligence in the 1690s though his was not a monopoly. Each secretariat had their own 
agents and carried out information gathering activities according to its needs. This division 
is reflected in the number of actors in Ireland sending news back to their respective 
hierarchies. 
Given that the Jacobites and French did not control all the island of Ireland, however, there 
was a risk in messengers travelling overland before they got to a seaport where a French 
ship might be docked. It was in this way that a first breakthrough for the English 
authorities came in late June 1689, when Williamite Ulster militia apprehended a courier 
being sent to Dublin from the French naval artillery officer, Bernard-Louis de Saint Jean, 
Baron de Pointis who was posted at Londonderry.364 The letters were forwarded to 
Nottingham for examination. Realising their possible significance and that they were in 
code, he had his staff send them to Dr John Wallis.  
It was of the essence to view any correspondence or question any agents as might be 
intercepted as quickly as possible. The messages that came into British hands by whatever 
means were routinely sent to Nottingham’s office in his role as secretary of state in 
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England. For Jacobites in Britain, their letters transited through the post offices and so 
risked being stopped and examined by specially appointed officers there.  
For the French correspondence, the likelihood of intercepting courier vessels out at sea, or 
indeed of capturing messengers on land, was largely a question of chance. Nottingham, 
however, tried to establish a rule that any packets or letters found on enemy vessels should 
be sent to him. An example of this is his letter to the mayor and aldermen of Weymouth 
from August 1690, clearly requesting that any letters found on board French vessels should 
be sent, unopened, to the secretary of state’s offices at Whitehall.365 
Even when discovered, stopped letters were quite often found to have been encoded. In this 
case, Nottingham relied greatly upon the services of Dr Wallis (1616–1703). He had been 
professor of mathematics at Oxford since 1633 and was quite elderly by this period. He had 
gained quite some experience in decoding secret messages under successive English 
governments, from Cromwell transferring seamlessly to Charles II and then William III. 
His job was to examine the letters sent to him and try to send back whatever he discovered 
to the secretary of state’s offices. The process of decoding and the subsequent acting on 
information revealed were matters considered of utmost importance and were treated at the 
very highest levels of government of the new regime. Nottingham discussed recently 
deciphered correspondence with King William, who on more than one occasion had a 
financial bonus sent to Dr Wallis for services rendered.366 How exactly all the letters came 
into Nottingham’s hands is not always specified but obviously Wallis was not required to 
know that. 
Wallis set to work on the numerical codes over the next weeks and was at first 
apprehensive of his ability to decode them. By 1 August (o.s.), he had succeeded in 
breaking the code and, no doubt relieved, sent Nottingham a final transcript, stating that “I 
have met with better success than at first I could promise your lordship or myself and with 
more expedition than I could hope for.” Nottingham in turn updated Schomberg and then 
wrote to the king with the news Wallis had discovered. The letters revealed that Pointis had 
been in command of an artillery battery based at Culmore Fort above Derry and had been 
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wounded in action. It further revealed that he was the architect of the boom across the 
River Foyle, which had frustrated Royal Navy efforts to break the siege of Derry. 
Writing to Seignelay, Pointis firstly described the boom he had designed, how it was 
constructed and where it was. Secondly, he complained bitterly to the minister about lack 
of ammunition for his cannon. He details how, when requested cannon balls and fuses were 
delivered to the French gunners before Derry, they discovered that only 120 out of the 500 
requested had been sent, that the shot was mostly the wrong size for the guns they had, and 
that the fuses were almost unusable. Pointis clearly believed this was done deliberately, as 
he had requested those in charge of ordinance in Dublin to test the shot and fuses.367 This 
sensitive information was transmitted by the Secretary of State to King William in a note 
dated 2 August (o.s.). “The enclosed is Mr Pointis’ letter to Monsieur Saigneley [sic] 
unciphered by Dr Wallis by which your Majesty will see how easily Londonderry might 
have been relieved.”368 
By the time this data became available, however, news had reached William via 
Schomberg that Derry had in fact been relieved by ships from Kirk’s squadron. Even if in 
the event the information decoded from the letter did not prove as timely as it might have 
been, the episode proved once again Dr Wallis’s usefulness to the new regime. If they were 
fortunate enough to intercept more French correspondence, this must have increased the 
confidence of the British government in their efforts to gain strategic advantage over their 
opponents. 
The arrival of William III and his forces in Ireland in June 1690 and their military success 
at the Boyne, severely curtailed Jacobite lines of communication within Ireland. The 
subsequent capture of Kinsale and Cork also restricted the ports from which they could 
operate. Thus, for both supplies and information from France, they were increasingly 
restricted to those on the Western seaboard, Limerick and Galway, as farthest from the 
lengthening reach of the Royal Navy. By mid-1690, more active Williamite marine and 
terrestrial forces made it more likely that Jacobite and French messages and intelligence 
would be intercepted. 
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In the aftermath of the Boyne and the general disarray of the Jacobite forces’ retreat from 
Dublin, the Williamite forces came upon some correspondence at the lodgings of the 
Marquis d’Albeville, Ignatius White, an advisor to James II. 
A great heap of letters has been taken in the lodgings of the marquess 
Albeville, who fled on Wednesday to Kilkenny. The letters are yet 
unopened to Count Lozune, etc but one from James Porter sets forth how 
30 French ships were dispatched up the Channel to do us mischief. The 
wind happens now to be extreamly in their favour, soe as his Majestie is 
full of apprehensions therein.369 
This is an example of the double-edge in discovering enemy intelligence. While the 
seizuire of the letters was a boost for the Williamites the news that French ships were on 
their way into the Channel was clearly worrying for new king William and may have been 
an extra factor in prompting his return to England. From his point of view it was more 
important not to be blockaded in Ireland so he resigned himself to leaving Limerick in 
Jacobite hands, which prolonged the Irish war by another season. 
Also discovered were “severall French pacquets newly received… And therein found 
letters from Monsieur de Louvois which by His Majesty’s commande I here inclose, in 
hopes Dr Wallis may expound what mysterys may lye therein.”370 Southwell, as secretary 
to King William, sent these to Nottingham in a letter dated 9 July (o.s.) written from their 
camp on the outskirts of Dublin. The letters were dispatched by Nottingham to Dr Wallis at 
Oxford requesting he examine them, beginning with those of the freshest date. 
I send you herewith some letters from Monsieur Louvoy to Mons 
Lauzune which I desire you will decipher as soon as possible you can, 
they seeming to contain matters of great importance for their Majesties 
Service.371 
The importance and possible urgency of the letters had been clear to all, King William, 
Southwell and the secretary of state included. If the Battle of the Boyne had secured 
Ireland’s east coast, the French naval victory of Beachy Head had seriously damaged the 
ability of the Royal Navy to defend Britain’s shores. Not only was there a fear of the 
French landing in England, but also clear news that a small French force would enter St 
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George’s Channel and thereby cut off William from England at a time when fears of 
invasion were at their height. In light of the urgency at this time, Nottingham advised 
Wallis that he would pay for messengers Wallis needed to bring to him any decoded 
messages, and to work tirelessly on them, sending them as and when they were done. 
One of the letters contained there was from Seignelay to Lauzun and, like Pointis, Wallis 
was able to decipher it within a few days, albeit not without some trouble. This is perhaps 
through having gained some inside knowledge of the codes and how they were used from 
Pointis’s correspondence, as previously mentioned. This related to news of considerable 
import to the English authorities, as it confirmed what they had found out from other 
sources. This he sends back on 17 July (o.s.), but with the proviso that he has not advanced 
regarding the others. 
The rest are all from Mr Louvois and I am the more diffident of them, 
having never yet mastered any of his cipher. I suspect somewhat of 
particular in his way of ciphering, which I have not yet had the good hope 
to light upon.372 
Wallis continued in his efforts at understanding the codes used by the French war minister 
but to no avail, and so informed Nottingham of the outcome in a letter 22 July, no doubt 
much to Nottingham’s disappointment. Perhaps Wallis himself regarded the work 
primarily as a mathematical challenge, but in such a period of political upheaval and 
threats posed by war and an ever present fear of Jacobism, political naivety was dangerous, 
and Wallis may have felt vulnerable. He therefore took the opportunity to underline that 
this lack of success was not for want of trying. Regretting his inability to solve the cipher 
he pleaded that “your Lordship may not impute the failure to want of diligence, or want of 
due devotion to their Majesties’ service.” Doubtless echoing Nottingham’s own concerns, 
Wallis suggested in a postscript that Williamite forces should search for cipher keys 
“among other things of Mons. De Lauzun seized in Ireland.” 
Despite this setback, the Oxford mathematician continued his efforts on behalf of the 
English authorities and decoded many other captured messages, between both French and 
Jacobite correspondents. So much work did he do that by December 1690 he felt he had to 
write to Nottingham to complain of the strain he was under. Not only had he not done any 
of his own personal work in the previous six months, but his health was suffering as a 
result.  
                                                   
372
 Wallis, BL 32499, f.242. (on microfilm at NLI Dublin). 
130 
 
I am very ready to serve his Majesty the best I can, gratis, and to lay 
down all my own affairs, as I have done this half year, to attend this 
service, but I have been indisposed as to my health all this winter, my 
eyesight fails me so that I must be forced to quit this service.373 
From the evidence of Wallis’s work and the other letters contained in Nottingham’s papers, 
the main difference between the French and Jacobite letters was that the Jacobites largely 
used non-numeric codes. Other methods of concealment were employed, such as 
displacing letters of the alphabet. This had the advantage of being easier to commit to 
memory than numbers and thus left less of a paper trail, as evidently being arrested and 
found in possession of cipher keys would be compromising.  
The Jacobite agents also used letters written in lemon juice, with the recipient required to 
hold a sheet to some source of heat to make the words reappear.374 An alternative was 
writing in milk, where the reader needed to scatter ashes on the pages in order to read 
them.375 Sometimes a number of these secrets would be used simultaneously, so that a 
regular letter also had secret writing, thus requiring the recipient to first uncover the letters 
and literally read between the lines. These would be in addition to the obvious masking of 
names of key individuals. For example, in some captured Jacobite correspondence Louis 
XIV is denoted by Mr. Browne while King James is down as Mr. Codrington.  
That all these ruses were known to the secretary of state’s officers is clear by the fact that 
samples appear transcribed in Nottingham’s papers on a fairly regular basis over 1689–
1691. Regarding alpha codes, Dr Wallis even drew up a table of letter displacements to 
assist the secretary’s staff in themselves examining any correspondence deemed 
suspicious. A the end of his life, Wallis commented on his decoding work and its 
difficulties, stating proudly how successful he had been in this, but added that the later 
French ciphers were so complicated that he had not been able to decrypt all of them. 
I afterwards ventured on many others, some of more, some of less 
difficulty, and scarce missed of any, that I undertook for many years, 
during our civil wars, and afterwards. But of late years the French 
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methods of cipher are grown so intricate beyond what it was wont to be 
that I failed of many, tho' I have master'd divers of them.376 
It is possible here to advance the theory that the intricate code techniques used by Louvois 
may have been examples of the Grand Chiffre or Great Cipher developed in France by the 
Rossignol family, both Antoine (1600–1682) and his son Bonaventure, who continued his 
father’s works.It is interesting that Strasser, writing on Renaissance and later codes, states 
that the Rossignols were mathematicians “almost equivalent to England’s Dr John Wallis”. 
, Given Wallis’s own words, that he was not able to crack codes used by Louvois -  akin to 
the Great Cipher  - Strasser’s comments seem inaccurate. Strasser himself says that the 
Great Cipher was not decrypted until the 1890s by a coding expert at the French ministry 
for foreign affairs.377 
The English post office and the security of the realm 
In time of war, suspicions of Jacobite spies and agents were widespread, and those linked 
to the postal service were potentially extremely damaging to regime interests. In this age, 
the postal service was at the centre of the Stuart intelligence network. As so much 
communication at the time went via the mail, the post office it was of considerable 
strategic importance.378 The English State’s secret service working on behalf of the Charles 
II had in the 1660s an office at the London general post office expressly for the purpose of 
checking the mail. They employed a number of people who had the job of opening any 
suspicious letters, copying the contents and resealing them without it being possibly to 
detect any tampering. 
In June 1689, a former employee of the post office, Sir Samuel Morland, wrote a letter to 
Charles Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury, requesting assistance in gaining a pension. He told of 
his work for the Restoration government relating to the “secrets for opening letters and 
sealing them again, for ciphers and for falsifying seals”.379 He offered the new 
administration the chance of learning them. Morland went on to say that it was common at 
that time for foreign diplomats to deliberately send their packets into the post office in 
London at the last minutes before the mail was taken away. This was to minimise the time 
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government clerks who were employed to examine letters would have to check the details 
of sender, recipient and, if time permitted, contents.  
For the authorities, this was a key activity in order to try to intercept letters from those 
identified as French agents, as evidenced in the Finch manuscripts concerning captured 
Jacobite correspondence. There, opponents of the regime — some of whom specifically 
were working for the French and some French themselves — revealed the tools of the 
trade, including writing in invisible ink for hiding messages or again using multiple 
addresses generally via merchants based in different continental cities. That letters were 
captured was not surprising, but many clearly did get through, as evidenced in their 
survival in French records.380 In November 1690, Nottingham had received news that other 
letters destined for Tyrconnell and Louvois had been taken from a small ship out of 
Limerick and bound for France. As some of these letters had already been opened by the 
time Nottingham received them, he felt obliged to enquire further as to the details of the 
taking of the messages.  
I desire you will let me know whether they were opened when delivered 
to you, or sealed by you before sending them, so that I may know 
whether the postmasters on the road have played any tricks with the 
letters.381 
The risk that Jacobite adherents could infiltrate the postal service and thereby either 
miscarry government letters or facilitate treasonous correspondence was certainly taken 
seriously. In February 1691, Queen Mary herself, on receiving a report that a post office 
employee in Bagshot was known to be a “papist”, specifically ordered that he be dismissed 
immediately.382 
Another case is that of a certain Mr Sweetings. An anonymous tip-off letter sent to Hans 
Willem van Bentinck, Earl of Portland, was forwarded to Nottingham in May 1690. The 
letter states that “in the London post office there is a clerk named Sweetings who is in the 
pay of France and of the London papists, and manages their packages to and from France 
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by way of Holland.”383 The evidence for this was that letters destined for the English 
ambassador at Vienna, a Mr Paget, were refused by this clerk as they had been brought in 
too late in the day, while packages arriving later, brought in by a “French papist”, had been 
accepted for expedition that day. Whether these charges were true or the information was 
motivated by malice, it nonetheless underlines that the Williamites rightly believed the 
managing of letters was of paramount importance and applied resources accordingly.  
Conclusion  
The aim here was to examine ways in which information was appropriated, concealed and 
circulated in the war fought by the French and their Jacobite allies in Ireland. In a wider 
context, light was shed on how the new regime in Britain tried to intercept correspondence 
and understand its content. For letter correspondence, it is clear the French took 
considerable pains to ensure theirs were transported as regularly and securely as the 
available means allowed. Although some letters were intercepted, as evidenced from the 
Finch papers, this would seem the exception, and that the great majority of French 
correspondence was successfully sent and received.  
Mathematician Dr John Wallis greatly aided the Williamite regime in deciphering some of 
the letters that they captured. It is, however, testament to the skill of the French 
cryptographers of the period that whatever different coding techniques were used by the 
French war department, their letters remained a mystery to Wallis, one of the foremost 
cipher experts of his time. Although the information war was as closely fought as other 
areas, ultimately it was not decisive. Military and naval matters decided the outcome of the 
conflict. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Traditionally French support for the Jacobite war effort in Ireland in the years 1689-1691 
has been examined in Irish historiography largely in terms of military assistance. A small 
number of works have taken a different view and considered the interaction between the 
two groups by looking at French and Irish sources and scholarship in tandem and have 
come up with new questions and fields of study.  
 
This synthetic model is the one adopted here and applied to the concept of information as it 
related to French support for Jacobite Ireland. Through themes and individuals the 
importance of information, its acquisition, concealment and transmission is shown in the 
context of the changing French assessments of the Irish theatre. The information 
considered related to the areas of propaganda, diplomacy, court gossip, strategy and 
cryptography. Both thematic areas like propaganda and intelligence through 
correspondence were examined.  French individuals, exemplary in the appropriation and 
exploitation of information were examined and their contributions weighed. 
 
The study shows that the French went to considerable pains both to stay informed about the 
evolving situation in Jacobite Ireland and secure their channels of communication there. 
The efforts of the Williamite regime to disrupt and intercept that flow of information, both 
in a propaganda setting and regarding correspondence in an Irish and a Three Kingdom 
context is also outlined.  
 
What emerges underlines the view that French support for James II was subject to internal 
French discussion and brokerage of influence. The study validates  information as a 
framework of enquiry to better understand French interaction with Jacobites in Ireland, but 
is also applicable in a wider context, that of the use of intelligence in the conflict between 
France and the new Williamite regime in the Three Kingdoms in the early period of the 
Nine Years War. 
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